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Page 1 of7 Case: CV-PC-2005-21649 Current Judge: Thomas F. Neville 
Erick Virgil Hall, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Erick Virgil Hall. Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User Judge 
3/1/2005 NEWC CCBLACJE New Case Filed Thomas F. Neville 
CCBLACJE Post Conviction Relief Filing Thomas F. Neville 
3/2/2005 CERT CCBLACJE Certificate Of Mailing Thomas F. Neville 
3/25/2005 RSPS CCMONGKJ St Rsps To Post Conv Relf,st Motn To Dismiss Thomas F. Neville 
4/13/2005 RSPS CCRIVEDA Response To States Response To Post Conv Thomas F. Neville 
Relf 
9/7/2005 MOTN CCMARTLG Motion For Petnr Access Grand Jury Transcrpts Thomas F. Neville 
HRSC CCMARTLG Hearing Scheduled - Motn Accss Trns Thomas F. Neville 
(10103/2005) Thomas Neville 
1013/2005 HRHD DCELLlSJ Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Thomas F. Neville 
10/03/200501:30 PM: Hearing Held Motn 
Accss Trns 
10/31/2005 STIP CCGROSPS Stip For Release Of Jury Quest. & Add To The Thomas F. Neville 
MISC CCGROSPS Reporters Transcript Thomas F. Neville 
11/15/2005 ORDR DCELLlSJ Order Allowing Petitioner Access To & Poss Thomas F. Neville 
CONT DCELLlSJ Of G/j Transcripts SUb. To Conditions Thomas F. Neville 
ORDR DCELLlSJ Order For Preparation Add'l Transcripts Thomas F. Neville 
1/5/2006 MEMO CCTHIEBJ Memorandum Of Law In Support Of Motion Thomas F. Neville 
MOTN CCTHIEBJ Motion For Discovery Thomas F. Neville 
1/19/2006 OBJT CCCHILER State's Objection to the Motion for Discovery Thomas F. Neville 
1/20/2006 MOTN DCELLlSJ Motion To Reconsider oral orders re: ex parte Thomas F. Neville 
procedures for expert access and strictions on 
juror contact 
MEMO DCELLlSJ Memorandum In support of Motion to Reconsider Thomas F. Neville 
1/24/2006 MOTN DCELLlSJ Motion For the Court to adopt petitioner's Thomas F. Neville 
proposed scheduling order 
2/8/2006 HRSC DCELlISJ Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/15/2006 02:00 Thomas F. Neville 
PM) 
NOTC DCELLlSJ Notice of hearing on Motion to Reconsider Thomas F. Neville 
2/15/2006 HRHD DCELLlSJ Hearing result for Motion held on 02/15/2006 Thomas F. Neville 
02:00 PM: Hearing Held 
3/1/2006 LODG CCMARTLG Lodged State's Memo in Support of the State's Thomas F. Neville 
Objection to the Motn for Discovery 
3/16/2006 MOTN CCTHIEBJ Ex Parte Motion For Expert Access To Petitioner Thomas F. Neville 
3/28/2006 MOTN CCMARTLG State's Motion in Limine to Preclude Depositions Thomas F. Neville 
Without Court Order 
NOTH CCMARTLG Notice Of Hearing Motn in Limine to Preclude Thomas F. Neville 
Depositions Without Court Order (6-23-06 @ 9 
am) 
HRSC CCMARTLG Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/23/2006 09:00 Thomas F. Neville 
AM) State's Motn in Limine to Preclude 
Depositions Without Court Order 
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Case: CV-PC-2005-21649 Current Judge: Thomas F. Neville 
Erick Virgil Hall, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
User: CCTHIEBJ 
Erick Virgil Hall, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User Judge 
3/31/2006 MOTN CCMARTLG Motion for Issuance of Subpoenas for Depositions Thomas F. Neville 
and Subpoenas Duces Tecum for Production of 
Documents 
4/17/2006 AMEN CCMARTLG Amended Petn for Post-Conviction Relief Thomas F. Neville 
5/15/2006 DCELLlSJ Notice Of Amended Hearing for all motions Thomas F. Neville 
currently set for June 23, 2006 
5/24/2006 AMEN DCELLlSJ Addendum to Amended Petition for Thomas F. Neville 
Post-Conviction Relief 
5/31/2006 RSPS CCMARTLG State's Response to the Amended Petn for Post Thomas F. Neville 
Conviction Relief and State's Motn to Dismiss 
6/2/2006 MOTN DCELLlSJ Motion To suspend post-conviction proceedings Thomas F. Neville 
MISC DCELLlSJ Second Addendum to Amended Petition for Thomas F. Neville 
post-conviction relief 
MOTN DCELLlSJ Renewed motion for access to completed Thomas F. Neville 
questionnaires 
NOTC DCELLlSJ Notice Of Hearing, June 20, 2006 @ 1 :30 p.m. Thomas F. Neville 
6/7/2006 MOTN CCMARTLG Motion for Order to Conduct Medical Testing and Thomas F. Neville 
Order for Transport 
NOTH CCMARTLG Notice Of Hearing Motn Order to Conduct Medical Thomas F. Neville 
Testing and Order for Transport (6-20-06 @ 1 :30 
pm) 
6/12/2006 NOTC CCMARTLG Notice of Filing of Correction to Affd of Dr James Thomas F. Neville 
Merikangas MD 
6/14/2006 MOTN CCMARTLG State's Motion for the Production of Documents Thomas F. Neville 
and for Ordr Waiving the Atty-Client Privilege 
NOTH CCMARTLG Notice Of Hearing State's Motn to Dismiss and Thomas F. Neville 
Motn for Production of Documents (6-20-06 @ 
1:30 pm) 
MOTN DCELLlSJ Motion To Disqualify Thomas F. Neville 
AFFD DCELLlSJ Affidavit Of Mark J. Ackley In support of Motion Thomas F. Neville 
to Disqualify 
MEMO DCELLlSJ Memorandum In support of Motion to Disqaulify Thomas F. Neville 
NOTC DCELLlSJ Notice Of Hearing June 20, 2006 @ 1 :30 p.m. Thomas F. Neville 
6/20/2006 HRHD DCELLlSJ Hearing result for Motion held on 06/20/2006 Thomas F. Neville 
01:30 PM: Hearing Held State's Motn in Limine 
to Preclude Depositions Without Court Order 
State's Motn to Dismiss and Motn for Production 
of Documents 
6/2212006 OBJT CCSHAPML State's Objection to the Petitioner's Motion to Thomas F. Neville 
Disqualify the Court 
NOTC CCSHAPML Notice of Hearing (7/5/06 @ 9:00AM) Thomas F. Neville 
HRSC CCSHAPML Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Thomas F. Neville 
07105/200609:00 AM) 
5/2712006 AMEN CCWOODCL Amended State's Motion For The Production Of Thomas F. Neville 
Documents and For Order Waiving Attorney 
OO()()!l Client Privilege 
Date: 1/22/2009 Judicial District Court - Ada Cou User: CCTHIEBJ 
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Erick Virgil Hall, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Erick Virgil Hall, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User Judge 
6/27/2006 NOTH CCWOODCL Notice Of Hearing (07/0S/06 @ 9 am) Thomas F. Neville 
6/30/2006 MISC DCANDEML 3rd Addendum to Amended Petition Thomas F. Neville 
NOTC DCANDEML Notice of Hearing (7/S @9 a.m.) Thomas F. Neville 
7/S/2006 HRHD DCELLlSJ Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Thomas F. Neville 
07/0S/2006 09:00 AM: Hearing Held 
HRSC DCELLlSJ Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Thomas F. Neville 
09/27/200609:00 AM) 
7/6/2006 ORDR DCELLlSJ Order Granting Access to Completed jury Thomas F. Neville 
questionnaires 
7/11/2006 ORDR DCELLlSJ Order Denying Motion to Disqualify NUNC PRO Thomas F. Neville 
TUNC 
ORDR DCELLlSJ Order Denying the Motion to Suspend post Thomas F. Neville 
conviction proceedings 
ORDR DCELLlSJ Order Denying Petitioner's Motion to Transport for Thomas F. Neville 
Medical Testing 
ORDR DCELLlSJ Order Waiving Attorney-Client Privilege And Thomas F. Neville 
Granting State's Access To Documents 
7/19/2006 ORDR DCELLlSJ Order Granting In Part, And Denying in Part, Thomas F. Neville 
Petitioner's Motion for Issuance of Subpoenas 
For Depositions and Subpoenas Duces Tecum 
For Production of Documents 
MOTN DCELLlSJ Motion For Permission To Appeal The Denial of Thomas F. Neville 
Petitioner's Motion to Disqualify 
8/24/2006 AFOS CCMAXWSL Affidavit Of Service 8-24-2006 Thomas F. Neville 
AFOS CCMAXWSL Affidavit Of Service 8-24-2006 Thomas F. Neville 
9/11/2006 MISC DCANDEML Partial Agreement on Discovery Thomas F. Neville 
9/26/2006 HRVC DCELLlSJ Hearing result for Motion to Compel held on Thomas F. Neville 
09/27/200609:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
12/6/2006 MOTN DCELLlSJ Ex Parte Motion for Expert Access to Petitioner Thomas F. Neville 
AFFD DCELLlSJ Affidavit Of Paula M. Swensen in Support of Ex Thomas F. Neville 
Parte Motion For Expert Access to Petitioner 
12/21/2006 HRSC DCELLlSJ Hearing Scheduled (Post Conviction Relief Thomas F. Neville 
01/04/200709:00 AM) 
12/29/2006 MISC CCHEATJL Supplemental Memorandum In Support Of Motion Thomas F. Neville 
For Discovery 
1/8/2007 MISC DCELLlSJ Fourth Addendum to Amended Petition for Thomas F. Neville 
Post-Conviction Relief 
NOTC DCELLlSJ Notice Of Filing of Index of Exhibits to Amended Thomas F. Neville 
Petition For Post Conviction Relief 
NOTC DCELLlSJ Notice Of Filing of Table of Contents to Amended Thomas F. Neville 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
1/10/2007 CONT DCELLlSJ Hearing result for Post Conviction Relief held on Thomas F. Neville 
01/10/200701 :30 PM: Continued 
1/11/2007 CONT DCELLlSJ Post conviction hearing, cont'd to 01/12/2007 @ Thomas F. Neville 
9:30 a.m. f\()OOt::: 
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Page 4 of7 Case: CV-PC-2005-21649 Current Judge: Thomas F. Neville 
Erick Virgil Hall, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Erick Virgil Hall, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User Judge 
1/11/2007 ORDR DCELLlSJ Order To Vacate NUNC PRO TUNC hearing Thomas F. Neville 
November 9, 2006 hearing 
1/12/2007 CONT DCELLlSJ Post Conviction hearing Thomas F. Neville 
2/2/2007 MOTN CCMARTLG Renewed Motion for Order to Conduct Medical Thomas F. Neville 
Testing and Order for Transport 
MOTN CCMARTLG Motion for Juror Contact Thomas F. Neville 
NOTH CCMARTLG Notice Of Hearing (2-16-07 @ 9 am) Thomas F. Neville 
HRSC CCMARTLG Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/16/2007 09:00 Thomas F. Neville 
AM) Renewed Motn for Order to Conduct 
Medical Testing and Order for Transport and 
Motn for Juror Contact 
2/9/2007 MOTN CCMARTLG State's Motion to Clarify Discovery Order And/Or Thomas F. Neville 
to Modify Discovery Order 
NOTH CCMARTLG Notice Of Hearing Motn to Clarify Discovery Thomas F. Neville 
(2-16-07 @ 9 am) 
2/12/2007 MEMO MCBIEHKJ Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion Thomas F. Neville 
2/13/2007 NOTC DCELLlSJ Withdrawal of Notice of Hearing on Motion for Thomas F. Neville 
Juror Contact 
2/16/2007 MISC DCELLlSJ Response to State's Motion To Clarify Discovery Thomas F. Neville 
Order andlOr To Modify Discovery Order 
ORDR DCELLlSJ Order Regarding Discovery Thomas F. Neville 
ORDR DCELLlSJ Order To transport petitioner no later than Feb. Thomas F. Neville 
26, 2007 For Radiological and serological Testing 
HRHD DCELLlSJ Hearing result for Motion held on 02/16/2007 Thomas F. Neville 
09:00AM: Hearing Held Renewed Motn for 
Order to Conduct Medical Testing and Order for 
Transport and Motn for Juror Contact; Motn to 
Clarify Discovery and/or Modify Discovery Order 
2/2012007 NOTC DCELLlSJ Notice Of Filing of Curriculum Vitae For James R. Thomas F. Neville 
Merikangas, M.D. 
3/16/2007 RSPS CCMARTLG Discovery Response to Court Thomas F. Neville 
5/14/2007 NOTC DCANDEML Notice of Hearing (6/15 @ 2:30) Thomas F. Neville 
HRSC DCANDEML Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Thomas F. Neville 
06/15/2007 02:30 PM) 
6/1/2007 MOTN CCMARTLG Motion For Juror Contact Thomas F. Neville 
MEMO CCMARTLG Memorandum In Support Of Motn For Juror Thomas F. Neville 
Contact 
MOTN CCMARTLG Sealed Supplemental Motion For Discovery Thomas F. Neville 
Document sealed 
5/5/2007 NOFG CCTHIEBJ Notice Of Filing of Attachments To Sealed Thomas F. Neville 
Supplemental Motion For Discovery 
Document sealed 
3/11/2007 MISC DCELLlSJ Sealed Notice of Filing of Audio Citations to Thomas F. Neville 
Interview of Norma Jean Oliver 
Document sealed nn~~re 
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Page 5 of 7 Case: CV-PC-2005-21649 Current Judge: Thomas F. Neville 
Erick Virgil Hall, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Erick Virgil Hall, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User Judge 
6/15/2007 CONH DCELLfSJ Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Thomas F. Neville 
06/15/200702:30 PM: Conference Held 
7/9/2007 OBJT CCDWONCP State's Objection to Petitioner's Motion for Thomas F. Neville 
Unrestricted Access to Jurors 
8/8/2007 ORDR DCELLfSJ Agreed Protective Order Thomas F. Neville 
8/23/2007 MOTN CCTHIEBJ Motion For Permission To Appeal Thomas F. Neville 
NOHG CCTHIEBJ Notice Of Hearing Thomas F. Neville 
8/27/2007 RSPS CCBLACJE State's Response to Request for Admissions Thomas F. Neville 
9/6/2007 MOTN DCELLfSJ Motion For Expert Access To Petiti<;mer Thomas F. Neville 
9/12/2007 ORDR DCANDEML Order to Provide Transcript of Hearing Held in Thomas F. Neville 
Ada County Case No. HCR18591 
ORDR DCANDEML Order To Conduct Medical Testing Thomas F. Neville 
9/13/2007 ORDR DCANDEML Court's Order Denying Petitioner's Motion For Thomas F. Neville 
juror Contact 
ORDR DCANDEML Order to Release Records of Norma Jean Oliver Thomas F. Neville 
ORDR DCANDEML (6) Order to Release Medical & Thomas F. Neville 
PhysicallPsychiatric Records of Norma Jean 
Oliver 
9/17/2007 ORDR DCANDEML Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Thomas F. Neville 
Petitioner's Supplemental Motion for Discovery 
9/28/2007 TRAN CCTHIEBJ Transcript Filed Thomas F. Neville 
10/1/2007 MOTN CCTEELAL Motion for Fragile X Blood Test Thomas F. Neville 
10/3/2007 ORDR CCTHIEBJ Order To Conduct Fragile-X Blood Test Thomas F. Neville 
10/5/2007 PETN DCELLfSJ Final Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief Thomas F. Neville 
10/1212007 NOTC DCANDEML Notice of Filing of Table of Contents Thomas F. Neville 
NOTC DCANDEML Notice of Filing of Index of Exhibits Thomas F. Neville 
NOTC DCANDEML Notice of Filing of Verifictation Page Thomas F. Neville 
10/19/2007 NOTC DCELLfSJ Notice of Filing of Exhibit 97 to the final amended Thomas F. Neville 
petition for post-conviction relief 
10/29/2007 MOTN CCSTROMJ Motion for Additional Time to Make State's Thomas F. Neville 
Response to Final Amended Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief 
11/16/2007 NOTC CCTHIEBJ Notice Of Filing Of Exhibit 17 To The Final Thomas F. Neville 
Amended Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
12121/2007 MOTN CCTHIEBJ State's Motion To Dismiss Thomas F. Neville 
RSPN CCTHIEBJ State's Response To Final Amended Petition For Thomas F. Neville 
Post Conviction Relief 
1/18/2008 ORDR DCELLlSJ Order Denying Petitioner's Motion for Permissive Thomas F. Neville 
Appeal 
HRSC DCELLfSJ Hearing Scheduled (Status 02/08/2008 03:00 Thomas F. Neville 
PM) 
(\{)(){\~ 
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Erick Virgil Hall, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Erick Virgil Hall, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User Judge 
1/18/2008 HRSC DCELLlSJ Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Thomas F. Neville 
05/01/200809:00 AM) 1 1/2 days on State's 
Motion for Summary Dismissal 
RSPN CCTHIEBJ Addendum To State's Response To Final Thomas F. Neville 
Amended Petition For Post Conviction Relief: 
State's Response To Petitioner's Claim C 
1/25/2008 MOTN DCELLlSJ Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Thomas F. Neville 
HRSC DCELLlSJ Notice of Hearing Feb, 8, 2008 @ 3:00 p.m. Thomas F. Neville 
2/8/2008 ORDR DCELLlSJ Order on Discovery Disclosed January 18, 2008 Thomas F. Neville 
regarding Norma Jean Oliver and April Sebastian 
HRHD DCELLlSJ Hearing result for Status held on 02/08/2008 Thomas F. Neville 
03:00 PM: Hearing Held 
OBJC CCTHIEBJ State's Objection To The Petitioner's Motion For Thomas F. Neville 
Issuance Of Subpoena Duces Tecum 
2/15/2008 ORDR DCTYLENI Order Restricting Contact with Norma Jean Thomas F. Neville 
Oliver 
ORDR DCTYLENI Order Denying Petition's Moiton for Issuance of Thomas F. Neville 
Subpoena Duces Tecum 
3/3/2008 RESP DCELLlSJ Response to The State's Motion to Dismiss (Filed Thomas F. Neville 
under Seal) 
Document sealed 
3/5/2008 APDC DCELLlSJ Appeal Filed In District Court Thomas F. Neville 
CAAP DCELLlSJ Case Appealed: Thomas F. Neville 
3/6/2008 MOTN DCHOPPKK Motion for Release of Documents Referenced in Thomas F. Neville 
Addendum to PSI of April Sebastian in Ada 
County Case No. H0400228 (Capital Case) 
MOTN DCHOPPKK Motion for Order for Release of Payette County Thomas F. Neville 
Juvenile Records of Norma Jean Oliver (Capital 
Case) 
3/31/2008 MOTN DCHOPPKK Motion To Stay Post-Conviction Proceedings and Thomas F. Neville 
to Vacate Hearing on the State's Motion to 
Dismiss 
4/4/2008 HRSC DCELLlSJ Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Thomas F. Neville 
04/07/200803:30 PM) Notice of Hearing 
4/7/2008 CONT DCELLlSJ Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Thomas F. Neville 
04/07/200803:30 PM: Continued 
ORDR DCELLlSJ Order For Release of Payette County Juvenile Thomas F. Neville 
Records of Norma Jean Oliver 
4/16/2008 MOTN DCELLlSJ State's Motion for the production of The Thomas F. Neville 
Petitioner's Brain MRI SCAN 
ORDR DCELLlSJ Order For Delivery of Medical Records to the Ada Thomas F. Neville 
County Prosecuting Atty's office pursuant to the 
Health Insurance Portability Accounting Act and 
I.C. §19-3004; leR 17 
00008 
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Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Thomas F. Neville 
05/01/2008 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: Sue Wolf 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 300 pages 
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COMES NOW the Petitioner, ERICK VIRGIL HALL, by and through his attorneys at 
the State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD), and petitions this Honorable Court for post-
conviction relief from the conviction and sentences imposed by this Court in the Fourth Judicial 
District, in State v. Hall, Ada County Case No. H0300518, on January 18,2005. This Court has 
jurisdiction over the action pursuant to I.e. §19-2719; §§19-4901 et seq.; I.C.R., Rules 35 and 
57; and Article I, Sections 1 and 5 of the Constitution of the State of Idaho. Petitioner relies on 
Article I, §§ 1,5,6, 7, 8, 13, 17 ~d 18 of the Constitution of the State ofIdaho, and'~he Fourth, 
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Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution as well as 
International Human Rights Law in support of this Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (herein 
"Petition"). 
I. BACKGROUND (I.C.R. 57(a)(1) through (a)(6» 
1. Petitioner is in the custody of the State of Idaho Department of Correction, detained at the 
Idaho Maximum Security Institution (IMSI) near Boise, Idaho. 
2. Judgment and sentence were pronounced by Honorable Thomas F. Neville, District Judge 
of the Fourth Judicial District ofthe State ofldaho, in Ada County, Boise, Idaho. 
3. Petitioner stands convicted in Ada County Case No. H0300518 of the crimes of: 
Count I, Murder in the First Degree 
Count II, Rape 
Count III, Kidnapping in the First Degree 
4. The Court imposed sentences as follows on the 18th day of January, 2005: 
Count I, for Murder: Death 
Count II, for Rape: Life in Prison without possibility of parole 
Count III, for Kidnapping: Life in Prison without possibility of parole 
The sentences for Counts II and III are to run consecutively. 
5. Petitioner pled NOT GUILTY and a jury returned verdicts of guilty to the cnmes 
charged. 
6. Other than post-trial motions and any prematurely filed NOTICE OF APPEAL, which 
cannot be litigated under Idaho law until these post-conviction matters are concluded, this 
is Petitioner's first attempt in any court to obtain relief from the convictions and sentences 
herein challenged. 




II. ILLEGAL RESTRAINT OF LIBERTY 
Petitioner is a person restrained of his liberty in that he is a prisoner of the State ofIdaho, 
under the custody of the Idaho State Board of Corrections, held on death row at the Idaho 
Maximum Security Institution in Boise, Idaho. This restraint is pursuant to the following 
conviction and sentence imposed on January 18, 2005 by this Court presiding in the Fourth 
Judicial District, in State v. Hall, Ada County Case No. H0300518: Murder in the First Degree, 
Kidnapping in the First Degree, and Rape. This restraint is illegal in that the convictions and 
sentences were obtained in violation of the constitutions of the United States and of the State of 
Idaho and in violation of court rules, statutes and other law as set forth below. 
III. LACK OF SPECIFICITY - NEED TO AMEND 
This Petition is filed according to the time constraints ofI.C. § 19-2719, giving Petitioner 
only forty-two (42) days within which to file an initial petition for post-conviction relief. Due to 
these time constraints, it is impossible for Petitioner to file a petition which complies with I.C. §§ 
19-4901, et seq., § 19-2719 and ICR 57, because of the following factors, among others: 
1. As required by ICR 44.2 and I.C. 19-870(l)(c), the Court appointed Petitioner's 
present counsel to represent him in post-conviction proceedings on February 17, 
2. Present counsel for Petitioner have limited knowledge of and had no participation in 
the criminal case leading to the conviction and sentences herein challenged; and 
3. Present counsels have not yet received a copy of the reporter's transcript or the 
clerk's record from the criminal proceedings and have not had a meaningful 
I Present counsel was previously appointed to represent Petitioner in his direct"appeal on January 
25,2005. 
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opportunity to conduct an independent investigation and to engage in discovery as of 
this time. 
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires review of the trial transcript and the 
entire record to determine the nature, frequency and effect of counsel's errors, Hoffman v. Arave, 
236 F.3d 523, 535 (9th Cir. 2001), in addition to a thorough investigation for claims outside the 
record. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963) (recognizing that even a thorough 
investigation of the record may not reveal all claims since often "the record is unclear or the 
errors are hidden" and noting that reliance solely on the record would likely render post-
conviction proceedings "a meaningless ritual.") This investigation must be both diligent and 
exhaustive, aimed at including all possible grounds for relief since the failure to raise all possible 
claims may result in a procedural bar. See I.C. § 19-2719 (3), (5); Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 
469; 903 P.2d 58 (1995); State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795, 820 P.2d 665 (1991). Further, the 
investigation can neither rely solely on the assistance and investigation of trial counsel, see 
Hoffman, supra (recognizing the inability or difficulty of trial counsel's objective examination of 
their own performance); I.C.R. 44.2 (requiring the appointment of at least one attorney other than 
trial counsel to represent the defendant in post-conviction), nor upon the discovery provided by 
the prosecutor or law enforcement during the underlying criminal proceedings. See McCleskey 
v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 498 (1991). 
Petitioner has not had sufficient time to conduct this independent investigation, yet alone 
adequate time to review the volumes of material that trial counsel had in their possession during 
their prior representation. In fact, at this time Petitioner has not even received all documents 
from trial counsel due to their recent refusal to supply Petitioner with all their files absent a court 
order. Nevertheless, Petitioner has acted with diligence in preparing this petition. Petitioner has 




already taken the following steps: attempted several times to obtain all of trial counsels' files, 
obtained the files of the mitigation specialist, requested the files of the defense investigator, and 
conducted cursory interviews with Petitioner, the mitigation specialist, and trial counsel. Among 
the steps remaining to be taken include the following: obtain and review trial counsels' files, 
obtain and review the defense investigator's files, obtain and review the reporter's transcript and 
clerk's record, identify and request relevant records, conduct comprehensive interviews with all 
members of the defense team and potential witnesses, determine which experts would be 
appropriate for case development, and otherwise re-investigate the crime and surrounding events. 
See 2003 American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of 
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (herein "ABA Guidelines"), Guideline 10.15.1 ("Duties 
Of Post-Conviction Counsel,,).2 
Accordingly, Petitioner will seek this Court's leave to amend his Petition pursuant to I.e. 
§ 19-4906(a) and ICR 15 from time to time as development of his case in post-conviction 
progresses. Nevertheless, in support of his petition for post-conviction relief from the conviction 
and sentence entered against him, Petitioner is able to show the Court as follows: 
IV. GROUNDS FOR RELIEF 
The convictions and sentences entered against Petitioner were obtained in violation of 
laws of the United States and ofIdaho, including the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, §§ 1, 5, 6, 7, 8 13, 17, and 18, of the 
2 The Commentary to this Guideline provides in part: "Two parallel tracks of post-conviction 
investigation are required. One involves reinvestigating the capital case; the other focuses on the 
client. Reinvestigating the case means examining the facts underlying the conviction and 
sentence, as well as such items as trial counsel's performance, judicial bias or prosecutorial 
misconduct. Reinvestigating the client means assembling a more-thorough biography of the 
client than was known at the time of trial, not only to discover mitigation that was not presented 
previously, but also to identify mental-health claims which potentially reach beyond sentencing 
issues to fundamental questions of competency and mental-state defenses." 




Constitution of the State ofIdaho, provisions of the Idaho Code and the Idaho Criminal Rules as 
well as international law. 
Petitioner alleges that all claims of ineffective assistance of counsel herein satisfy both 
prongs of the Strickland analysis, specifically, that the claims show 1) a deficiency in trial 
counsel's performance, and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. See 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In addition, Petitioner alleges that he has 
demonstrated prosecutorial misconduct and the necessary level of prejUdice for this Court to 
grant him relief. Finally, Petitioner alleges that even if the claims do not meet the governing 
level of prejudice on their own, that when cumulatively considered, the accumulation of error 
creates prejudice entitling Petitioner to relief Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1992). 
A. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AT PRETRIAL, TRIAL AND SENTENCING 
PROCEEDINGS. 
1. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Failing To Timely Disclose 
Favorable Evidence. 
Suppression of evidence favorable to an accused by the prosecution violates due process 
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or 
bad faith of the prosecution. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Favorable evidence 
includes not only that evidence tending to exculpate the accused, but also any evidence adversely 
affecting the credibility of the government's witnesses, e.g., evidence that could be used for 
impeachment. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). The prosecution must actively 
search out material in its files and in the files of related agencies reasonably expected to have 
possession of evidence favorable to an accused. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995). 
Even this early in his investigation, Petitioner is aware of at least one item of evidence 
withheld from him that would have been favorable during the guilt and punishment phases of his 




trial. Specifically, Petitioner claims that the prosecution and/or its agents withheld medical 
records of the prior statutory rape victim, Norma Jean Oliver. These records were withheld until 
conclusion of the case. If the records had been disclosed in a timely manner as requested, then 
Petitioner could have rebutted the testimony of the victim that Petitioner had committed a prior 
forcible rape. The records would have shown that the victim did not have any injuries associated 
with rape, and as such, the amended charge of statutory non-forcible rape was more consistent 
with the facts of the prior incident. 
2. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Making An Improper Closing 
Argument Regarding The Definition Of Mitigation. 
Several times during closing argument, the State argued that Petitioner's mitigation 
evidence was not mitigating evidence because it did not excuse his conduct. However, by 
definition, mitigation is not so narrowly confined; indeed, mitigation cannot constitute an excuse 
or justification for criminal conduct, if so, then the defendant would not be guilty of the crime. 
As such, the prosecution's argument precluded the jury from considering mitigation presented at 
odds with the definition of mitigation. The Idaho Supreme Court has stated, 
We generally note that the concept of mitigation is broad. Mitigating 
circumstances have been defined as: "Such as do not constitute a justification or 
excuse of the offense in question, but which, in fairness and mercy, may be 
considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability." Black's 
Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) at 903. 
State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 415, 631 P.2d 187, 197 (1981). Indeed, mitigation is anything 
that could justify a sentence less than death, State v. Creech, 105 Idaho at 369, 670 P.2d at 470 
(1983) or any circumstances that "may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of 
moral culpability." Osborn, 102 Idaho at 415, 631 P.2d at 197. Thus, mitigation not only refers 
to circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime but also circumstances of the 
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defendant himself including "his background, his age, upbringing and environment or any other 
matter appropriate to a determination of the degree of culpability." !d. 
An individual juror must be free to consider a mitigating factor, regardless of whether 
other members of the jury agree as to its existence. Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988); 
McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 US. 433 (1990) ("each juror [must] be permitted to consider and 
give effect to mitigating evidence"). It is not enough "simply to allow the defendant to present 
mitigating evidence to the sentencer," rather there must not be any impediment, through 
evidentiary rules, jury instructions, Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 US. 393 (1987), or prosecutorial 
argument. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 US. 302, 326 (1989). In this case, the prosecutor's closing 
argument created an impediment to the jury's consideration of mitigating circumstances by 
limiting the jury's consideration of mitigation to evidence that would excuse criminal conduct 
and thus impeding consideration of evidence that would have called for a lesser sentence.3 This 
misconduct requires this Court to vacate Petitioner's death sentence. 
3. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Making An Improper Closing 
Argument Regarding The Manner In Which Mitigation Is Weighed Against The 
Aggravation. 
While arguing their view of mitigation, the State presented a slide that depicted the 
weighing of aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances. The illustration was 
that of a scale, likened to the scales of justice, with the term "mitigation" on one side weighed 
against all four aggravating circumstances the State sought to prove to the jury: "HAC," 
"Propensity," "Utter disregard," and "In perpetration." The illustration resembled the following: 
3 Not only did these improper arguments affect the jury and its verdict, but the Court as well. 
Specifically, in its post-verdict findings, the Court noted that Petitioner's mitigation evidence did 
not excuse his crimes, indicating the Court's agreement with the jury regarding their finding that 
the four aggravating circumstances were not outweighed by the mitigation. 
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As shown above, the prosecution drew a scale leaning heavily in favor of the four aggravating 
circumstances weighed aggregately against the mitigation. Drawing upon the scale in its 
argument, the prosecution asserted that Petitioner deserved the death penalty. 
The State's argument and illustration is a grossly simplified and misleading 
characterization of the weighing process required under I.e. § 19-2S1S(8)(a)(ii). The statute 
requires that all of the mitigation presented by the defense be weighed against each of the 
statutory aggravators it has found as proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Charboneau, 
116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (1989). The scale depicted by the prosecution misstates the 
requirements under the law and constitutes gross misconduct. This misconduct requires this 
Court to vacate Petitioner's death sentence. 
4. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Arguing That The Defense Experts 
Were Hired Guns. 
During their closing argument, the prosecution referred to Petitioner's experts as hired 
guns, asserting that "they're in the business of supplying defendants with excuses." The 
prosecution further referred to their testimony as a "show" that cost $100,000, and rhetorically 
inquired whether they were "hired to convince [the jury] to spare the defendant?" This argument 
is constitutionally improper and highly prejudicial. 
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A defendant has a constitutional right to present a defense which includes the right to 
expert assistance. In Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
"the Constitution requires that an indigent defendant have access to the psychiatric examination 
and assistance necessary to prepare an effective defense based on his mental condition." Id. at 
70. A defendant cannot be penalized for exercising his constitutional rights. 
A defendant's right to counsel can be violated by a prosecutor's improper examination of 
a witness or argument which seeks to penalize the defendant for exercising his constitutional 
right. State v. Masters, No. M2003-00305-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 1208872, at *10 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. Jun. 2, 2004). In Masters, the court held that the defendant's rights were not violated 
during cross-examination of his experts when the prosecutor sought to attack "the reliability and 
impartiality of the witnesses because of their attitudes toward capital punishment and the bias of 
the information on which their opinions were, at least in some part, based." Id. However, when 
the prosecution goes beyond attacking the reliability and impartiality of a witness, the risk of 
depriving the defendant of a fair trial increases significantly. One such instance is where the 
state suggests that because the defense experts were paid hefty fees, their testimony would weigh 
heavily in favor of the defense. State v. Smith, 167 N.J. 158, 185, 770 A.2d 255, 272 (N.J. 
2001); see also State v. Schneider, 402 N.W.2d 779, 788 (Minn. 1987) ("Experts are not the paid 
harlots of either side in a criminal case and should not be portrayed in such a light."). 
Petitioner asserts that the prosecutor's argument in his case went beyond attacking the 
reliability and impartiality of his experts, and thus deprived him of his right to a fair trial and his 
right to present a defense in mitigation of punishment. This misconduct requires this Court to 
vacate Petitioner's death sentence. 
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5. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Making An Argument Inconsistent 
with Evidence Outside The Record. 
The prosecution had the opportunity to rebut the testimony of Petitioner's defense experts 
during the penalty phase of the trial, yet they chose not to do so. Indeed, the prosecution had 
their own professional witness, Dr. Estess, who they no doubt had to compensate to review 
Petitioner's experts' opinions as well as their testimony, yet the prosecution did not call him as a 
witness, presumably because he could not rebut their testimony. 
Petitioner asserts that it is improper for a prosecutor to seek to undermine Petitioner's 
experts when aware that their own expert concurs in their opinions. After review of the 
transcripts and record in this case, as well as a full opportunity to conduct discovery, Petitioner 
anticipates presenting additional evidence in support of this claim. 
6. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct In Arguing For Imposition Of The 
Death Penalty To Deter Future Crimes. 
During closing arguments, the prosecutor suggested that the death penalty should be 
imposed to deter future crimes. This argument is improper because it called for the jury to base 
its penalty verdict on matters wholly irrelevant to their consideration of the crime and the 
defendant's character and record. Deterrence is a matter solely for legislative consideration; it is 
improper for a jury in a capital case to consider alleged deterrent or non-deterrent effects of the 
death penalty in deciding whether it should be imposed. See People v. Love, 56 Ca1.2d 720, 366 
P.2d 33 (Cal. 1961) (holding that it was improper for the prosecution during closing argument to 
argue that the death penalty was a more effective deterrent than life imprisonment). Thus, courts 
uniformly condemn such prosecution appeals to the jury to render their verdicts for the greater 
social good. The clear purpose of these arguments is an attempt to dissuade the jury from 
granting mercy to the defendant. See Wilson v. Kemp, 777 F.2d 621, 624 (11 th ' Cir. 1985). 
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However, the requirement that the jury consider mitigating circumstances demonstrates that 
mercy certainly plays a part in capital sentencing. !d. Thus, the prosecutor's argument regarding 
deterrent effects and society's greater good swayed the focus of the jury away from the 
consideration of mitigating evidence in favor of evidence irrelevant to its consideration. This 
misconduct requires this Court to vacate Petitioner's death sentence. 
7. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Presenting Evidence Regarding 
Potential Conditions Of A Life Sentence And By Arguing That A Life Sentence 
Would Be Too Lenient And Otherwise Speculating As To What Might Happen 
To Petitioner If A Death Sentence Were Withheld. 
After review of the transcripts and record in this case, Petitioner anticipates presenting 
evidence and law in support of this claim. 
B. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO 
FAILURE TO CONDUCT ADEQUATE INVESTIGATION. 
1. Trial Counsel Failed To Retain Necessary Defense Experts. 
i. Forensic Pathologist. 
Trial counsel failed to hire a forensic pathologist or other expert to review the autopsy 
results and make an independent determination of cause of death or injuries inflicted upon the 
victim prior to her death. Trial counsel should have obtained independent consultation in each of 
these areas to truly subject the prosecution's case to the level of adversarial testing demanded in 
capital cases at both the guilt and penalty phases at trial. 
Without sufficient time for an adequate investigation by Petitioner's counsel, it is 
impossible to determine the actual discrepancies and if others existed that should have been 
investigated, however, Petitioner asserts he was prejudiced by the mere fact that trial counsel 
failed to fulfill its duty and effectively allowed the State to present an untested case to the jury at 
trial and sentencing. 
PETITION FOR POST -CONVICTION RELIEF 00020 12 
ii. Crime Scene Expert. 
Petitioner makes this claim without having reviewed the trial transcript, record or defense 
files in this case. Petitioner anticipates conducting extensive investigation into this area and 
reserves the right to withdraw this claim if the evidence does not lend support. 
iii. Medical Expert. 
Petitioner makes this claim without having reviewed the trial transcript, record or defense 
files in this case. Petitioner anticipates conducting extensive investigation into this area and 
reserves the right to withdraw this claim ifthe evidence does not lend support. 
iv. Violence In Penal Institutions Expert. 
Petitioner makes this claim without having reviewed the trial transcript, record or defense 
files in this case. Petitioner anticipates conducting extensive investigation into this area and 
reserves the right to withdraw this claim if the evidence does not lend support. 
v. Penal Institution Management Expert. 
Petitioner makes this claim without having reviewed the trial transcript, record or defense 
files in this case. Petitioner anticipates conducting extensive investigation into this area and 
reserves the right to withdraw this claim ifthe evidence does not lend support. 
2. Trial Counsel Failed To Adequately Investigate Circumstances Surrounding 
Petitioner's Prior Conviction For Statutory Rape. 
Petitioner was previously convicted of statutory rape. At the murder trial, the prosecution 
presented the testimony of the victim, Norma Jean Oliver, as well as the testimony of the prior 
prosecuting attorney on the case, to show that the rape was violent and to show that amendment 
of the forcible rape charge to statutory rape did not indicate the level of force involved. 
Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain all the records of statutory rape case 
including the medical records which Petitioner believes would have demonstrated at most that 
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the rape was a non-forcible statutory rape. Trial counsel's failure to conduct an adequate 
investigation falls below objectively reasonable standard for effectiveness. But for trial 
counsel's ineffectiveness, Petitioner asserts that there is a reasonable probability that outcome of 
the trial and the sentencing would have been different. 
3. Trial Counsel Failed To Adequately Investigate Petitioner's Development 
During Adolescence And Adulthood. 
During sentencing proceedings, the defense offered testimony from family members and 
two experts that described Petitioner's horrific childhood. However, trial counsel failed to 
adequately investigate Petitioner's life in adolescence and adulthood. In their closing argument, 
the prosecution argued this very fact to the jury. Thus, it was difficult for the jury to draw a 
connection between Petitioner's childhood and adult behavior and the jury was left with the 
impression that there were no mitigating circumstances in Petitioner's adult life. 
Had trial counsel adequately investigated and presented mitigating circumstances of 
Petitioner's adolescence and adulthood including mitigating evidence near the time of the crime, 
it is reasonably probable that the jury would have found that the mitigation outweighed the 
aggravation and sentenced Petitioner to a life sentence. 
C. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR THEIR 
FAILURE TO EXPLAIN MITIGATION TO THE JURY DURING CLOSING 
ARGUMENTS. 
Not only must trial counsel investigate and present mitigation, see e.g., Williams v. 
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003), but counsel must also 
explain the meaning and purpose of mitigating evidence. Pizzuto v. Arave, 385 P.3d 1247, 1252 
(2004) (citing Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915, 927 (9th Cir. 2001) ("To perform effectively 
in the penalty phase of a capital case, counsel must conduct sufficient investigation and engage 
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in sufficient preparation to be able to present and explain the significance of all the available 
[mitigating] evidence."); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 399. 
During the penalty phase, defense counsel offered the testimony of several mitigation 
witnesses including family members who testified as to the childhood and character of Petitioner. 
Dr. Mark Cunningham and Dr. Roderick Pettis testified regarding mitigation, including facts of 
Petitioner's upbringing such as incest, drug abuse, physical and verbal abuse, and neglect. Trial 
counsel however failed to explain the purpose of mitigation and their testimony to the jury, and 
instead allowed the prosecution to mislead the jury regarding the definition ,md purpose of 
mitigation by failing to object to the prosecution's closing argument mischaracterizing the 
definition of mitigation. See supra, Claim IV. A. b. 
Petitioner asserts that but for trial counsel's ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable 
probability that the jury would have considered the mitigation, appropriately weighed it against 
the aggravating circumstances, and imposed a life sentence. 
1. Failure To Rehabilitate The Credibility Of Its Own Expert Witnesses During 
Closing Argument. 
During closing arguments, the State attempted to discredit the defense's expert witnesses, 
Dr.'s Cunningham and Pettis, by stating that "they are in the business of supplying defendants 
with excuses." The State questioned whether the witnesses were neutral or hired to convince the 
jury to spare the defendant. Not only did trial counsel fail to object, but counsel failed to address 
these comments in their closing argument. Trial counsel's duty to explain mitigation to the jury 
must encompass a duty to bolster the source of the mitigating evidence when it is attacked. Trial 
counsel allowed the jury to conclude that the defense experts' testimony was bought, leaving 
little, if any, room for reliability. Petitioner was deprived of his right to present mitigation and 
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have it considered by the jury because of trial counsels' ineffective assistance. Petitioner's 
sentence should thus be vacated. 
D. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DURING THE 
JURY SELECTION PROCESS. 
Petitioner has not been afforded the opportunity to review the jury selection proceedings 
in this case due to a lack of access to the trial transcripts which have not yet been prepared. 
After further investigation, Petitioner shall expound upon this claim, or reserve the right to 
withdraw the claim if supporting evidence is not discovered upon further investigation. 
1. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failure To Strike For Cause 
Or Utilize A Preemptory Strike Individual Jurors. 
Petitioner has knowledge that at least one juror should have been stricken from the jury, 
the wife of Timothy McNeese, Deputy Attorney General for the Idaho Department of 
Corrections. Ms. McNeese ultimately served as the foreperson. It is hardly reasonable to 
assume that the wife of an advocate for the State in carrying out death sentences would not be 
affected by her husband's employment when determining whether to impose the death sentence. 
Further, Petitioner served a IO-year term in the IDOC during the period that Mr. McNeese served 
as the Deputy Attorney General. It is likely that Mr. McNeese was familiar with Erick Hall and 
there is a reasonable probability that he shared discussions about inmates, possibly including 
Mr. Hall, as well as information about conditions of confinement and other matters that a juror 
might consider, appropriately or not, during the sentencing process with his wife. As stated, 
Petitioner does not have trial transcripts, the record or files in this case and thus has not had the 
opportunity to review them. 
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E. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN FAILING TO 
ADEQUATELY RAISE LEGAL CHALLENGES. 
1. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Object To The 
Prosecutor's Closing Argument. 
As discussed supra in Claim IV. A, subsections b through g, hereby incorporated by 
reference, in closing argument the prosecution mischaracterized the definition of mitigation 
evidence and the manner in which it is weighed against evidence in aggravation. The 
prosecution also improperly 1) commented on the role of Petitioner's experts, 2) argued 
deterrence as a justification for the death penalty, 3) argued inconsistently with the opinion of 
their own expert, and 4) speculated on what might happen if a death sentence were not imposed. 
Trial counsel were ineffective for allowing each these arguments to be presented to the jury 
without objection. But for trial counsels' failure to object and request a mistrial, and in the 
alternative, request an admonishment and corrective instruction by the Court, there is a 
reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. 
2. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Adequately 
Challenge The Introduction Of Statements Made By Petitioner To Law 
Enforcement. 
Petitioner has not had the opportunity to review the interrogations, reports, pleadings, and 
transcripts relevant to this claim and reserves the right to either expound or withdraw this claim 
after further investigation. 
3. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Move For A 
Change Of Venue. 
Trial Counsel failed to move for a change of venue and/or renew a motion for change in 
venue during voir dire despite the extensive media coverage and pretrial pUblicity regarding this 
case and a separate rape/murder case yet to proceed to trial. The sheer volume of pUblicity in 
this case rendered it impossible in which to find an impartial jury composed of Mr. Hall's peers. 
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From the media's and the public's perspective, this was a high-profile case involving a young 
woman from out-of-town, abducted along the Boise Greenbelt, a highly traveled recreational 
area in Boise. 
Trial counsel should have thoroughly litigated this issue. It is the defendant's burden to 
show "a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news coverage prevented a fair trial in violation of 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution." State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 77 
P.3d 956, 967 (2003). Thus, it was up to trial counsel to establish that in the totality of the 
circumstances, juror exposure to pretrial publicity would result in a trial that was fundamentally 
unfair to the Defendant. Id. Trial counsel should have presented the Court information in support 
of a motion for change of venue including, but not limited to, the nature and content of pretrial 
publicity, affidavits indicating the level of community prejUdice, and testimony by prospective 
jurors. Id. 
Because no motion for a change of venue was filed, this Court was never given the 
opportunity to review the significant amount of damaging media coverage in the Boise 
community regarding this case that spanned several years. After a review of the transcripts and 
record, Petitioner anticipates expanding this claim to include other evidence of the 
ineffectiveness of counsel in failing to move for a change of venue. 
4. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Request A Special 
Jury Instruction That Would Require The Jury To Provide Written Findings 
Delineating The Mitigating Circumstances That Were Found. 
Prior to the amendment to I.e. § 19-2515, a judge, not a jury, was required to make 
written findings setting forth any statutory aggravating circumstance found and set forth in 
writing any mitigating factors considered. I.e. § 19-2515(f) (Michie 2000). The failure to make 
such written findings constituted reversible error. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 415-16, 631 
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P.2d 187, 197-98 (1981); Creech v. Arave, 928 F.2d 1481, 1489-90 (9th Cir. 1991), reversed in 
part on other grounds by Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463 (1993). 
The written findings requirement serves two purposes: 1) it helps to ensure that the 
imposition of the sentence of death is reasoned and objective as constitutionally required, and 2) 
it protects a capital defendant's right to meaningful appellate review. See Osborn, at 414-15; 
631 P.2d at 196-97. Without the findings, the reviewing court cannot determine whether the 
fact-finder overlooked or ignored any mitigation that was presented, whether the evidence 
supports the aggravating factors found, and whether the fact-finder properly weighed all factors. 
ld. at 415,631 P.2d at 197; State v. Pratt, 125 Idaho 546, 873 P.2d 800 (1993). 
Pursuant to the current version of the statute, if a defendant waives the right to a jury at 
his sentencing proceeding, the district court shall 
(i) [m]ake written findings setting forth any statutory aggravating circumstance 
found beyond a reasonable doubt; 
(ii) [s]et forth in writing any mitigating circumstances considered; and 
(iii) [u]pon weighing all mitigating circumstances against each statutory 
aggravating circumstance separately, determine whether mitigating circumstances 
are found to be sufficiently compelling that the death penalty would be unjust and 
detail in writing its reasons for so finding." 
I.C. § 19-2515(8)(b). In contrast, when a jury is not waived, the jury is only required to indicate 
on special verdict forms whether a statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and "whether all mitigating circumstances, when weighed against the 
aggravating circumstance, are sufficiently compelling that the death penalty would be unjust." 
I.C. § 19-2515(8)(a). 
Because the jury is not required to specify the mitigating circumstances it found, a 
defendant who chooses to have a jury make the findings of fact at his sentencing proceeding 
relinquishes his constitutional right to have his sentence meaningfully re~iewed .bY the district 
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court and by the Idaho Supreme Court on direct appeal and as a part of its mandatory sentencing 
review under I.C. § 19-2827. Without a complete record, the district court and the Idaho 
Supreme Court are precluded from conducting a meaningful review which includes a 
determination whether imposition of the death sentence was reasoned and objective or the result 
of arbitrariness and passion. See e.g., Osborn, at 415,631 P.2d at 197 ("If the findings of the 
lower court are not set forth with reasonable exactitude, this court would be forced to make its 
review on an inadequate record, and could not fulfill the function of 'meaningful appellate 
review' demanded by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court."); see also State v. 
Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 877, 781 P.2d 197, 214 (1989) (recognizing the increased potential of 
arbitrary and inconsistent imposition of the death penalty by juries). 
Trial counsel should have requested a special verdict form requiring the jury to delineate 
the mitigating circumstances it found and the weighing of such mitigation against the individual 
aggravating circumstances when rendering its sentencing decision. Petitioner has been deprived 
of the right to have this Court and an appellate court determine whether his sentence was the 
result ofa reasoned and objective analysis. Because of trial counsel's ineffectiveness, Petitioner 
has lost the necessary predicate for his right to a meaningful review. Petitioner's sentence should 
thus be vacated and be afforded a new sentencing proceeding where the sentencer is required to 
provide adequate written findings. 
5. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Challenge Idaho's 
"Heinous, Atrocious Or Cruel" Aggravating Circumstance, And The Respective 
Instruction To The Jury, As Unconstitutionally Vague And As Not Having Been 
Meaningfully Narrowed By The Idaho Supreme Court To Comport With The 
Eighth Amendment. 
After review of the transcripts and record in this case, Petitioner anticipates presenting 
evidence and law in support of this claim. Petitioner does not however assert that especially in 
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light of the advent of jury sentencing in Idaho, trial counsel has an obligation to reassess prior 
case law upholding this and other aggravating circumstances, see also infra, Claim IV. E, 
subsections f through g. For instance, in previously upholding the "heinous, atrocious or cruel" 
aggravating circumstance, the Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
Lankford asserts that the aggravating factor that "their murder was 
especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity," is 
unconstitutional under Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 
L.Ed.2d 372 (1988). In Maynard, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
aggravating circumstance of an Oklahoma death penalty statute which referred to 
especially heinous, atrocious or cruel murders was unconstitutionally vague 
pursuant to the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court 
reasoned that these aggravating factors failed to adequately inform the sentencer 
of what must be found in order to impose the death penalty and thereby left the 
sentencer with the ability to impose the death penalty in an arbitrary and 
capnclOUS manner. 
There is, however, an important distinction between the Oklahoma 
and Idaho aggravating circumstance statutes. The distinction is that 
Oklahoma has jury sentencing while Idaho adheres to judicial sentencing in 
capital murder cases. These aggravating circumstances are terms of art that 
are commonly understood among the members of the judiciary. As a result, 
the potential for inconsistent application that exists as a result of jury 
sentencing is eliminated where the judge sentences. 
State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 877, 781 P.2d 197,214 (1989) (emphasis added). Thus, trial counsel 
were ineffective in failing to challenge the constitutionality of this aggravating circumstance, not 
necessarily solely because of the change to jury sentencing, but especially because of such change. See 
ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline, 10.8 ("As described in the commentary to Guideline 
1.1, counsel also has a duty, pursuant to Subsection (A)(3)(a)-(c) of this Guideline, to preserve issues 
calling for a change in existing precedent; the client's life may well depend on how zealously counsel 
discharges this duty.") 
i. Idaho Has Failed To Establish A Valid Limiting Construction. 
After review of the transcripts and record in this case, Petitioner anticipates presenting 
evidence and law in support of this claim. 
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i. The Unconstitutional Aggravating Circumstance Requires Re-Sentencing. 
After review of the transcripts and record in this case, Petitioner anticipates presenting 
evidence and law in support ofthis claim. 
ii. Even If The Aggravating Circumstance Is Valid, The Jury Erred In Finding 
It In This Case. 
After review of the transcripts and record in this case, Petitioner anticipates presenting 
evidence and law in support of this claim. 
6. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance of Counsel In Failing to 
Challenge The Aggravating Circumstance, I.e. § 19-2515(9)(1), And The 
Respective Instruction To The Jury, That The Defendant Exhibited Utter 
Disregard For Human Life, As Unconstitutional. 
After review of the transcripts and record in this case, Petitioner anticipates presenting 
evidence and law in support of this claim. See also supra, Claim IV. E, subsection e, hereby 
incorporated by reference. 
i. Idaho Has Failed To Establish A Valid Limiting Construction. 
After review of the transcripts and record in this case, Petitioner anticipates presenting 
evidence and law in support of this claim. 
ii. The Unconstitutional Aggravating Circumstance Requires Re-Sentencing. 
After review of the transcripts and record in this case, Petitioner anticipates presenting 
evidence and law in support of this claim. 
iii. Even If The Aggravating Circumstance Is Valid, The Jury Erred In Finding 
It In This Case. 
After review of the transcripts and record in this case, Petitioner anticipates presenting 
evidence and law in support of this claim. 
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7. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Failing to Challenge 
The Aggravating Circumstance I.e. § 19-2515(h)(8), And The Respective 
Instruction To The Jury, As Unconstitutionally Broad And Indefinite Until The 
Idaho Supreme Court Supplies More Direction For Its Application. 
After review of the transcripts and record in this case, Petitioner anticipates presenting 
evidence and law in support of this claim. See also supra, Claim IV. E, subsection e, hereby 
incorporated by reference. 
i. Idaho Has Failed To Establish The Appropriate Context For Determining 
The Existence Of The Aggravating Circumstance. 
After review of the transcripts and record in this case, Petitioner anticipates presenting 
evidence and law in support of this claim. 
ii. The Unconstitutional Aggravating Circumstance Requires Re-Sentencing. 
After review of the transcripts and record in this case, Petitioner anticipates presenting 
evidence and law in support of this claim. 
iii. Even If The Aggravating Circumstance Is Valid, The Jury Erred In Finding 
It In This Case. 
After review of the transcripts and record in this case, Petitioner anticipates presenting 
evidence and law in support of this claim. 
8. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To Raise International Law 
Violations. 
The convictions and sentences entered against Petitioner were obtained in violation of 
intemationallaw. 
V. PRAYERS FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, respectfully prays this Honorable 
Court: 
1. To allow civil discovery pursuant to the IRCP and ICR 57(b); 
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2. For leave to amend the Petition as more information becomes available during the 
course of these proceedings; 
3. For an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the petition; 
4. For an order vacating the convictions and sentences imposed against Petitioner; 
5. For such other, further relief as, to the Court, seems just and equitable. 
DATED this 2nd day March of2005. 
MARK A.CKLEY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 




STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Erick Hall, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That I am the Petitioner in the above entitled action; that I have read the foregoing 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, and I know the contents thereof, and that the 
facts contained therein are true and correct as I verily believe. based upon his review of the 
record, conversations with Petitioner. 
DATED this 2.,5 day of February, 2005. 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL 
Petitioner 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ~S day of February, 2005. 
No ary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Ob~, \ \:') 
My commission expiresd' B' ~O\ \ 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this _\ _ day of March, 2005, served a true and 
correct copy of the forgoing PETITION FOR POST -CONVICTION RELIEF as indicated 
below: 
ROGER BOURNE 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
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BOISE ID 83702 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL 
INMATE # 33835 
IMSI 
POBOX51 
BOISE ID 83707 
Statehouse Mail 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile r- Hand Delivery 
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J. DAVID NAVARRO 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 








S tate of Idaho ) 
Defendant. ) 
======~--------------
Case No. SP OT 0500155 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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notice pursuant to Rule 77 (d) LC.R. in envelopes addressed as follows: 
Prosecuting Attorney; Inter-Departmental 
Mail 
,2005 
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J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
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Deputy Clerk ~\ 
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GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Roger Bourne 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Idaho State Bar No. 2127 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: 287-7700 
Fax: 287-7709 
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' .... , 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 












Case No. SPOT0500155D 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF, 
STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS, 
AND STATE'S OBJECTION TO 
CIVIL DISCOVERY 
COMES NOW, Roger Bourne, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of 
Ada, State of Idaho, and makes the State's Response to the defendant, Erick Virgil Hall's 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief, as follows. 
The State admits that the petitioner is in the custody of the Idaho State Department of 
Corrections, pursuant to a judgment and sentenced pronounced by the Honorable Thomas F. 
Neville, District Judge, in Ada County Case No. H0300518. 
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The State admits that the defendant has been convicted of the crime of First Degree 
Murder, Rape, and Kidnapping in the First Degree. The State further admits that the defendant 
has been sentenced to death for the murder and to consecutive fixed life sentences for the rape 
and kidnapping. The State admits that the petitioner pled not guilty and that a jury returned 
verdicts of guilty to the crimes charged. 
To the knowledge of the undersigned, this is the defendant's first petition for post 
conviction relief filed in Case No. H0300518. 
The State denies every other allegation upon which the petitioner relies in support of this 
petition for post conviction relief. The State denies that the petitioner is illegally restrained of 
his liberty and denies that the defendant's convictions and sentences were obtained in violation 
of the Constitutions of the United States or the State of Idaho, or in violation of any statute, rule 
or international treaty. 
Hereafter, the State will respond to the allegations in the petition using the numbering 
system in the original petition. 
A. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AT PRETRIAL, TRIAL AND 
SENTENCING PROCEEDINGS. 
1. • •• by Failing to Timely Disclose Favorable Evidence. 
The State denies that it suppressed any evidence favorable to the defendant. The State 
specifically denies that any medical records of Norma Jean Oliver were favorable to the 
defendant and denies that the medical records were suppressed or withheld from the defendant. 
The State denies that the records show anything inconsistent with Ms. Oliver's testimony. 
2. . .. Misconduct by Making an Improper Closing Argument Regarding the 
Definition of Mitigation. 
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The State denies that there was anything improper about the State's closing argument 
regarding mitigation or any other topic. 
3 .... by Making an Improper Closing Argument Regarding the Manner in 
Which Mitigation is Weighed Against the Aggravation. 
The State denies that there was anything improper about the State's closing argument on 
the topic of weighing mitigation versus aggravation. The jury was properly instructed. 
4. . .. by Arguing that the Defense Experts Were Hired Guns. 
The State denies that any prosecution reference to the defendant's experts was improper 
or unfairly prejudicial. 
5. ... by .Making an Argument Inconsistent with Evidence Outside the 
Record. 
To the extent that the Prosecution understands this claim, the Prosecution denies it as 
being without a legal or factual basis. Counsel for the petitioner has no knowledge concerning 
information provided by Dr. Estess to the prosecution. His claim is nothing more than 
speculation without a factual basis. He cites no legal basis for his claim. His claim should be 
denied. 
6. . .. in Arguing for Imposition of the Death Penalty to Deter Future 
Crimes. 
The State denies that there was anything improper about the Prosecution's closing 
argument relative to deterrence. 
7. . .. by Arguing that a Life Sentence Would be too Lenient ... 
The State denies this allegation and moves to dismiss since there is no factual basis set 
out to support the claim. 
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B. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO 
FAILURE TO CONDUCT ADEQUATE INVESTIGATION. 
1. Trial Counsel Failed to Retain Necessary Defense Experts. 
i. - v. Named Experts. 
For each of the experts named under this claim, defense counsel admits that he has not 
reviewed the trial transcript, or record or defense files in this case. In other words, the petitioner 
has no idea whether trial counsel hired any of the named experts or not and as such has no 
evidence to support the claim. At this point, no relief can be granted based upon this claim. 
2. Trial Counsel Failed to Adequately Investigate Circumstances 
Surrounding Petitioner's Prior Conviction for Statutory Rape. 
The petitioner claims that trial counsel should have reviewed Norma Jean Oliver's 
medical records which would have demonstrated that the rape was non-forcible. The petitioner 
does not point to any part of the medical records to support this conclusion and is apparently 
unaware that trial counsel represented the defendant in that earlier rape charge. There is no legal 
basis shown and as such, no relief can be granted based on this claim. 
3. Trial Counsel Failed to Adequately Investigate Petitioner's Development 
During Adolescence and Adulthood. 
Despite the defense presentation of testimony from family members and a hundred 
thousand dollars worth of psychologists and psychiatrists' testimony, the petitioner incredibly 
argues that there were additional mitigating circumstances from the defendant's adolescence and 
adulthood, which were not presented. The petitioner gives no hint of what those additional facts 
might be. The allegation should be dismissed. 
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C. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR 
THEIR FAILURE TO EXPLAIN MITIGATION TO THE JURY DURING 
CLOSING ARGUMENTS. 
This is a bald assertion without any claimed factual basis. The State moves to dismiss it. 
1. Failing to Rehabilitate the Credibility of its own Expert Witnesses During 
Closing Argument. 
This claim is a bald assertion without legal or factual basis and should be dismissed. 
D. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DURING 
THE JURY SELECTION PROCESS. 
There is no factual basis to support this claim and it should be dismissed. 
1. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance by Failure to Strike for 
Cause or Utilize a Preemptory Strike Against Individual Jurors. 
In a bald assertion of astonishing proportions, the petitioner claims that because the 
husband of one of the jurors was a deputy attorney general assigned to the Department of 
Corrections at the same time that Erick Hall was serving a sentence in an Idaho prison, the juror 
would have been familiar with Erick Hall. This is a glaring example of a violation of counsel's 
obligation of Candor to the Tribunal as required by Rule 3.3 of the Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct. There is no asserted factual basis for this claim and it should be dismissed. 
E. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN 
FAILING TO ADEQUATELY RAISE LEGAL CHALLENGES. 
1. ... By Failing to Object to the Prosecutor's Closing Argument. 
There is no legal or factual basis for the claim and it should be dismissed. 
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2. . .. By Failing to Adequately Challenge the Introduction of Statements 
Made by Petitioner to Law Enforcement. 
Current counsel is apparently unaware of the extensive suppression hearing that was 
conducted in the case. There is no factual basis for the claim and it should be dismissed. 
3. . .. By Failing to Move for a Change of Venue. 
Current counsel is apparently unaware of the extensive questioning of jurors concerning 
their knowledge of the case based on pre-trial publicity. There is no factual basis for the claim 
and it should be dismissed. 
4. . .. By Failing to Request a Special Jury Instruction That Would Require 
the Jury to Provide Written Findings Delineating the Mitigating 
Circumstances That Were Found. 
The petitioner does not show that he has a constitutional or due process right to written 
findings by the jury. He has not claimed that any other state or the federal system requires that 
findings be made by a jury in a death penalty case. He only asserts that there cannot be 
meaningful appellate review without written findings. Obviously, the jury's guilt verdict can be 
reviewed without written findings. There is no showing that trial counsel was ineffective as 
claimed. 
5. . .. Failing to Challenge Idaho's "Heinous, Atrocious Or Cruel" 
Aggravating Circumstance, and the Respective Jury Instructions. 
The petitioner has not claimed a constitutional deficiency with this aggravator or with the 
jury instruction. This allegation should be dismissed. 
i., ii., iii. 
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The State moves to dismiss these claims for lack of legal or factual basis to support the 
claim. The instructions are available to the petitioner, but no specific discovery is claimed. The 
fact that the jury found this aggravator cannot be a basis for ineffective assistance of counsel. 
6. . .. Failing to Challenge the Utter Disregard for Human Life Aggravator. 
i. ii., iii. 
The State moves to dismiss, no legal or factual basis is shown in the petition. The jury 
instructions were immediately available to the petitioner before the filing of the petition. The 
petitioner does not point to any defect in the instructions. The claimed "jury error" in finding 
this aggravator cannot be ineffective assistance of counsel. 
7. • •. In Failing to Challenge the "Propensity" Aggravator as Found in Idaho 
Code § 19-2515(h)(S). 
The State presumes that the petitioner is referring to the "Propensity" aggravator as set 
out in Idaho Code § 19-2515(9)(h). The code section cited by the petitioner does not refer to an 
aggravator. The jury instruction describing that aggravating circumstance is currently available 
to the petitioner and as such is available for briefing and argument. The petitioner has given no 
legal or factual basis for this claim and so it should be dismissed. The State also notes that in the 
petitioner's claim number iii ... that the "jury erred in finding it," referring to the aggravator, 
cannot be claimed as ineffective assistance of counsel. It is an appellate issue. This claim 
should be dismissed for that additional reason. 
S. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Failing to Raise International Law 
Violations. 
The State knows of no international law applicable to this case. The Petitioner 
apparently doesn't either since none are cited. This claim should be dismissed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The State moves for the dismissal of this petition for the reasons stated. There is no 
genuine issue of material fact that would justify a hearing as required by Idaho Code § 19-
4906( c). The Court is not required to accept either the petitioner's mere conclusory allegations, 
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the petitioner's conclusions oflaw. Roman v. State, 125 
ID 736 (Ct.App. 1987); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 ID 156 (Ct. App. 1986). 
No showing has been made to support the petitioner's request for civil discovery. A 
request for civil discovery must be specific as to the items sought and the reasons demonstrating 
the need to protect his substantial rights. Raudebaugh v. State, 135 ID 602 (S.Ct. 200 I). The 
State moves the Court to deny the request for civil discovery. The State further moves the Court 
to deny all of the grounds for relief requested for the reasons set out above. 
tlJiJ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this "?/daY of March 2005. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecutor 
• 
Roger Bourne 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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CASE NO. SPOT0500155 
RESPONSE TO STATE'S 
RESPONSE TO POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF, STATE'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS, AND STATE'S OBJECTION 
TO CIVIL DISCOVERY 
(Capital Case) r ' ... ! 
t. 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, ERICK VIRGIL HALL, by and through his counsel at the 
State Appellate Public Defender, and responds to the State's answer to, and motion to dismiss, 
Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief. 
I. 
THE STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS IS PREMATURE 
The State's motion to dismiss Petitioner's Petition For Post-conviction Relief (hereinafter 
"petition") is premature since at this stage in the proceeding Petitioner has not yet received the 
Reporter's Transcript or had sufficient opportunity to conduct a thorough investigation of the 
underlying criminal case. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires review of the trial 
transcript to determine the nature, frequency and effect of counsel's errors, Hoffman v. Arave, 
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236 F.3d 523, 535 (9th Cir. 2001). Further, a copy of the transcript is necessary to provide to any 
independent experts retained by Petitioner. To request an expert to formulate an opinion prior to 
receipt of all relevant information such as the testimony of the State's expelis, falls below 
professional standards of practice. Finally, Petitioner has not had sufficient time to conduct a 
thorough investigation for claims outside the record. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 
358 (1963) (recognizing that even a thorough investigation of the record may not reveal all 
claims since often "the record is unclear or the errors are hidden" and noting that reliance solely 
on the record would likely render post-conviction proceedings "a meaningless ritual.") 
II. 
THE STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS IS NOT ONLY PREMATURE, BUT 
INCOMPLETE AND MISLEADING 
As noted above, it is impossible for Petitioner to file a final a complete list of claims 
before receipt of, and an opportunity to review, the Reporter's Transcript. Nevertheless, there 
are a few aspects of the State's Response which require response. 
The first aspect of the State's Response which requires response is the fact that the State 
does not move to dismiss every claim. Petitioner's understanding is based on the fact that the 
State moves to dismiss only a limited number of claims, such as those it asserts to be purely 
legal. To this extent, the State recognizes the need to amend Petitioner's petition after a 
sufficient time for review of the transcripts and to conduct an independent investigation. 
The second aspect of the State's Response which requires response is the fact that the 
State has misstated Petitioner's claims in an apparent attempt to prejudice the Court against 
Petitioner and his counsel. For example, in responding to Petitioner's Claim, B.1 ("Trial 
Counsel Failed To Retain Necessary Defense Experts"), subsections i-v, the State claims that 
"petitioner has no idea whether trial counsel hired any of the named experts or not and as such 
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has no evidence to support the claim." (Response, p. 4.) This is an incorrect assertion. As 
Petitioner noted, his counsel met with trial counsel for the purpose of identifying, at least in part, 
potential claims for post-conviction relief. As a result of that meeting, Petitioner stated the 
following: "Trial counsel failed to hire a forensic pathologist or other expert to review the 
autopsy results and make an independent determination of cause of death or injuries inflicted 
upon the victim prior to her death." (Petition, p. 12.) The State suggests that Petitioner and his 
counsel are lying to the Court. It is one thing to claim that there is no evidence to support the 
claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to utilized a pathologist, it is quite another to 
suggest that trial counsel did consult with one, contrary to a sworn statement made by Petitioner. 
If there is insufficient evidence to support the claim, then that is because Petitioner has not yet 
received the trial transcripts which would, at a minimum, include the testimony of the State's 
pathologist, an essential matter to be reviewed by a pathologist retained in post-conviction 
proceedings. 
A second example of the State's attempt to prejudice this Court is contained in its 
response to Petitioner's Claim, B.2 ("Trial Counsel Failed To Adequately Investigate 
Circumstances Surrounding Petitioner's Prior Conviction For Statutory Rape"). The State claims 
that "petitioner does not point to any part of the medical records to support his conclusion and is 
apparently unaware that trial counsel represented the defendant in the earlier rape charge. 
(Response, p. 4.) Actually, Petitioner is aware that Amil Myshin represented him in the earlier 
rape charge; that does not change the fact that trial counsel failed to adequately investigate and 
prepare for Ms. Oliver's testimony in the murder case. Mr. Myshin's records from his prior 
investigation did not contain Ms. Oliver's medical records, so he could not rely on those for her 
cross-examination at trial. Petitioner has not yet obtained the medical records because trial 
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counsel has not cooperated in his requests to disclose their files. Petitioner has not located the 
records in the Clerk's Record; indeed, Petitioner believes they were not made part ofthe record. 
A third example of the State's attempt to prejudice this Court against Petitioner and his 
counsel is in its response to Petitioner's Claim D.I ("Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective 
Assistance By Failure To Strike For Cause Or Utilize A Preemptory Strike Individual Jurors.") 
The State claims that Petitioner's counsel has violated their obligation of Candor to the Tribunal 
required by Rule 3.3 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. (Response, p. 5.) Petitioner 
submits that a careful review of his claim compared to the manner in which the State restates it, 
or misstates it, reveals that if any counsel has violated professional rules governing candor to the 
Court, it is the State. Petitioner has confirmed that the spouse of a deputy attorney general for 
the Idaho Department of Corrections did indeed sit on the jury. Petitioner believes this juror was 
the foreperson. Petitioner is investigating whether this juror was privy to prejudicial information 
both specific to Petitioner as well as general to inmates housed by the Department of 
Corrections. 
The third aspect of the State's Response that deserves a response is the State's assertion 
that Petitioner has failed to assert any defects in the jury instructions. Petitioner limits this 
response to Claim E.5 and Claim E.6, set forth in their entirety below. 
E. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN FAILING TO 
ADEQUATELY RAISE LEGAL CHALLENGES. 
*** 
5. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Challenge Idaho's 
"Heinous, Atrocious Or Cruel" Aggravating Circumstance, And The Respective 
Instruction To The Jury, As Unconstitutionally Vague And As Not Having Been 
Meaningfully Narrowed By The Idaho Supreme Court To Comport With The 
Eighth Amendment. 
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Respondent alleges that Petitioner "has not claimed a constitutional deficiency with this 
aggravator or jury instruction" and therefore asserts that the claim should be dismissed. 
(Response, p. 6.) Respondent is mistaken; the constitutional deficiency clearly alleged is that the 
aggravating circumstance contained in LC. § 19-2515(9)(e), commonly known as the "heinous, 
atrocious or cruel" aggravator, is unconstitutionally vague. (Petition, p. 20.) 
Dismissal is also improper because Petitioner has not yet had the opportunity to review 
the Reporter's Transcript to determine whether the Court provided any additional instructions to 
the jury beyond the written instructions, and to determine the manner in which the prosecutor 
argued the instruction. Until Petitioner receives and reviews the Reporter's Transcript, it is 
impossible to determine the full scope of this claim. 
Petitioner provides the following additional legal analysis based solely on his review of 
the written jury instructions attached as an exhibit to the Clerk's Record. The instructions at 
issue provided: 
The terms especially "heinous," "atrocious," or "cruel," are considered separately; 
but in combination with "manifesting exceptional depravity." The terms heinous, 
atrocious or cruel are intended to refer to those first-degree murders where the 
actual commission of the first-degree murder was accompanied by such additional 
acts as to set the crime apart from the norm of first-degree murders. 
A murder is especially heinous if it is extremely wicked or shockingly eviL 
Atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile. 
Cruel means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with utter indifference to, or 
even enjoyment of, the suffering of others. 
The statutory aggravating factor does not exist unless the murder was especially 
heinous, especially atrocious, or especially cruel, and such heinousness, 
atrociousness or cruelty manifested exceptional depravity. It might be thought 
that every murder involves depravity. However, exceptional depravity exists only 
where depravity is apparent to such an extent as to obviously offend all standards. 
of morality and intelligence. The terms "especially heinous manifesting 
exceptional depravity," "especially atrocious manifesting exceptional depravity," 
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or "especially cruel manifesting exceptional depravity" focus upon a defendant's 
state of mind at the time ofthe offense, as reflected by his words and acts. 
Instruction No. 44. 
The purpose of this instruction is to limit the scope of the aggravating circumstance to a 
narrow class of first-degree murders as required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment. 
However, the aggravating circumstance and the limiting instruction were unconstitutionally 
vague andlor otherwise insufficient to channel the jury's discretion in a manner necessary to 
restrict the aggravator to a narrow class of first degree murders. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 
u.s. 356 (1988). Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to 
this instruction on these grounds and by failing to submit the following argument. 
In State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 631 P.2d 187 (1981), the Idaho Supreme Court 
attempted to narrow the application of the aggravator to only those cases where the murder is 
both "heinous, atrocious or cruel" and "manifest[s] exceptional depravity." Osborn, 102 Idaho at 
418, 631 P.2d at 200 (quoting State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1973) and State v. Simants, 
250 N.W.2d 881, 891 (Neb. 1977». In addressing the meaning of "heinous, atrocious or cruel," 
the Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
The Florida Supreme Court interpreted this language as follows: "(W)e feel that 
the meaning of such terms is a matter of common knowledge, so that an ordinary 
man would not have to guess at what was intended. It is our interpretation that 
heinous means extremely wicked or shockingly evil; that atrocious means 
outrageously wicked and vile; and, that cruel means designed to inflict a high 
degree of pain with utter indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of 
others. What is intended to be included are those capital crimes where the actual 
commission of the capital felony was accompanied by such additional acts as to 
set the crime apart from the norm of capital felonies the conscienceless or pitiless 
crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim." Id. at 9. (Emphasis 
added) 
Osborn, 102 Idaho at 418,631 P.2d at 200 (emphasis added). 
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The Osborn Court adopted only a portion of the Dixon definition, specifically, that 
"heinous, atrocious or cruel" means: "extremely wicked or shockingly evil; that atrocious means 
outrageously wicked and vile; and, that cruel means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with 
utter indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others." The Osborn Court did not 
limit the aggravator to crimes which are "unnecessarily torturous to the victim." Instead, the 
Court relied on the fact that the Dixon definition had been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). 
In Proffitt, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the manner in which the Florida Supreme 
Court constructed the aggravator, stating: 
That court has recognized that while it is arguable "that all killings are atrocious, . 
. . (s)till, we believe that the Legislature intended something 'especially' heinous, 
atrocious or cruel when it authorized the death penalty for first degree murder." 
Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d, at 910. As a consequence, the court has indicated that 
the eighth statutory provision is directed only at "the conscienceless or pitiless 
crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim." State v. Dixon, 283 
So.2d, at 9. 
Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 255 (emphasis added). Thus, the Dixon definition was upheld, but only 
because a narrowing construction was applied limiting the aggravator to crimes which are 
"unnecessarily tortuous to the victim." This aspect of the Proffitt holding was overlooked by the 
Idaho Supreme Court which assumed the entirety of the instruction to be sufficient. Petitioner 
submits that the without the portion limiting the aggravator to crimes which are "unnecessarily 
tortuous to the victim," the Dixon definition is constitutionally deficient. This interpretation of 
the holding in Proffitt is confirmed by four subsequent U.S. Supreme Court cases: Maynard v. 
Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988); Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1 (1990); Sochor v. Florida, 504 
U.S. 527 (1992); and Bell v. Cone, _ U.S. _, 125 S.Ct. 847 (2005), all of which were 
decided after Osborn. 
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In Shell v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court rejected the portion of the Dixon limiting 
instruction utilized in Mississippi as constitutionally insufficient to save the vague aggravator. 
Shell, 498 U.S. at 1. The instruction at issue in Mississippi provided: "[T]he word heinous 
means extremely wicked or shockingly evil; atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile; and 
cruel means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with indifference to, or even enjoyment 
ofL] the suffering of others." Shell, 498 U.S. at 2.W This is in essence the portion of the Dixon 
instruction adopted by Idaho, and, as noted in Justice Marshall's concurrence, also determined to 
be insufficient in Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. at 361-364. Shell, 498 U.S. at 2. 
In Sochor v. Florida, the Supreme Court clarified its holding in Proffitt. Specifically, the 
Court stated: 
Understanding the factor, as defined in Dixon, to apply only to a "conscienceless 
or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim," we held in 
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976), that the 
sentencer had adequate guidance. See id., at 255-256, 96 S.Ct., at 2968 (opinion 
of Stewart, Powell, and STEVENS, JJ.). 
Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. at 536. 
Most recently, the U.S. Supreme Court in Bell v. Cone, U.S. _, 125 S. Ct. 847 
(2005), addressed the question of whether the narrowing construction presumed to have been 
applied by the Tennessee Supreme Court was constitutionally sufficient. The Court upheld the 
construction, noting that the Tennessee Supreme Court had consistently required a finding of 
torture to the victim before death or acts evincing a depraved state of mind. Id. _ U.S. _, 
125 S. Ct. at 854-855. The Supreme Court cited past Tennessee opinions where "torture" 
involved a sufficient period of time for the victim to realize what was occurring and where 
"depraved state of mind" involved repetitive acts of violence unnecessary to accomplish murder. 
Id, at 855. 
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Just as the portion of the Dixon limiting instruction relied upon in Osborn and 
incorporated into Petitioner's jury instruction, is insufficient, so is the portion of the Simants 
instruction defining the phrase "manifesting exceptional depravity." In Moore v. Clarke, 904 
F.2d 1226 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 930 (1992), the Eighth Circuit explained that 
the use of "exceptional" is as vague and subjective as "especially," a standard rejected by the 
Supreme Court in Maynard, supra. 
Thus, Instruction No. 44, which follows the definition in Osborn, is unconstitutionally 
vague, or otherwise insufficient to have guided the jury's discretion. Trial counsel should have 
objected to the aggravator itself, and the limiting instruction on the grounds that they are vague, 
overbroad and unhelpful to the jury. But for trial counsel's ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable 
likelihood that Petitioner would not have been sentenced to death based upon this factor. 
i. The Unconstitntional Aggravating Circumstance Requires Re-Sentencing. 
After review of the transcripts and record in this case, Petitioner anticipates presenting 
evidence and law in support of this claim. Nevertheless, Petitioner submits that because the jury 
weighed the unconstitutional aggravator in sentencing him to death, his death sentence must be 
vacated and he must either receive a new sentencing hearing or have his case reviewed anew by 
the state court. In a "weighing" state, if an aggravating circumstance is invalidated, but other 
valid aggravating circumstances remain, the sentencing calculus must be redone. See, e.g., 
Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990). Idaho is a "weighing" state. See Williams v. 
Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1478 n.l3 (9th Cir. 1995). Under Clemons, the invalidation of the 
aggravator requires resentencing, appellate reweighing, or appellate harmless error analysis. 
Because appellate reweighing and the error cannot be deemed harmless in light of Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), resentencing is necessary. But see State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 
RESPONSE TO STATE'S RESPONSE TO POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, STATE'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS, AND STATE'S OBJECTION TO CIVIL DISCOVERY 
9 
00053 
496, 509-510 988 P.2d 1170, 1183-1184 (1999) (holding that the invalidation of one aggravating 
circumstance does not invalidate a death sentence so long as the sentencer complied with Idaho's 
death penalty statute) 
ii. Even If The Aggravating Circumstance Is Valid, The Jury Erred In Finding 
It In This Case. 
After review of the transcripts and record in this case, Petitioner anticipates presenting 
evidence and law in support ofthis claim. 
6. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance of Counsel In Failing to 
Challenge The Aggravating Circumstance, I.C. § 19-2515(9)(1), And The 
Respective Instruction To The Jury, That The Defendant Exhibited Utter 
Disregard For Human Life, As Unconstitutional. 
The Court provided the jury with instructions regarding the aggravating circumstance 
contained in I.e. § 19-2515(9)(f), commonly known as the "utter disregard" aggravator. 
Specifically, Instruction No. 45: 
"Exhibited utter disregard for human life," with regard to the murder or the 
circumstances surrounding its commission, refers to acts or circumstances 
surrounding the crime that exhibit the highest, the utmost, callous disregard for 
human life, i.e., the cold-blooded, pitiless slayer. "Cold-blooded" means marked 
by absence of warm feeling: without consideration, compunction, or clemency, 
matter of fact, or emotionless. "Pitiless" means devoid of or unmoved by mercy 
or compassion. A "cold-blooded, pitiless slayer" refers to a slayer who kills 
without feeling or sympathy. The utter disregard aggravating factor refers to the 
defendant's lack of conscience regarding killing another human being. 
Instruction No. 45A provided that 
The alleged aggravating circumstance of having acted with "reckless indifference 
to human life", (sic) with regard to the murder or the circumstances surrounding 
its commission, refers to conduct so wanton or reckless with respect to the 
unjustified infliction of harm as to be tantamount to a knowing willingness that it 
occur. 
The purpose of these instructions was to define the "utter disregard" aggravator. Trial 
counsel should have objected to these instructions on the grounds that they are vague, overbroad 
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and unhelpful to the jury. The utter disregard factor is unconstitutionally vague, even with the 
definitions outlined in this instruction. The jury found the aggravating circumstance that the 
defendant exhibited utter disregard for human life. But for trial counsel's ineffectiveness, the 
Petitioner may not have been sentenced to death based upon this factor. 
It was ineffective assistance not to challenge the constitutionality of the "utter disregard" 
aggravator. The Idaho Supreme Court ruled in State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho at 405,631 P.2d 187 
(1981), that the utter disregard aggravator "is meant to be reflective of acts or circumstances 
surrounding the crime which exhibit the highest, the utmost, callous disregard for human life, 
i.e., the cold-blooded, pitiless slayer." Osborn, 102 Idaho at 419, 631 P.2d at 200. The Court 
added in State v. Fain, 116 Idaho 82, 774 P.2d 252 (1989), that this aggravator refers to the 
defendant's lack of conscientious scruples against killing another human being. Id. at 99. 
Petitioner recognizes that the Idaho Supreme Court upheld this factor by limiting its application. 
Osborn, 102 Idaho at 419, 631 P.2d at 200; State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 670 P.2d 463 
(1983). Petitioner acknowledges that Idaho's utter disregard factor has also been upheld by the 
United States Supreme Court. Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463 (1993). Even though both the 
Idaho Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court have upheld this aggTavator against 
constitutional challenge effective counsel will specifically challenge it in every pending capital 
case. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405; Creech, 507 U.S. 463. 
Petitioner submits that the utter disregard aggravator is sufficiently devoid of meaningful 
content; is sufficiently vague and capable of application to any first degree murder, that it fails to 
fulfill its role of narrowing the class of murders to which it may be applied. It violates the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments, and presumably Article I, Section 6 of the Constitution ofthe State 
of Idaho. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. at 364 
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(1988). The manner in which the United States Supreme Court upheld Idaho's utter disregard 
factor actually demonstrates its invalidity. 
Petitioner, before addressing the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Arave v. 
Creech, wishes to put that decision in context by reviewing the opinion of the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals that preceded it. As Mr. Creech's case wound its way through the federal 
court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found the utter disregard factor to be unconstitutional. 
Given this standard, we find that the narrowing construction of section 19-2515(g)(6), as applied 
to Creech, was unconstitutionally vague. Having concluded that the statutory language "the 
defendant exhibited utter disregard for human life" was too vague, the Idaho Supreme Court 
limited it by stating "the phrase is meant to be reflective of acts or circumstances surrounding the 
crime which exhibit the highest, the utmost, callous disregard for human life, i.e., the cold-
blooded, pitiless slayer." Osborn, 631 P.2d at 201. 
This limiting construction gives no more guidance than the statute. Rather than defining 
"utter disregard," the court in Osborn merely emphasized it. But the problem with the "utter 
disregard" standard is not that it is too Iowa threshold, it is that it is unclear. Idaho's limiting 
construction does not resolve this infirmity. Just as it is difficult to determine what constitutes 
"utter disregard for human life," it is unclear what constitutes "the highest, the utmost, callous 
disregard for human life." The Supreme Court noted in Cartwright, 486 U.S. at 364, that the 
"contention that the addition of the word 'especially' somehow guides the jury's discretion, even 
if the term 'heinous' does not, is untenable." Cartwright's reasoning appears to apply here. Creech 
v. Arave, 947 F.2d 873 at 883-84 (9th Cir. 1991)(footnote omitted). 
In discussing the constitutionality of the utter disregard factor the Supreme Court 
recognized that "the question is close." Creech, 507 U.S. at 475. The Supreme Court upheld the 
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utter disregard factor by assuming that the Idaho Supreme Court in Osborn limited its application 
to "the subclass of defendants who kill without feeling or sympathy," as opposed to those who 
"kill with anger, jealousy, revenge, or a variety of other emotions" or "take pleasure in killing." 
Creech, 507 U.S. at 476. To reach this conclusion, the Court explained its analysis of the 
Osborn gloss on the utter disregard factor by writing: 
Webster's Dictionary defines "pitiless" to mean devoid of, or unmoved by, mercy 
or compassion. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1726 (1986). The 
lead entry for "cold-blooded" gives coordinate definitions. One, "marked by 
absence of warm feelings: without consideration, compunction, or clemency," id., 
at 442, mirrors the definition of "pitiless." The other defines "cold-blooded" to 
mean "matter of fact, emotionless." Ibid. It is true that "cold-blooded" is 
sometimes also used to describe "premeditation," Black's Law Dictionary 260 
(6th ed. 1990) -- a mental state that may coincide with, but is distinct from, a lack 
of feeling or compassion. But premeditation is clearly not the sense in which the 
Idaho Supreme Court used' the word "cold-blooded" in Osborn. Other terms in the 
limiting construction -- "callous" and "pitiless" -- indicate that the court used the 
word "cold-blooded" in its first sense. "Premeditation," moreover, is specifically 
addressed else-where in the Idaho homicide statutes, Idaho Code § 18-4003(a) 
(1987) (amended version at Supp. 1992); had the Osborn court meant 
premeditation, it likely would have used the statutory language. In ordinary usage, 
then, the phrase "cold-blooded, pitiless slayer" refers to a killer who kills without 
feeling or sympathy. 
Creech, 507 U.S. at 471-72. 
Petitioner notes that of the two alternatives, "feeling or sympathy," only the former can 
be said to narrow the field of murderers to whom the phrase "without feeling or sympathy" can 
be applied. Who committing first degree murder can be said to be acting with sympathy for his 
victim? Therefore, according the United States Supreme Court, the utter disregard factor fulfills 
its Eighth Amendment limiting function by focusing on those who kill with an absence of 
feeling, ruling out those who "kill with anger, jealousy, revenge, or a variety of other emotions" 
or "take pleasure in killing." Creech, 507 U.S. at 476. 
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One problem with this analysis of the Supreme Court is that, in struggling to uphold the 
utter disregard factor, the Court adopted its own limiting construction of the aggravator; a 
construction which the Idaho Supreme Court never adopted before or after Creech v. Arave, 
supra. What is enlightening about the majority opinion is that a majority of the U.S. Supreme 
Court found that without this additional definition and limitation, the language of the utter 
disregard aggravator, even as refined by the Idaho Supreme Court's limiting construction, was 
too vague to pass constitutional muster. Id. Based upon this analysis, the constitutionality of the 
"utter disregard" aggravator factor is suspect and the U.S. Supreme Court may reconsider its 
decision. 
Another reason why the U.S. Supreme Court may reconsider the constitutionality of the 
aggravator is the opinion in State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 967 P.2d 702 (1998). In Wood, the 
Idaho Supreme Court approved finding the utter disregard aggravator based on the defendant's 
sexual molestation of the victim prior to killing her and subsequently the sexual abuse of her 
body seven days after her death. Id. at 103-4, 967 P.2d at 717-8. Thus, in finding the (g)(6) 
aggravator to exist, the district court considered Wood's conduct seven days subsequent to the 
murder. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that this aggravator must be limited to the "acts or 
circumstances surrounding the crime which exhibit the highest, the utmost, callous disregard for 
human life, i.e., the cold-blooded pitiless slayer." Osborn, 102 Idaho at 419, 631 P.2d at 201. 
The issue is whether or not conduct committed seven days after the crime constitutes 
circumstances surrounding the crime. The Court held that the district court was correct in 
considering post-mortem conduct in the detennination of the appropriate sentence. Wood, 132 
Idaho at 104, 967 P.2d at 718. The Court noted that several states agree with the interpretation, 
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including Georgia and Nevada. See Conklin v. State, 254 Ga. 558, 331 S.E.2d 532, 539 (Ga. 
1985) (holding that the offense of murder does not necessarily terminate at the instant of death); 
Cavanaugh v. State, 102 Nev. 478, 729 P.2d 481, 486 (Nev. 1986) (holding that post-mortem 
mutilation of body parts shows depravity of mind). However, some jurisdictions disagree with 
this analysis, holding that it is inappropriate to consider actions after the death of the victim 
because they are irrelevant in determining aggravating circumstances. See Jackson v. State, 451 
So.2d 458, 463 (Fla.1984) ("Actions after the death of the victim are irrelevant in determining 
[the especially heinous, atrocious or cruel] aggravating circumstance. "); State v. Ortiz, 131 Ariz. 
195, 639 P.2d 1020, 1035 (1981) (Holding that to make out cruelty under the statute the evidence 
must show that the victim was made to suffer during the commission of the murder; cruelty 
cannot consist of abuse of the victim's body after his death.); and State v. Preston, 673 S.W.2d 1 
(Mo. 1984) (holding that there was sufficient evidence supporting the aggravating circumstance 
because the victim was physically and psychologically tortured before death). 
For a death sentence to be free from arbitrariness and capriciousness, "[t]he State must 
channel the sentencer's discretion by clear and objective standards that provide specific and 
detailed guidance, and that make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of 
death." Creech, 507 U.S. at 471. The uncertainty in the meaning of this aggravator results in the 
specific arbitrary and capricious application of the death penalty that the Constitution does not 
allow. Based on Wood and challenges to similar aggravators pending around the country, failure 
to preserve the issue by a specific challenge was ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of 
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, §§ 5,6 and 
13 of the Idaho Constitution. 
RESPONSE TO STATE'S RESPONSE TO POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, STATE'S 15 
MOTION TO DISMISS, AND STATE'S OBJECTION TO CIVIL DISCOVERY 00059 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court refrain from ruling on any motion to 
dismiss Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner has not received the Reporter's 
transcript, thus has not had the chance review it and formulate his claims, nor has Petitioner had 
the opportunity to conduct a full and adequate investigation outside the record. Petitioner has 
acted with diligence in preparing the initial petition and will undeniably seek this Court's leave 
to amend his Petition pursuant to I.e. § 19-4906(a) and ICR 15 from time to time as 
development of his case in post-conviction progresses. 
DATED this 13th day April, 2005. 
KIMB Y J. ONS 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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COMES NOW the Petitioner, ERICK VIRGIL HALL, by and through his counsel at the 
State Appellate Public Defender, and moves this Court for an Order granting Petitioner full 
access to the grand jury transcripts from the underlying capital case number H0300518, Grand 
Jury Case No. 03-35. 
The grand jury transcripts are part of the record in this case. (R., p. 693 (Certificate of 
Exhibits).) Counsel in this case has a copy of the grand jury transcripts. See IC.A.R. 32 ("in 
any criminal or post-conviction case where a documentary exhibit, including a presentence 
report, is transmitted to the Supreme Court for use in an appellate proceeding, the district court 
shall serve a copy of the documentary exhibit on the attorney general and on appellate counsel 
for the defendant, subject to the confidentiality provisions of IC.A.R. 32."). Thus, the 
transcripts are available to Petitioner's counsel. 
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However, in reviewing the record thus far received, counsel noted restrictions imposed by 
the trial court on Mr. Hall's access to the grand jury transcripts. (R., pp. 24-26, 55-57, 68-71.) 
The trial court specifically decided that Mr. Hall could read the transcripts at the courthouse and 
could not take copies to read at the jail. (R., pp. 68-71.) The Orders apparently applied until the 
conclusion of the case. (R., pp. 25, 56.) Although it appears that the Orders are no longer in 
effect, in an abundance of caution Petitioner moves this court for an Order allowing him copies 
of the grand jury transcripts. 
In Idaho capital cases, a Petitioner generally receives one opportunity to raIse all 
challenges to his conviction and sentence in a petition for post-conviction relief. State v. 
Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795, 807, 820 P.2d 665, 677 (1991). Failure to raise all issues which were 
known or should have been known may constitute waiver of such claims. I.C. § 19-2719(5); see 
Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 471-472, 903 P.2d 58, 60-61 (1 995)(upholding dismissal of fact-
specific claims raised in successive petition for post-conviction relief based on irregularities that 
occurred in criminal case because such claims were known by petitioner at time of prior 
petition). Both equal protection and due process require that the state provide Petitioner an 
adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396, 403-06 
(1985)(imposing procedural impediments to effective assistance of counsel on appeal as of right 
under state statute implicates both equal protection and due process); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 
477, 485 (l963)(holding that where a state cannot deny transcripts to indigent criminal 
defendants at post-conviction or on appeal, neither can the state's statutory scheme allow the 
public defender's office to refuse to order those transcripts without violating the Fourteenth 
Amendment); Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748, 751-752 (l967)(holding counsel's waiver on 
appeal of petitioner's right to a full transcript violated due process). In a capital case, the Eighth 
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Amendment is also implicated, and defendants facing a death sentence are entitled to heightened 
procedural safeguards. See Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523, 539-540 (9th Cir. 2001); citing 
Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 125-27 (1991). 
In this case, information contained within these transcripts is relevant to Mr. Hall's 
special appellate proceedings. (See R., pp. 16-21; 186-188 (irregularities in return of 
Indictments»; see also, e.g., Hoffman, 236 F.3d at 535 (reasoning that a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel requires review of the trial transcripts to determine the nature, frequency 
and effect of counsel's errors). This early in the post-conviction proceedings, and without the 
receipt of transcripts, it is impossible to determine whether trial counsel effectively investigated 
and litigated any grand jury irregularities. It is critical that Mr. Hall review the materials already 
received by this office. 
The grand jury transcripts are two hundred and seventy-three (273) pages. The 
transcripts are dense, often dealing with forensic science, locations and timelines, and their 
review will take considerable time. The review will also be an ongoing exercise. Once the trial 
transcripts are received, Petitioner will need to compare grand jury testimony to trial testimony. 
Counsel's copies of the grand jury transcripts contain no names of grand jurors. 
Furthermore, every witness who testified before the grand jury either (a) testified at trial, or (b) 
will be thoroughly investigated during post-conviction. By contrast, the clerk's record itself-
already available to Petitioner-does contain grand jury names, so disclosure of the grand jury 
transcripts does not in any way disclose additional confidential information to Petitioner. 
Pursuant to the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution, the corresponding provisions of the Idaho Constitution, and matters of record, 
Petitioner respectfully asks this Court for access to the grand jury transcripts. 
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DATED this 7th day September, 2005. 
. ~ , / ~ 
" 
! a c vL }1(. ,4{ c '-( I k.L (/V'---' 
PAULAM. SWENSEN 
Co-Counsel, Capital Litigation Unit 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
. hI 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this I·~ay of September, 2005, served a true and 
correct copy of the forgoing MOTION FOR PETITIONER ACCESS TO GRAND JURY 
TRANSCRIPTS as indicated below: 
ROGER BOURNE 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191 
BOISE ID 83702 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL 
INMATE # 33835 
IMSI 
POBOX51 




~ Hand Delivery 
+ Statehouse Mail 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile 
__ Hand Delivery 
MOTION FOR PETITIONER ACCESS TO GRAND JURY TRANSCRIPTS 
00066 
5 
MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State ofIdaho 
I.S.B. # 4843 
MARK J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. # 6330 
PAULA M. SWENSEN, I.S.B. # 6722 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, 
Petitioner, 
v. 












CASE NO. SPOT0500155 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
(CAPITAL CASE) 
COMES NOW, Erick Virgil Hall, Petitioner, provides notice that a hearing will be held 
regarding the Motion For Petitioner Access To Grand Jury Transcripts. Due to the Court's 
calendar, the hearing will be held before the Honorable Thomas F. Neville at 200 W. Front St., 
Boise, Idaho on the 3rd day of October, 2005, at 1 :30 p.m. (MDT). 
DATED this i h day of September, 2005. 
OR\G'{~AL 
PAULAM. SWENSEN, 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this i h day of September, 2005, served a true and 
correct copy ofthe attached NOTICE OF HEARING by the method indicated below: 
ROGER BOURNE 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191 
BOISE ID 83702 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL 
INMATE # 33835 
IMSI 
POBOX 51 
BOISE ID 83707 




"I Hand Delivery 
~ Statehouse Mail 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile 
__ Hand Delivery 
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Recording: 
13:52:14 - New case 
HALL, ERICK VIRGIL 
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Petitioner not present for the record. 
13:52:53 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
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to G/J transcript. Court understands there is a stipulation 
regarding the 
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transcript. 
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CASE NO. SPOT0500155 
STIPULATION FOR RELEASE OF 
JURY QUESTIONNAIRES AND 
FOR ADDITIONS TO THE 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
(Capital Case) 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, by and through his counsel at the State 
Appellate Public Defender, and the Respondent, by and through its representative, Roger 
Bourne, and respectfully request this Court to enter the proposed orders based on the following: 
1. Petitioner has contacted the Respondent regarding the release of the completed jury 
questionnaires in the underlying criminal case, Case No. H0300518, submitting that 
the questionnaires are relevant to claims raised in his initial petition for post-
conviction relief See e.g., Claim D ("Deprivation of effective assistance of counsel 
during the jury selection process"). STIPULATION: The parties stipulate that this 
Court should order the clerk or the jury commissioner to permit the Petitioner to 
inspect and copy the completed jury questionnaires submitted by all prospective 
jurors in the underlying criminal case. 
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2. Petitioner has contacted the Respondent regarding the preparation of additional 
transcripts based on recorded but untranscribed portions of the underlying criminal 
proceedings, submitting that preparation of the transcripts are required by law, and 
relevant to claims raised in his initial petition for post-conviction relief. See e.g., 
I.A.R. 25(d), I.A.R. 25(1); Claim D ("Deprivation of effective assistance of counsel 
during the jury selection process"); and Claim E.2 ("Trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance by failing to adequately challenge the introduction of statements 
made by petitioner to law enforcement"). STIPULATION: The parties stipulate that 
the court reporter should transcribe the following: 
a. The recorded, but untranscribed, exercise of peremptory challenges by both 
parties during the jury selection process (Tr., p. 3376, Ls. 12-13 ("Peremptory 
challenges exercised by counsel."»; 
b. The recorded, but untranscribed, playing of the audio-visual recording of the 
Petitioner's statements to law enforcement (Tr., p. 4185, L. 22 ("Video partially 
played for the jury.); p. 4205, L. 22 ("Tape played for the jury."); p. 4208, Ls. 22-
23 ("Tape fast forwarded and tape played to its conclusion." ». 
DATED this 28th day October, 2005. 
ROGER BOURNE 
Deputy, Ada County Prosecutor 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this~\ day of October, 2005, served a true and 
correct copy of the forgoing STIPULATION FOR RELEASE OF JURY QUESTIONNAIRES 
AND FOR ADDITIONS TO THE REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT as indicated below: 
ROGER BOURNE 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191 
BOISE ID 83702 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL 
INMATE # 33835 
IMSI 
POBOX 51 




X Hand Delivery 
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U.S. Mail 
Facsimile 




STIPULATION FOR RELEASE OF JURY QUESTIONNAIRES AND FOR 
ADDITIONS TO THE REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
3 
!4J002 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIStf(J.UCT OF 4 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OFAi~A FIL~t. l<ro 
NOV 152005 















THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
------------------------------) 
PETITIONER ACCESS TO 
AND POSSESSION OF 
GRAND JURY TRANSCRIPTS 
SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS 
Motion having been made, hearing having been held on October 3,2005, and the Court 
otherwise being fully infonned, 
It is hereby ordered that Petitioner's counsel may provide a copy of the grand jury 
transcripts, Grand Jury Case No. 03-35, to Petitioner. Petitioner's counsel shall redact said 
transcripts to eliminate the reference to the current employer of grand jury witness Deidre 
Palmquist, said reference being at page 150, line 19, of the April 22, 2003, transcript of the 
above grand jury proceedings. The court further orders that Petitioner shall not make copies of 
the grand jury transcripts or otherwise cotmnunicate the content of the grand jury transcripts with 
any person other than counsel and counsel's agents. 
It is so ordered. 
tt, (1~~4y 
Dated this I·~ day ornot t i?,2005. 
Eo. 
THOMAS __ NEVILLE 
District Judge 
ORDER GRANTlNG PETITIONER ACCESS TO AND POSSESSION 
OF GRAND JURy TRANSCRIPTS SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS 
000'74 
10 / 2012005 TUIT 15:18 fTXlRX NO 58281 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
/ N~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _'_::l_ day of Getober, 2005, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTlNG PETITIONER ACCESS TO AND 
POSSESSION OF GRAND JURy TRANSCRIPTS SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS by 
method indicated below to: 
MARK ACKLEY 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE 
BOISE ID 83703 . 
ROGER BOURNE 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
200 W. FRONT. SUITE 3191 
BOISE ID 83702 
__ U.S. Mail 
_ Statehouse Mail rn 
--.b. Facsimile - <:t. fY\()J 
__ Hand Delivery 
__ u.s. Mail 
-.-_ Statehouse Mail "-
~ Facsimile ~ ~~ 
__ ' Hand Delivery 
ORDER GRANTlNG PETITIONER ACCESS TO AND 'POSSESSION 
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ORDER FOR PREPARATION 
OF ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPTS 
----------------------------~) (Capital Case) 
Stipulation having been made and the Court otherwise being sufficiently advised, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petitioner's request for the preparation of 
additional transcripts is GRANTED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court reporter shall transcribe the following: 
a. The recorded but untranscribed portion of the jury selection process pertaining to 
the parties' exercise of their peremptory challenges (Tr., p. 3376, Ls. 12-13 
("Peremptory challenges exercised by counsel.")); 
b. The recorded but untranscribed portion of the trial where the audio-visual 
recording of the Petitioner's statements to law enforcement was played for the 
jury (Tr., p. 4185, L. 22 ("Video partially played for the jury.); p. 4205, L. 22 
("Tape played for the jury,"); p. 4208, Ls. 22-23 ("Tape fast forwarded and tape 
played to its conclusion." )). 
Dated this fS '~day of J~'-~dl..c.,,\ ,2005. 
THOMAS F. NEVILLE 
District Judge 
ORDER FOR PREPARATION OF ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPTS 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this £ day of pJ~ ,2005, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER FOR PREPARATION OF ADDITIONAL 
TRANSCRIPTS by method indicated below to: 
MARK ACKLEY 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE 
BOISE ID 83703 
ROGER BOURNE 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191 
BOISE ID 83702 
u.S. Mail --
__ Statehouse 11.ail () 
"- Facsimile -~ 
__ Hand Delivery 
U.S. Mail 
__ Statehouse ~ail a 
t::L Facsimile -~ 
__ Hand Delivery 
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State Appellate Public Defender 
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Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
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CASE NO. SPOT0500155 
MOTION FOR DISCOVERY 
(CAPITAL CASE) 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, by and through his counsel at the State 
Appellate Public Defender (hereinafter "SAPD"), and moves this Honorable Court pursuant to 
the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Sections 
5,6,7, and 8 of the Idaho Constitution, I.e. § 19-4901 et seq., § 19-2719, and I.e.R. 57(b) to 
order discovery. In support of this motion, the Petitioner relies on his Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Discovery and moves the Court for an order granting discovery as specified below. 
Before identifying Petitioner's specific requests for discovery, Petitioner requests the 
Court's consideration of the following prefatory note regarding the appendices contained herein 
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and their respective attachments. The attachments are voluminous but necessary. The purpose 
of the attachments is three-fold: first, to demonstrate to the Court the measures taken to preclude 
requests for matters previously disclosed; second, to assist the State in identifying legible and 
complete copies of documents requested; and third, to create a record for appellate and post-
conviction purposes identifying illegible, redacted, or otherwise incomplete documents bearing 
upon trial counsels' ability to prepare an adequate defense. 
SPECIFIC DISCOVERY REQUESTED 
I. Witnesses, Prospective Witnesses, and Other Persons of Interest. 
A. Lisa Manora Lewis. According to police reports, Ms. Lewis told Detective Dave 
Smith and Scott Birch of the Attorney General's Office that she and Peggy Jean 
Colbert Hill spoke to Ms. Henneman regarding directions back to the DoubleTree 
Inn. Purportedly, Petitioner and Patrick Bernard Hoffert then arrived, at which 
point Petitioner spoke briefly to Ms. Henneman. For unknown reasons, the State 
opted not to call Ms. Lewis to testify. Petitioner requests the following: 
1. Prosecuting attorney documents. l 
2. All statements and summaries of statements to law enforcement, including 
Scott Birch, either made by or attributed to Ms. Lewis, regardless of 
medium, and all reports and notes made by law enforcement about Ms. 
Lewis, including those made by Scott Birch. 
3. All statements and summaries of statements to, and reports or notes by, 
SRO Mike Barker. 
1 "Prosecuting attorney documents" refers to memoranda, notes, or recordings prepared by the 
prosecutors and their investigators that contain statements or summaries of statements based on 
their interviews, or their presence during interviews, with any person during the course of their 
investigation and preparation for the underlying criminal case regardless of whether such 
individual ever testified at trial. 
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B. Peggy Jean Colbert Hill. Ms. Hill confirmed Ms. Lewis' story when 
interviewed by Detective Dave Smith and Scott Birch. Additionally, Ms. Hill 
noticed Ms. Henneman's yellow sapphire ring and recalled that Petitioner left 
with Ms. Henneman. The State did not call her to testify. Petitioner requests the 
following: 
1. Prosecuting attorney documents. 
2. All statements and summaries of statements to law enforcement, including 
to Scott Birch, either made by or attributed to Ms. Hill, regardless of 
medium, and reports and notes made by law enforcement about Ms. Hill, 
including those made by Scott Birch. 
3. All statements and summaries of statements to, and reports or notes by, 
SRO Mike Barker. 
C. Patrick Bernard Hoffert. Mr. Hoffert was with Ms. Lewis and Ms. Hill at the 
time they saw Petitioner near the Greenbelt, and met Lynn Henneman. Mr. 
Hoffert is a person of interest in the Henneman homicide. He committed suicide 
the night after the homicide. Petitioner requests the following: 
1. All reports and investigative notes regarding the death of Patrick Bernard 
Hoffert, including but not limited to: 
a. Law enforcement reports and notes related to Mr. Hoffert's suicide at 
408 E. 51 st St. #6, Garden City, Idaho, on September 25,2000. 
b. Law enforcement reports and notes related to Garden City PD Incident 
No. 01-2000-03006, whether generated by Garden City or other law 
enforcement agencies. 
2. Copies of all audio and video-taped interviews conducted in connection 
with Mr. Hoffert's death, including but not limited to the interviews of 
Verdell Jean Stinn/Rugger and Deirdre Muncy. 
3. Any writings attributed to Mr. Hoffert on the day of his suicide, including 
but not limited to property collected by Garden City Police Department 
(hereinafter "GCPD") from the suicide investigation, including "notebook 
wi notes from Hoffert," property no. 12448. 
MOTION FOR DISCOVERY 3 
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4. Results of any forensic testing conducted upon the 1989 black Toyota, 
VIN JT4RN13P4K0005180, property no. 12455. 
5. Coroner/ pathology notes and reports regarding the death of Mr. Hoffert. 
6. Any DNA or other forensic profile developed on Mr. Hoffel1. 
7. Detective Allen's supplemental report on the suicide scene. 
D. Chris Hall. Mr. Hall was a person of interest in the Lynn Henneman homicide 
investigation. Petitioner requests the following discovery: 
1. Prosecuting attorney documents. 
2. All statements and summaries of statements to law enforcement either 
made by or attributed to Mr. Hall, regardless of medium, and all reports 
and notes made by law enforcement about Mr. Hall. 
E. Christian Johnson. Mr. Johnson testified for the State at trial. (Tr., pp. 3760-
3813.) He was initially a suspect in the Henneman homicide. (Tr., p. 3776.) Mr. 
Johnson may have been represented by the Ada County Public Defender's office 
during or prior to his testimony, and had charges pending against him at the time 
of trial. (Tr., p. 3776.) Petitioner requests the following: 
1. Prosecuting attorney documents. 
2. Any and all incentives to testify against Erick Hall explicitly or implicitly 
offered to, or requested by, this witness. 2 
3. All statements and summaries of statements to law enforcement either 
made by or attributed to Mr. Johnson, regardless of medium, and all 
reports and notes made by law enforcement about Mr. Johnson. 
2 Incentives to testify include, but are not limited to, agreements, expectations or promises of 
leniency, favorable prison or jail treatment, and accommodations or improved conditions of 
confinement. Further, all discovery requests related to plea negotiations and/or incentives to 
testify include any type of documents or audio or video recordings that contain any reference to 
any form of interaction with any witness or prospective witness and/or his/her attorney regarding 
plea negotiations and/or favorable treatment regardless of the outcome of any proceeding and 
regardless of whether favorable negotiations or treatment were in fact provided. 
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4. A complete NCIC criminal record check, including juvenile criminal 
records. 
5. Documentation or summaries of all off-record and/or ex parte 
conversations regarding Mr. Johnson's criminal history or ongoing 
criminal proceedings. (Tr., p. 3676, Ls. 12-17.) 
6. Documents or summaries of plea negotiations related to the case for which 
Mr. Johnson made an appearance on or about 10/13/04. (Tr., p. 3676.) 
7. Any search warrant from any search and seizure of Mr. Johnson. (Tr., p. 
3783). 
8. All reports and notes from Idaho Department of Corrections and Idaho 
Department of Probation and Parole including, but not limited to: 
a. Copies of any self-initiated requests for parole and/or probation 
from September 2000 to present. 
b. Documentation of parole or probation hearings and results, from 
September 2000 to present. 
c. Copies of any parole and/or probation plans from September 2000 
to present. 
d. Reports or notes or other documentation made by Mr. Johnson's 
parole or probation officer from September 2000 to present. 
e. Documentation from any probationary search and seizure from Mr. 
Johnson's residence or personal effects stored at any other 
location. 
F. Miriam Colon. Ms. Colon testified for the State at trial. (Tr., pp. 3564-3602.) 
1. Prosecuting attorney documents. 
2. All statements and summaries of statements to law enforcement either 
made by or attributed to Ms. Colon, regardless of medium, and all reports 
and notes made by law enforcement about Ms. Colon. 
3. A complete NCIC criminal record check, including juvenile criminal 
records. 
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G. Norma Jean Oliver. Ms. Oliver testified against Petitioner at his sentencing, 
claiming that Petitioner had previously forcibly raped her. (Tr. pp. 4756-4783.) 
Her testimony related to alleged events culminating in Petitioner's guilty plea to 
statutory rape in State v. Hall, Ada County Case No. M9108836/HCRI8591. 
Records sought by but not utilized by trial counsel, indicate significant and 
material inconsistencies between Ms. Oliver's sentencing testimony and 
information she previously provided to law enforcement and medical personnel 
near the time of the purported forcible rape. Based on her erratic behavior and 
sentencing testimony, there is reason to doubt whether she was competent to 
testify. 3 Accordingly, Petitioner requests the following discovery regarding this 
witness: 
1. Prosecuting attorney documents. 
2. All statements and summaries of statements to law enforcement either 
made by or attributed to Ms. Oliver, regardless of medium, and all reports 
and notes made by law enforcement about Ms. Oliver. 
3. Any incentives to testify against Erick Hall explicitly or implicitly offered 
to, or requested by, Ms. Oliver. 
4. Transcript of hearing to release 1992 Presentence Investigation Report 
held on 10/28/03. 
5. A complete NCIC criminal record check, including juvenile criminal 
records. 
3 (Tr., pp. 4755-4756 (noting Ms. Oliver was "too distraught to even talk to" defense counsel); p. 
4777, Ls. 2-7, p. 4783, Ls. 17-18 (noting that she had been on medication but was not at the time 
of testifying, even though she admitted having a chemical imbalance); pp. 4756-4782 (indicating 
she could not recall several aspects of the alleged forcible rape); p. 4780 (noting that she was on 
SSI because she has a chemical imbalance and is unable to keep a job); pp. 4952-4954 
(indicating that forcible rape charges had been reduced to statutory rape because she was 
"vulnerable," "fragile," and "unable to effectively go on with the case in front of a jury" or 
withstand cross-examination based in part on the recommendation of her treatment providers).) 
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6. All documentation and recordings relating to Ms. Oliver's arrest as a 
runaway on or about 12/04/91, including any statements made to the 
arresting officers, jailor juvenile authorities, and any dispatch or other 
recordings, including the entire juvenile criminal file stemming from that 
arrest. 4 
7. Information regarding Ms. Oliver's mental health, competency, or 
veracity, regardless of whether documentation exists, known by the 
prosecution in the underlying criminal case. 
8. Information regarding the investigation of the reported rape of Ms. Oliver, 
and subsequent charging, arrest, plea negotiations and plea entry Petitioner 
in State v. Hall, Case No. M9108836: 
a. A complete transcript of the proceedings including a transcript of the 
grand jury proceedings. 
b. A "contact sheet" of all photos taken of Ms. Oliver after the alleged 
rape. 
c. Color copies of all photos taken of Ms. Oliver after the alleged rape 
and not submitted as an exhibit in Petitioner's current case. 
d. The name of the person with whom Ms. Oliver stayed at the Sands 
Motel on or about 12/04/91, after the alleged rape and prior to her 
arrest as a runaway, and any documentation of communication with 
that person. 
e. Any notes, memoranda or other documents memorializing oral 
communications made during plea negotiations held by the Ada 
County Prosecutor's office. 
f. All files created by or held by the Ada County Public Defender's 
office related to State v. Hall, Case No. M9108836, including 
documentation pertaining to plea negotiations. 
g. All reports and notes, photographs, audio and video recordings, 
including, but not limited to: 
1. Tape-recorded statement made to the Garden City Police 
Department (hereinafter "GCPD") by Erick Hall on or 
about 12/04/91. 
4 According to reports, Mr. Hall reported Ms. Oliver to authorities as a runaway. It was only 
after her subsequent arrest and detention, did Ms. Oliver allege that Erick had raped her. 
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11. Tape-recorded statement made to GCPD by Norma Jean 
Oliver on or about 12/04/91. 
h. Admission from the Ada County Prosecutor that state discovery page 
numbers 120-138 were disclosed in discovery to defense counsel, as 
stated in the State's "Informal Discovery Letter" dated 01116/04, 
confirmation that the prosecutor's office hand-writes discovery page 
numbers on the lower right comer of each page turned over in 
discovery, and copies of said discovery pages with such discovery 
page numbers clearly visible. 
1. All reports, notes and other documents made by Dr. Lawrence 
Vickman, S1. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, regarding the 
examination and treatment of Ms. Norma Jean Oliver in or around 
December 1991. 
J. Results of DNA or other forensic testing conducted on vaginal and 
anal swabs and articles of clothing belonging to Ms. Oliver. 
k. Information regarding Ms. Oliver'S mental health, competency, or 
veracity, regardless of whether documentation exists, known by the 
prosecution in the underlying criminal case as well as Case No. 
M9108836. 
1. All mental health, psychological and/or psychiatric records, including 
all reports, notes and other documents, held or created by 
Intermountain Hospital, Dr. Lamar Heyrend, counselor Margaret 
Farmer, and Bonnie Pitman for Ms. Oliver. 
m. Social Security Income records, including all application materials, of 
Norma Jean Oliver. (Tr. p., 4780.) 
H. Detective Daniel Hess. Detective Hess's testimony bolstered Ms. Oliver's 
testimony. (Tr., pp. 4784-4813.) Petitioner requests the following discovery: 
1. Prosecuting attorney documents. 
2. All records, reports or other documents obtained by Det. Hess or other law 
enforcement in the course of investigation and prosecution of the 1991 
Norma Jean Oliver rape case, with specific information as to when the 
documents were obtained and by whom. 
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I. Jay Rosenthal. Mr. Rosenthal was the deputy prosecuting attorney for Ada 
County in the aforementioned Norma Jean Oliver rape case. Mr. Rosenthal 
testified that he amended the charges from forcible rape to statutory rape because 
Ms. Oliver "simply was unable to effectively go on with the case in front of a 
jury." (Tr., pp. 4952-4953.) Petitioner requests the following discovery: 
1. Prosecuting attorney documents. 
2. Explanation as to why the charge of forcible anal intercourse was 
dismissed even though the grand jury indicted on this charge. Mr. 
Rosenthal testified as to why the forcible vaginal rape charge was pled 
down to statutory rape, but he did not testify, nor was he asked, why the 
indictment was amended to delete the forcible anal rape charge. 
3. All records, reports or other documents obtained by the prosecuting 
attorney or his agents in the course of investigation and prosecution of the 
1991 Norma Jean Oliver rape case, with specific information as to when 
the documents were obtained and by whom. 
J. April Sebastian. Ms. Sebastian testified against Petitioner at his sentencing 
while represented by Petitioner's trial counsel on an upcoming "rider" hearing, 
Ada County Case No. H0400228. (Tr., pp. 4868-70; pp. 4875-96.) Ms. Sebastian 
also had another active case, Ada County Case No. H0400335, at the time of her 
testimony. Petitioner requests the following discovery: 
1. Prosecuting attorney documents. 
2. Any incentives to testify against Erick Hall explicitly or implicitly offered 
to, or requested by, this witness. 
3. Copy of the Presentence Investigation Report for Case No. 
H04003351M0401584. 
4. Copy of the Presentence Investigation Report, including "Addendum to 
Presentence Investigation Report" and any document purporting to make 
"rider" recommendations in Case No. H0400228. 
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5. All statements and summaries of statements to law enforcement either 
made by or attributed to April Sebastian, regardless of medium, and all 
reports and notes made by law enforcement about Ms. Sebastian, from 
March 1, 2003 to present. 
6. A complete NCIC criminal record check, including juvenile criminal 
records. 
7. All reports and notes from Idaho Department of Corrections and Idaho 
Department of Probation and Parole including, but not limited to: 
a. Copies of any self-initiated requests for parole and/or probation for 
case number, from March 2003 to present. 
b. Documentation of parole or probation hearings and results, from 
March 2003 to present. 
c. Copies of any parole and/or probation plans, from March 2003 to 
present. 
d. Reports or notes or other documentation made by Ms. Sebastian's 
parole or probation officer, from March 2003 to present. 
K. Michelle Deen. Ms. Deen testified against Petitioner at his sentencing. (Tr., 
pp.4813-39.) Petitioner recently discovered that Ms. Deen was convicted of at 
least two felonies, only one of which was elicited at trial. In addition, Petitoner 
has discovered that Amil Myshin represented Ms. Deen during the entry of a 
guilty plea on 12/03/03 in Ada County Case No. H0301398. Petitioner requests 
the following discovery: 
1. Prosecuting attorney documents. 
2. Documentation of initial contact between Michelle Deen and the 
prosecuting attorney's office. 
3. Any and all incentives to testify against Erick Hall explicitly or implicitly 
offered to, or requested by, this witness. 
4. All statements and summaries of statements to law enforcement either 
made by or attributed to Ms. Deen, regardless of medium, and all reports 
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and notes made by law enforcement about Ms. Deen, from March 2003 to 
present. 
5. A complete NCIC criminal record check, including juvenile criminal 
records. 
6. All police reports, notes and recordings regarding theft, breaking and 
entering, burglary or similar crimes stemming from incidents reported by 
Erick Hall and/or Janet Hoch against Michelle Deen and/or Tommy 
Workman and to which law enforcement responded in or around July 
2001. 
7. Documents related to Ada County Case No. H0200584: 
a. Copy of the Presentence Investigation Report, including any 
probation revocation report, reports or recommendations from the 
Jurisdictional Review Committee or any other addenda; 
8. Documents related to Ada County Case No. H0301398: 
a. Copy of the Presentence Investigation Report, including any 
probation revocation report, reports or recommendations from the 
Jurisdictional Review Committee or any other addenda; 
b. Copy of the psychological evaluation ordered by the district court 
in June 2004 in Case No. H0301398, a mere four months before 
Ms. Deen testified at Petitioner's sentencing. 
9. All reports and notes from the Idaho Department of Corrections and Idaho 
Department of Probation and Parole including, but not limited to: 
a. Copies of any self-initiated requests for parole and/or probation for 
case number, from March 2003 to present. 
b. Documentation of parole or probation hearings and results, from 
March 2003 to present. 
c. Copies of any parole and/or probation plans, from March 2003 to 
present. 
d. Reports or notes or other documentation made by Ms. Deen's 
parole or probation officer, from March 2003 to present. 
L. Evelyn Dunaway. Ms. Dunaway testified against Petitioner at his sentencing. 
(Tr., pp. 4857-68.) Petitioner requests the following discovery: 
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1. Prosecuting attorney documents. 
2. Any incentives to testify against Erick Hall explicitly or implicitly offered 
to or requested by this witness. 
3. All statements and summaries of statements to law enforcement either 
made by or attributed to Ms. Dunaway, regardless of medium, and all 
reports and notes made by law enforcement about Ms. Dunaway, from 
March 2003 to present. 
4. A complete NCIC criminal record check, including juvenile criminal 
records. 
5. All police reports, notes, recordings and witness statements regarding a 
domestic dispute or incident between Evelyn Dunaway and Erick Hall to 
which law enforcement responded in or around March 2002. (Tr., pp. 
4858 L.24 - p. 4864, L.ll.) 
6. All reports and notes from Idaho Department of Corrections and Idaho 
Department of Probation and Parole including, but not limited to: 
a. Copies of any self-initiated requests for parole and/or probation for 
case number, from March 2003 to present. 
b. Documentation of parole or probation hearings and results, from 
March 2003 to present. 
c. Copies of any parole and/or probation plans, from March 2003 to 
present. 
d. Reports or notes or other documentation made by Ms. Dunaway's 
parole or probation officer, from March 2003 to present. 
M. Rebecca McCusker. Ms. McCusker testified against Petitioner at his sentencing. 
(Tr., pp. 4857-68.) Petitioner requests the following discovery: 
1. Prosecuting attorney documents. 
2. Any and all incentives to testify against Erick Hall explicitly or implicitly 
offered to or requested by this witness. 
3. All statements and summaries of statements to law enforcement either 
made by or attributed to Ms. McCusker, regardless of medium, and all 
reports and notes made by law enforcement about Ms. McCusker. 
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4. A complete NCIC criminal record check, induding juvenile criminal 
records. 
5. All records, notes and documents created by or in the possession of Idaho 
Department of Health and Welfare regarding Rebecca McCusker, 
including, but not limited to allegations of child neglect or abandonment. 
N. Dr. Glenn Groben and the Ada County Coroner's Office. 
1. All bench notes from the Lynn Henneman autopsy, sexual assault kit and 
any other procedures performed or observed by Dr. Groben or any other 
Ada County Coroner personnel. 
2. Any peer review, formal or informal, whether internal or external to the 
Ada County Coroner's Office, as well as any documentation related 
thereto, ofthe autopsy performed on Ms. Henneman (Tr., p. 4097, Ls. 19-
22.), or confirmation that no peer review was conducted. 
3. Any notes, reports, or dictations of findings made by Dr. Groben in the 
following locations: 
a. At or near the body recovery scene; and 
b. At or near the alleged crime scene near the Main St. Bridge. 
4. Ada County Coroner's Office procedures for body removal and 
preservation. (Tr., p. 4095, Ls. 2-21.) 
5. Copies of the full body x-rays taken ofLynn Henneman, and full 
disclosure of where, when and by whom the x-rays were taken. 
6. Any toxicology test results from Idaho labs; and if none exist, then an 
explanation why testing was conducted by a Texas laboratory, and a 
complete copy ofthe Texas report. (Petitioner currently is in possession 
of a one-page toxicology report from the Texas lab.) 
7. A list of all cases, regardless of jurisdiction, in which Dr. Groben 
conducted autopsies wherein broad ligature strangulation, drowning, or 
blunt force trauma was the cause, suspected cause, or explicitly excluded 
cause of death, including specific identification of those "other cases 
exactly like this" referenced by Dr. Groben in his trial testimony. 5 
5 (Tr., p. 4056, Ls. 6-16 ("Q. Okay. Well, for what you're saying, if I'm understanding what 
you're saying then, that you feel the body was outside of the water for the first 12 hours? A. 
Well, at least it wasn't buoyant at all, and it certainly gets buoyant pretty quick. Doesn't take 
much water because that body had to be flat against the surface with all its weight and you can't 
do that in the water. I've had other cases exactly like this where I have seen the same thing, 
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8. A list of all cases in which Dr. Groben testified wherein broad ligature 
strangulation, drowning, or blunt force trauma was the cause, suspected 
cause, or explicitly excluded cause of death. 
9. Reports and notes from all autopsies referenced in preceding request no. 7. 
10. Any complaints filed against Dr. Groben and/or the Ada County Coroner 
with any agency or professional association regarding hislits professional 
performance, qualifications or veracity. 
11. Scanned, accessible, high-resolution files of all photos of Ms. Henneman's 
body, including reenactment photographs. Petitioner currently is in 
possession of photographs on compact disk some of which will not open 
including CSI and BCPD photos. 
12. Microscopic slides and reports, notes, or other documentation of "residual 
intact red blood cells" for the seven identified scalp injuries, and specific 
identification ofthe number of sections taken from each individual 
laceration and the results at each identified section. 
13. Sex crimes kit protocol. 
14. Any notes, reports, or results oftests in the Henneman case regarding the 
following: 
a. Reconstruction of ligatures 
b. Depth of the scalp wounds 
c. Fingernail clippings 
d. Pubic hair combings 
e. Head hair 
£ Blood sample (tube) 
g. The amount of force to break the humerous 
h. Any subcutaneous examination ofthe left and right wrists and left 
and right ankles as well as any other possible ligature sites 
(Petitioner is in possession of Dr. Groben's report at page 3 which 
and it just can't happen in the water."); p. 3989, L. 11 - p. 3990, L. 2 (Q .... Did you conduct an 
examination of the skin underneath the ligature? Did you dissect that to perform medical tests to 
determine whether or not there was any hemorrhage present? A. Yes. Q. And did you locate 
any hemorrhage? A. No, I did not. Q. And is that a significant finding? A. Not with ligatures 
such as this. I've had many cases of broad -- ... It's a broad ligature, and I have seen this many 
times in hangings and also other -- with self-strangulation. And because 'it's so broad, the 
pressure is disbursed over a wide area.").) (emphasis added) 
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describes a subcutaneous examination of Ms. Henneman's right 
wrist and left ann only). 
15. List of videos that Dr. Groben watched that, according to his testimony, 
demonstrated the length of time it takes a choking victim to be rendered 
unconscious. (Tr., p. 4036, 17 - p. 4037, L. 3.) 
16. Forensic pathology procedural manual currently in effect as well as in 
effect in October 2000 for the Ada County Coroner's Office. (Tr., p. 
4042, Ls. 9-11.) 
17. All materials presented, including PowerPoint slides, used for the 
presentation given by Dr. Groben on the Henneman homicide at the 
northwest pathologist meeting held in September or October 2004. 
18. All notes, reports and recordings made by or at the direction ofthe 
Coroner's Office or its agents regarding the death of Amanda Stroud. 
19. All notes, reports and recordings made by or at the direction of the 
Coroner's Office or its agents regarding the death of Kay Lynn Jackson. 
20. Documentation of all correspondence between Dr. Groben or Erwin 
Sonnenberg or their agents and other non-lay or expert witnesses or 
potential witnesses or their agents. 
21. Dr. Groben's curriculum vita. 
22. Dr. Groben's billing records or invoices for the instant case. 
23. Any applications by the Ada County Coroner's office for accreditation 
with the National Association of Medical Examiners ("NAME"), or any 
other accrediting association, and any responses thereto. 
O. Dr. Michael Estess. Dr. Estess interviewed Petitioner prior to trial. (R., p. 230; 
Tr., p. 2857.) The prosecutor and/or his agents interviewed Dr. Estess and listed 
him as a prospective State witness. Dr. Estess evaluated the testimony of 
Petitioner's experts at sentencing. After consultation with Dr. Estess, the 
prosecutor chose not to call him, choosing instead to undermine Petitioner's 
experts through closing argument. Petitioner requests the following discovery: 
1. Prosecuting attorney documents. 
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2. Dr. Estess's files. 
3. Any reports or summaries of oral communications made by Dr. Estess to 
the State in the instant case. 
4. Documentation of all correspondence between Dr. Estess or his agents and 
other non-lay or expert witnesses or potential witnesses or their agents. 
5. Dr. Estess' curriculum vita. 
6. Dr. Estess' billing records or invoices for the instant case. 
P. Dr. Robert Engle. The prosecutor listed Dr. Engle as a prospective State 
witness, although he did not testify. (R., p. 597, Tr., p. 2857.) Petitioner requests 
the following discovery: 
1. Prosecuting attorney documents. 
2. Dr. Engle's files. 
3. Any reports or summaries of oral communications made by Dr. Estess to 
the State in the instant case. 
4. Documentation of all correspondence between Dr. Engle or his agents and 
other non-lay or expert witnesses or potential witnesses or their agents. 
5. Dr. Engle's billing records or invoices for the instant case. 
Q. Other Non-Lay or Expert Witnesses. 
1. All correspondence between non-lay or expert witnesses or their agents, 
including those witnesses listed in this section and/or the following 
persons: 
a. Kathryn Colombo 
b. Rachel Cutler 
c. Shawna Hilliard 
d. Jennifer Taylor 
R. Jean McCracken. Ms. McCracken IS Erick's mother. The prosecutor's 
investigator interviewed her. Petitioner requests the following discovery: 
1. Prosecuting attorney documents. 
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S. Amanda Stroud. Amanda Stroud was presumably critical in law enforcement's 
investigation and apparently conveyed hearsay statements attributed to Petitioner. 
Petitioner requests the following discovery: 
1. Prosecuting attorney documents. 
2. All statements and summaries of statements prepared by law enforcement 
that were either made by or attributed to Ms. Stroud, regardless of 
medium, and all reports and notes made by law enforcement about Ms. 
Stroud. (Petitioner currently is in possession of an undated, unsigned 
report of interview of Amanda Stroud beginning with "She stated that she 
had been drunk ... ;" a letter from Amanda Stroud to Gregory Higgins 
dated 8/03; and the report of Det. Richard Allen dated 5/15/03, see 
Appendix B.) 
3. All audio or video recordings, wntmgs, or other mediums of 
communications made by Ms. Stroud and obtained by the prosecutor or 
law enforcement (Petitioner currently is in possession of the transcript of 
the 03/10/03 interview by Detectives Morgan and Smith, transcriber 
unknown, but does not have possession of the corresponding audio or 
video recording.) 
4. All law enforcement and prosecution investigative reports, notes, and files 
regarding the Amanda Stroud homicide investigation. 
T. Kathy Stroud. Kathy Stroud reported her suspicions that Erick Hall was 
involved in the Cheryl Hanlon homicide to law enforcement based on hearsay 
information apparently conveyed by her daughter. Petitioner requests the 
following discovery: 
1. Prosecuting attorney documents. 
2. All statements and summaries of statements to law enforcement either 
made by or attributed to Ms. Stroud, regardless of medium, and all reports 
and notes made by law enforcement about Ms. Stroud. (Petitioner 
currently is in possession of one incomplete, undated report of Det. Dave 
Smith, BCPD, see Appendix B.) 
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II. Prosecuting Attorney's Office 
A. Miscellaneous documentation. Petitioner requests infonnation regarding the 
following matters regardless of medium, including but not limited to notes, 
reports, memorandum, photographs, emails, and audio and/or video recordings 
(unless otherwise specified): 
1. Color copies of any illustrative exhibits utilized during the State's opening 
statement. 
2. A copy of the motion requesting an order impaneling the grand jury, and a 
copy of the order as required under ICR 6.1(b) and I.e. § 19-1307. 
3. A copy of any committee minutes on the drafting of the death penalty jury 
instructions. (Tr., p. 4675, L. 25 - p. 4676, L. 4 (noting that both defense 
counsel and the prosecutor served on the death penalty instructions 
commi ttee).) 
4. Color copies of all PowerPoint slides and other documents shown to the 
jury, including, but not limited to the "scale" diagram roughly drawn and 
referenced in Mr. Hall's petition for post-conviction relief. 
5. Access to the original video and/or audio tapes made during police 
custodial interrogation of Petitioner on 4/1/03 for the purpose of 
professional enhancement, and first part of interrogation (held in "Room 
A") on 3/13/03. 
6. Disclosure and access to any other audio and/or video recordings 
involving Petitioner while in police custody and not previously disclosed 
during the underlying criminal proceedings. (Petitioner currently is in 
possession of videos of police interrogations conducted on 3/13/03, 
3/29/03, and 4/1/03. But see above request III.A.5.) 
7. All documented communications, or summaries of communications, by 
the prosecutor's office with the media, including but not limited to press 
releases. 
B. Discovery Materials. 
1. Documentation denoted by asterisk (*) as identified in comments section 
of attached Appendix B. 
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2. State's 1st, 3rd, 6th, 8th, 10th, 12th and 15th Addenda to Discovery Responses, 
and continnation that the State's 16th Addenda to Discovery Response was 
the last discovery response sent to defense counsel. 
C. Electronic Mail. 
1. Copies of all e-mails between the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney's 
office and the Ada County Public Defender's office regarding the 
Henneman case, the Hanlon case, or Erick Hall. 
III. Law Enforcement Agencies 
A. Field notes and logbooks. Because police reports do not contain all infonnation 
contained in original field notes and logbooks, Petitioner requests all field notes 
and logbooks generated by any law enforcement officer in the course of the 
investigation of the Henneman and Hanlon homicides.6 
B. Correspondence. All correspondence or summaries of correspondence between 
law enforcement and other state and federal agencies regarding the Henneman 
homicide investigation. 
C. Specific reports. 
1. Reports prepared by "task force" members excluding those reports listed 
in Appendix B. The "task force" consisted of the following law 
enforcement personnel: 
a. Special Agent Scott Mace, FBI 
b. Det. Dave Smith, BCPD 
c. Det. Lance Anderson, BCPD 
d. Lt. Jim Maxon, BCPD 
e. Officer Dan Barber, BCPD 
f. Officer Mike Riley, BCPD 
g. Officer Tom Schuler, BCPD 
h. Officer Keven O'Rourke, BCPD 
1. Det. Greg Morgan, BCPD 
J. Det. Wade Spain, BCPD 
k. Sgt. Mike Lusk, ISP (Boise) 
6 This request is duplicative of only those prior requests specifically identified in section II of 
~s~tioo. . 
MOTION FOR DISCOVERY 19 
00096 
1. Sgt. Stewart Robinson, ISP (Twin Falls) 
m. Det. Vicki Gooch, ISP (Boise) 
n. Sgt. Dave Kynock, ISP (Boise) 
o. Det. Joe Miller, Meridian Police 
p. Det. Mike Taddicken, ACSD 
q. Det. Jamie Barker, ACSD 
r. Special Agent Scott Birch, Idaho Attorney General's Office 
s. Det. Rick Allen, GCPD 
t. Sgt. John Taylor, GCPD 
u. Det. Cory Stambaugh, GCPD 
v. Det. Steve Bartlett, GCPD 
2. Other reports prepared by law enforcement personnel, whether or not 
officially "task force" members, (but excluding those reports listed in 
Appendix B): 
a. Officer Sherri Cameron, BCPD 
b. Officer Darla Curtis, GCPD 
c. Ofr Shawna Hilliard, BCPD 
d. Officer Thomas Holst, BCPD 
e. Officer Gary Wiggins, BCPD 
r Officer M. Furniss, GCPD 
3. Other reports pertaining to search efforts including, but not limited to the 
following (but excluding those reports listed in Appendix B): 
a. St. Alphonsus' Lifeflight searches 
b. Access Air searches 
c. Idaho Mountain Search and Rescue searches 
d. Boise Fire Department dive team search 
e. Ada County Paramedics four-wheeler search 
f. Blood hound searches with Officer Tony Plott and Belle 
g. Aerial search conducted by Mike Urizar and Lt. Walby 
h. Boise River searches by Detectives Bartless and Babbitt 
4. Other reports pertaining to recovery efforts including, but not limited to 
those prepared by the following individuals (but excluding those reports 
listed in Appendix B): 
a. Captain Tony Lloyd, Boise Fire Department 
b. Fireman Ton Galindo, Boise Fire Department 
c. Fireman Doug Cooper, Boise Fire Department 
d. Fireman Scott Hall, Boise Fire Department 
e. Officer S. Cameron, Boise City Police Department 
f. Det. Sergeant John Taylor, Garden City Police Department 
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D. FBI I-drives. Copies of all reports, communications or files contained on any 1-
Drive of any FBI field office involved in the Henneman or Hanlon investigation, 
including, but not limited to the Salt Lake City and Boise field offices. 
E. Task force lead assignments. The task force received and investigated 527 leads 
that Petitioner believes were recorded on "lead sheets." Trial counsel files only 
contain twelve "lead sheets." 
F. Miscellaneous reports and other documentation. 
1. Police reports regarding all unsolved rapes, attempted rapes, murders and 
attempted murders that took place in Ada County from January 1995 to 
date. 
2. Police reports regarding any and all attempted abductions taking place in 
or around the Greenbelt, from January 1995 to date, including, but not 
limited to the following unsolved homicides: 
a. Any and all law enforcement reports and notes regarding the 
murder of Kay Lynn Jackson. 
3. Police reports regarding any and all attempted robberies involving beating 
on or around the head and taking place in Ada County from January 1995 
to date. (Tr., p. 4887, Ls. 1-4 (April Sebastian testified that Petitioner told 
her that he sometimes hit unsuspecting persons over the head and stole 
their money).) 
4. Any and all FBI reports containing "profiling" of the perpetrator in the 
Lynn Henneman and Cheryl Hanlon murders. 
5. Any and all reports or documentation regarding the special light sources 
used, and where, when and by whom used. 
6. Police reports regarding Petitioner's escape history. 
7. Copy of all police reports and notes regarding Ada County Case No. 
M0303573, the Failing to Register as a Sex Offender case filed against 
Petitioner. 
8. The name of the officer(s) who searched the Main Street Bridge area. 
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9. All documented communications, or summaries of communications, by 
law enforcement with the media, including but not limited to press 
releases. 
10. Any reports identifying transients' involvement in small fires reported at 
East Jr. High. 
11. Documentation regarding the search for bloodstains located at or near the 
Chart House parking lot and near the Main Street Bridge. 
12. Records for Lynn Henneman's cellular telephone use from October 1, 
2000 until service was terminated. 
13. Any results from informal or formal testing conducted for time and 
distance to walk relevant areas of the Greenbelt, whether such testing was 
conducted by law enforcement personnel or others. 
14. Any and all reports, notes and statements related to searches conducted 
along the Boise River between the DoubleTree Motel and the Capital 
Street Bridge, including searches of the Main Street bridge area on 
October 9, 2000. (Petitioner currently is in possession of report of Det. 
Cory Stambaugh, dated 5118/01, see Appendix B). 
15. Any and all reports, notes and statements related to searches conducted by 
the FBI Salt Lake City-based "Evidence Recovery Team" along the Boise 
River near the Main St. bridge area on or about 10/10100, including 
documents relating to use of alternative light sources. 
F. Documentation regarding DNA evidence. 
1. Legible, readable, and unredacted miscellaneous documentation and other 
requested information identified in Appendix A and attached thereto. 
2. All documentation relating to entry of Petitioner's DNA profile into the 
Idaho CODIS database, or any local or state database. (Tr., p. 3428.) 
3. All documentation relating to entry of Petitioner's DNA profile into the 
national NDIS database, or any national database. 
4. Copies of any reports and summaries of communications or conversations 
between Cellmark, Idaho State Police Forensics Laboratory, police 
agencies and/or the Ada County prosecutor's office regarding the 
existence and/or DNA profile for another perpetrator in the Henneman 
and/or Hanlon homicide cases. 
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5. Results of all comparisons made of Erick Virgil Hall's DNA profile 
against any local, state, or national DNA database, including the Idaho 
CODIS and national NDIS databases. 
6. All DNA profile infonnation developed or other forensic testing 
conducted in connection with the murder of Kay Lynn Jackson and 
infonnation related to DNA or other forensic exclusions in that case. 
7. All DNA profile infonnation developed or other forensic testing 
conducted in connection with the death of Amanda Stroud and infonnation 
related to DNA or other forensic exclusions in that case. 
G. All Documentation and Information Regarding Reward Money Offered For 
Assistance In The Henneman and Hanlon Homicide Investigations Including 
Claims Made On Such Reward. 
H. Documentation Regarding Sex Offender Registration. 
1. Documentation from the Idaho sex offender registry involving 
registration, or attempts at registration, by Erick Hall. 
v. Miscellaneous Documents and Reports. 
A. Miscellaneous 
1. Legible copy of all receipts from the Table Rock Brewhouse associated 
with food and alcohol ordered and purchased by Lynn Henneman on 
09124/00. 
2. Transcripts of all grand jury proceedings held in connection with State v. 
Erick Virgil Hall, Ada County No. H0300614 (Hanlon). 
3. Register of Actions for State v. Erick Virgil Hall, Ada County Case Nos. 
H03006141M0302868 (Hanlon). 
4. Copies of all exhibits presented to Grand Jury No. 03-35 (Lynn 
Henneman). 
5. Copies of any and all written questions by jury to the court, any bailiff, or 
other court personnel. (Tr., p. 5516.) 
VI. IMSI, Ada County Jail, Garden City Jail and Other Prison and Jail Records 
A. Inmate Classification Manuals. Any and all manuals, infonnal or fonnal policies, 
memoranda or guidelines for inmate placement, initial classification, 
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reclassification, custody status and risk assessment for Idaho Department of 
Corrections that were in use in March, 2004. (See Tr., pp. 4903-4951 (testimony 
of Dennis Dean, Inmate Records Placement Manager, IDOC).) 
B. Safety Practices Manual. Any and all manuals, informal or formal policies, 
memoranda or guidelines regarding safety practices for female correctional 
officers or other female employees or volunteers and inmates classified as or 
believed to be sexually violent toward women. 
VII. Depositions and Related Documentation Requiring Subpoenas 
A. All members of the defense team and their agents. Petitioner moves to depose 
Amil Myshin (lead counsel), D.C. Carr (second chair counsel), Glenn Elam 
(investigator), Rosanne Dapsauski (mitigation specialist), and Rolf Kehne Gury 
selection consultant). Petitioner further moves for subpoenas duces tecum, as 
specified below. Due to trial counsels' respective schedules, the standard of 
performance in post-conviction cases, and trial counsels' preference, Petitioner 
requests that this Court issue subpoenas for the attendance of each team member 
for the purpose of independent depositions. 
Petitioner further moves for a subpoenas decus tecum for each of the 
above depositions, to include the following: 
1. Documentation identifying the cases each trial team member worked on 
from April 1, 2003 through Januaryl8, 2005. (Tr., p. 215, L. 24 - p. 216, 
L.2 (noting lead counsel's heavy workload including a manslaughter trial 
scheduled for April 2004.) 
2. All e-mail correspondence between trial team members and the 
prosecutor's office. (Tr., p. 249, Ls. 8-14.) 
B. Dr. Michael Estess 
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VIII. Documents Requiring Subpoenas 
A. Miscellaneous 
1. All files created by or held by the Ada County Public Defender's office 
related to State v. Erick Virgil Hall, Case No. M0302158/H0300423 
(failure to register). 
2. An identification of the names of all cases that each trial counsel handled 
while representing Petitioner including the case names and dates that any 
of the cases went to trial, including an identification of cases involving 
serious felony offenses of arson, homicide (all degrees), rape, sodomy, 
kidnapping, burglary and robbery. 
3. All Washington DSHS Division of Child Support records pertaining to 
Frank McCracken and Jean McCrackenlHall in Case No. 70253. Court 
Order to specify that need for records outweighs need for privacy. 
IX. Preservation of Physical Evidence. Petitioner requests that all physical evidence 
collected in the underlying criminal investigation be preserved in order to avoid the 
destruction of potentially exculpatory materials. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 
51 (1988)(bad faith destruction of potentially useful evidence may violate due process). 
X. Access to Hanlon Court Documents. SAPD counsel was informed by court personnel 
that permission from both the Hanlon defense team and the prosecutor's office was 
necessary to gain access to the Hanlon court file/record. However, trial counsel on the 
Hanlon case subsequently informed SAPD that they knew nothing of this. SAPD access 
is necessary because the Hanlon case played an extremely important role in the pretrial 
and trial proceedings in the Henneman case. Regardless of whether evidence from the 
Hanlon case was ever admitted, the threat of its admission clearly influenced trial 
counsels' preparations and the outcome of the proceedings. 
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DATED this 5th day January, 2006. 
Lead Counsel, Capital itigation Unit 
PAULA M. SWENSEN 
Co-Counsel, Capital Litigation Unit 
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APPENDIX A 
The following is a list of illegible, redacted, unreadable, or otherwise incomplete 
documentation and imaging relating to DNA testing within the possession of the SAPD, obtained 
through review of trial counsels' files. 
1. Photo documentation dated 1112/00, SAPD #8286. 
2. ISP Lab Notes dated 10/2000, SAPD #9714. 
3. ISP Lab Notes dated 10/2000, SAPD #9715. 
4. ISP Lab Notes dated 1012000, SAPD #9711. 
5. Handwritten notes dated 10/2000 through 412003, SAPD #8280. 
6. Identity of "KAG" who initialed handwritten notes dated 1 012000 through 
4/2003, SAPD #8280. 
7. ISP State Lab DNA Report by Ann Bradley dated 11103/00, SAPD #8585. 
8. ISP State Lab DNA Report by Ann Bradley dated 11103/00, SAPD #8587. 
9. Report or notes written by Ann Bradley, dated 11113/00, Petitioner 
currently is in possession of one page only, SAPD #8594. 
10. Missing page 29 of Ann Bradley' s reported dated 12/18/00, SAPD #8645. 
11. Organic Extraction Worksheet dated 10/18/00, SAPD #8580. 
12. Polaroid photograph of Chilex Hair Extraction dated 11128/00, SAPD 
#8359. 
13. Identity of witness to Chelex Extraction of DNA dated 1119/00, SAPD 
#8302. 
14. PCR Printed Results dated 11111100, SAPD #8320. 
15. DQA1 Typing Image, SAPD #8614. 
16. Identity of analyst who initialed ISP DQA1 2nd Reader Form, dated 
10/23/00. 
17. DQA1 Typing Image dated 12/12100, SAPD #8634. 
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18. DQA1 Typing Images dated 12/20100, SAPD #8655. 
19. DQA1 Typing Image dated 12/29100, SAPD #8681. 
20. DQA1 Typing Image dated 1110101, SAPD #8706. 
21. DQA1 Typing Image dated 2/9101, SAPD #8729. 
22. DQA1 Typing Image dated 3/23/01, SAPD #8755. 
23. DQA1 Typing Image dated 5/10101, SAPD #8803. 
24. DQAl 2nd Reader Form dated 12/20/00, SAPD #8660. 
~25. Identity of "PM" who initialed 2nd Reader Form," dated 12/01/00, SAPD 
#8619. 
26. Identities of "PM" and "C" who initialed DQAl 2nd Reader Form dated 
12120100, SAPD #8660. 
27. Identity of analyst on "DQA1 2nd Reader Form," dated 12120100, SAPD 
#8662. 
28. Product Gel Sheet dated 3/25/03, SAPD #8262. 
29. Product Gel Sheet dated 1117100, SAPD #8290. 
30. Product Gel Sheet dated 11110/00, SAPD #8306. 
31. Product Gel Sheet dated 11110100, SAPD #8318. 
32. Product Gel Sheet dated 11116/00, SAPD #8343. 
33. Product Gel Sheet dated 12/2/00, SAPD #8368. 
34. PCR Product Gel Image dated 11/30100, SAPD #8610. 
35. PCR Product Gel Image dated 11130100, SAPD #8611. 
36. PCR Product Gel Image dated 11130100, SAPD #8612. 
37. PCR Product Gel Image dated 12/12/00, SAPD #8630. 
38. PCR Product Gel Image dated 12/12/00, SAPD #8632. 
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39. PCR Product Gel Image dated 12/20100, SAPD #8651. 
40. PCR Product Gel Image dated 12/20100, SAPD #8653. 
41. PCR Product Gel Image and date of image, SAPD #8677. 
42. PCR Product Gel Image dated 12/29100, SAPD #8679. 
43. PCR Product Gel Image dated 1/10101, SAPD #8702. 
44. PCR Product Gel Image dated 1/10/01, SAPD #8704. 
45. PCR Product Gel Image dated 2/9101, SAPD #8725. 
46. PCR Product Gel Image dated 2/9101, SAPD #8727. 
47. PCR Product Gel Image dated 3123/01, SAPD #8753 
48. PCR Product Gel Image dated 4/23/01, SAPD #8774. 
49. PCR Product Gel Image dated 4/23/01, SAPD #8776. 
50. PCR Product Gel Image dated 4/23/01, SAPD #8778. 
51. PCR Product Gel Image dated 5110/01. See Appendix C, SAPD #8799. 
52. PCR Product Gel Image dated 511 0101, SAPD #8801. 
53. PCR Product Gel Image dated 6/8/01, SAPD #8821. 
54. PCR Product Gel Image dated 6/8/01, SAPD #8823. 
55. Polymarker Typing Image, SAPD #8617. 
56. Polymarker Typing Image dated 12120100, SAPD #8657. 
57. Polymarker Typing Image dated 12/29100, SAPD #8683. 
58. Polymarker Typing Image dated 12/29100, SAPD #8685. 
59. Polymarker Typing Image dated 1/10/01, SAPD #8708. 
60. Polymarker Typing Image dated 2/9101, SAPD #8731. 
61. Polymarker Typing Image dated 3/23/01, SAPD #8757. 
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62. Quantiblot bnage dated 12/11100, SAPD #8625. 
63. Quantiblot bnage dated 11129/00, SAPD #8605. 
64. Quantiblot bnage dated 12/19100, SAPD #8647. 
65. Quantiblot bnage dated 12/28/00, SAPD #8673. 
66. Quantiblot bnage dated 119/01, SAPD #8698. 
67. Quantiblot bnage dated 2/7/01, SAPD #8720(b). 
68. Slot Blot Loading Sheet results dated 03/24/03 (possibly called a 
"membrane"), SAPD #8259. 
69. Slot Blot Loading Sheet results dated 11/03/00, SAPD #8287. 
70. Slot Blot Loading Sheet results dated 11109/00, SAPD #8303. 
71. Slot Blot Loading Sheet results dated 11113/00, SAPD #8340. 
72. Slot Blot Loading Sheet results dated 11129/00, SAPD #8361. 
73. Slot Blot Loading Sheet results dated 11/30100, SAPD #8363. 
74. Identity of"JF" who initialed "DNA Standards" on LTI Slot Blot Loading 
Sheet dated 11130/00, SAPD #8364. 
75. Slot Blot Loading Sheet results dated 12/01100, SAPD #8365. 
76. Identity of "EJR" who initialed Slot Blot Loading Sheet test dated 
3124/03, SAPD #8260. 
77. Identity of "MAT" who initialed "Ladder & Sample Tray Witness" run 
information, SAPD #8263. 
78. Identities of "m" and "MNK" who initialed "Administrative Review 
Complete" and "Report Mailed & Invoiced" on Forensic Case Review 
Checklist, dated 312003, SAPD #8267. 
79. Identity of "POY" who initialed "Administrative Review Complete" on 
Forensic Case Review Checklist dated 1212000, SAPD #8268. 
80. Identity of "KAB" who initialed shipping label from Cellmark to ISP, 
dated 2/2001, SAPD #8276. 
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81. Identity of witness (es) to "Section of DNA from Mixed Stains PCR," 
dated 1112/00, SAPD #8285. 
82. Identity of "CK" who initialed "Sample Order & Dilution" of 
Amplification dated 11106/00, SAPD #8289. 
83. Identity of "JAH" who initialed "Sample Order & Dilution Witness" of 
Amplification dated 1119/00, SAPD #8305. 
84. Identity of "WM" who initialed "Sample Order & Dilution Witness" of 
Amplification dated 11/10/00, SAPD #8316. 
85. Identity of all witnesses, including identity of witness with initials "SB" or 
possibly "RB," to Microcon 100 Filtration Concentration, SAPD #8339. 
86. Identities of "LLG" and "JU" who initialed "Ladder & Dilution Control 
Witness" and "Allelic Ladder Check" on Run Infonnation dated 11116/00, 
SAPD#8344. 
87. Identity of "K?D" who initialed "Sample Prep" of AmpFISTR Profiler 
Plus/COfiler 310 Sample Prep Sheet, SAPD #8345. 
88. Identity of "XX" who initialed "Ladder Witness" on Run Infonnation 
dated 12/2/00, SAPD #8369. 
89. Identity of individuals not disclosed on document regarding 3 sets of 
swabs, from John Brumbaugh (GCPD) to Jenny Treinen (ISP), dated 
10/31100, SAPD #8555. 
90. Identity of donor of oral mouth swabs contained in unidentified evidence 
envelope, from Darla Curtis (GCPD) to Jenny Treinen (ISP), dated 
1112/00, SAPD #8556. 
91. Identity of reviewer initials on "Blind Internal Quality Control Sample" 
(Bloodstain), dated 11128/00, SAPD #8621. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this f day of January, 2006, a true and correct copy ofthe 
foregoing document, MOTION FOR DISCOVERY, was mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL -X- U.S. Mail 
INMATE # 33835 Statehouse Mail --
IMSI Facsimile --
POBOX 51 __ Hand Delivery 
BOISE ID 83707 
ROGER BOURNE U.S. Mail --
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S Statehouse Mail --
OFFICE Facsimile 
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191 -L Hand Delivery 
BOISE ID 83702 E-Mail --
THOMAS F. NEVILLE U.S. Mail --
DISTRICT JUDGE Statehouse Mail --
200W.FRONT Facsimile --
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GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Roger Bourne 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Idaho State BarNo. 2127 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: 287-7700 
Fax: 287-7709 
FILED 7,'??: A.M-_ _ --P.M. ~ LJ 
JAN 1 9 2005 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 












Case No. SPOT0500155 
STATE'S OBJECTION TO THE 
MOTION FOR DISCOVERY 
COMES NOW, Roger Bourne, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of 
Ada, representing the State of Idaho, in the above entitled matter, and puts before the Court the 
State's Objection to the Petitioner's Motion for Discovery which was filed on about January 5, 
2006. The State will more thoroughly address the issues in a later memorandum, but objects on 
the basis that the approximate 350 discovery requests in the Petitioner's Motion are a precluded 
"fishing expedition" as described in Aeschliman vs. State, 132 Idaho 397 (Ct. App. 1999). The 
State requests that the Court exercise it's discretion and not order discovery until the Petitioner 
STATE'S OBJECTION TO THE MOTION FOR DISCOVERY (HALL), Page 1 
nn ... ... -
shows that each item of discovery is necessary to protect the petitioner's substantial rights. 
Aechliman, supra; State v. LePage 138 Idaho 803 (Ct. App. 2003). 
-/I! 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 11~ day of January 2006. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecutor 
Roger Bourne 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
;0 I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this .--LL day of January 2006, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing State's Objection to Motion for Discovery was served to Mark J. 
Ackley and Paula M. Swensen, Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders, 3647 
Lake Harbor Lane, Boise, Idaho 83703 in the manner noted below: 
Gr13y depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, 
first class. 
o By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
o By informing the office of said individual( s) that said copies were available for 
pickup at the Office ofthe Ada County Prosecutor. 
o By faxing copies of the same to said attomey(s)~t t e facsimile number: 
STATE'S OBJECTION TO THE MOTION FOR DISCOVERY (HALL), Page 2 . 
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
LS.B. # 4843 
MARK J. ACKLEY, LS.B. # 6330 
PAULA M. SWENSEN, LS.B. # 6722 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
7 ' . ' n 
NO,_ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, ) 
) CASE NO, SPOT0500155 
Petitioner, ) 
) MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
v. ) ORAL ORDERS RE: EX PARTE 
) PROCEDURES FOR EXPERT 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) ACCESS AND RESTRICTIONS 
) ON JUROR CONTACT 
Respondent. ) 
) (CAPITAL CASE) 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, ERICK VIRGIL HALL, by and through his 
attorneys, the State Appellate Public Defender's Office, and moves this Honorable Court 
to reconsider oral Orders made during the telephonic hearing held on January 6, 2006, 
wherein the Court denied Petitioner's oral motion for the Court to adopt ex parte 
procedures for facilitating expert access to Petitioner and wherein the Court placed 
restrictions on counsels' abilities to contact jurors in the underlying capital trial. 
This motion is made pursuant to I.C. § 19-2719, I.C. §§ 19-4901, et seq., I.C.R. 
57, and the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution, corresponding sections of the Idaho Constitution, all matters of record in the 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER ORAL ORDERS RE: EX PARTE PROCEDURES 1 
FOR EXPERT ACCESS AND RESTRICTIONS ON JUROR CONTACT 
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underlying criminal case, and the Memorandum m Support with accompanymg 
attachments filed herewith . 
.1);'d) 0-
Dated this _1-(._ day of January, 2006. 
'-1'j2A L )7'/ <t ( l(/L.(]Iz ( j 
PAULA M. SWENSEN 
Deputy, State Appellate Public Defender 
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FOR EXPERT ACCESS AND RESTRICTIONS ON JUROR CONTACT 
3m 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this "2/L day of January, 2006, served a 
true and correct copy of the forgoing MOTION TO RECONSIDER ORAL ORDERS 
RE: EX PARTE PROCEDURES FOR EXPERT ACCESS AND RESTRICTIONS 
ON JUROR CONTACT as indicated below: 
ROGER BOURNE 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191 
BOISE ID 83702 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL 
INMATE # 33835 
IMSI 
PO BOX 51 




~ Hand Delivery 
/ Statehouse Mail 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile 
__ Hand Delivery 
BRANI5I REED \~ 
Administrative Assistant 
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
LS.B. # 4843 
MARK J. ACKLEY, LS.B. # 6330 
PAULA M. SWENSEN, LS.B. # 6722 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
NO. -;;;1 
A.M. q :Si ~'l~t. ~ ___ _ 
JAN 24 2006 
BY.J.DAV~ 
~
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, 
Petitioner, 
v. 












CASE NO. SPOT0500155 
MOTION FOR THE COURT 
TO ADOPT PETITIONER'S 
PROPOSED SCHEDULING 
ORDER 
(CAPITAL CASE) o I 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, ERICK VIRGIL HALL, by and through his 
counsel at the State Appellate Public Defender, and moves this Court adopt Petitioner's 
proposed scheduling order for the remainder of these post-conviction proceedings. 
Petitioner's motion is based on I.e. §§ 19-2719, 19-4901, et seq., the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and the corresponding 
sections of the Idaho Constitution. 
The following scheduling proposal is based on a series of triggering events to 
ensure the timely and meaningful resolution of these capital post-conviction proceedings. 
To ensure meaningful post-conviction proceedings, a scheduling order must provide post-
conviction counsel the opportunity to satisfy their ethical and legal obligations to 
investigate and raise all claims that are arguably meritorious under the standards 
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applicable to high quality capital defense representation. ABA Guidelines For The 
Appointment And Performance Of Defense Counsel In Death Penalty Cases (2003) 
(hereinafter "ABA Guidelines"), Guidelines 1 O.IS.I.C ("[p Jost-conviction counsel should 
seek to litigate all issues, whether or not previously presented, that are arguably 
meritorious under the standards applicable to high quality capital defense representation, 
including challenges to any overly restrictive procedure rules" and "make every 
professionally appropriate effort to present issues in a manner that will preserve them for 
subsequent review"), 10.1S.l.E.4 ("[p Jost-conviction counsel should ... continue an 
aggressive investigation of all aspects of the case"); see also State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 
862, 864, 828 P.2d 891, 893 (1992)(recognizing that without meaningful post-conviction 
proceedings a capital petitioner might be denied due process of law under the federal and 
state constitutions). 
Because of the extensive nature of counsels' investigation, including discovery 
requests and depositions, Petitioner proposes that utilizing time lines as "triggering 
events" will be more efficient than specifying calendar dates, precluding the need for any 
unnecessary litigation. Petitioner proposes the following triggering events for deadlines: 
1. DISCOVERY 
a. A timeline for the State to respond to any court-ordered discovery and 
for Petitioner to review and assess such responses. The amount of 
time necessary for the State to respond to discovery depends in large 
part upon the degree to which this Court grants Petitioner's discovery 
requests. Petitioner's Motion for Discovery is currently pending; a 
hearing date on the motion has yet to be scheduled. The discovery 
MOTION FOR THE COURT TO ADOPT 
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motion is a necessary part of counsels' independent and thorough 
investigation required by performance standards for capital post-
conviction counsel for the purpose of identifying and raising all 
arguably meritorious claims in a final amended petition for post-
conviction relief. ABA Guidelines IO.15.l.C, IO.15.l.EA. Petitioner 
should be given a reasonable time to review the discovery and assess 
necessary investigative follow-up prior to filing an amended petition. 
2. TRANSCRIPTS 
a. The date Petitioner receIves the transcript of the exerCIse of 
peremptory challenges. Preparation of the transcript has been ordered, 
but a transcript has not yet been completed by the court reporter or 
received by Petitioner. Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523, 535 (9th Cir. 
2001)(recognizing that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
require review of the entire trial transcript) 
b. The date Petitioner receives the transcript of the interrogation tapes as 
played to the jury. Preparation of the transcript has been ordered, but a 
transcript has not yet been completed or received by Petitioner. See 
Hoffman v. Arave, supra. 
3. DEPOSITIONS 
a. A time line for the completion of depositions. After receipt of the 
transcripts and all court-ordered discovery, whichever occurs latest, 
and a reasonable time period in which to review those materials, 
Petitioner proposes that the Court should adopt a time-line for the 
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taking of depositions. The transcripts of the depositions will be 
attached to an amended petition for post-conviction relief. I.C. § 19-
4903. 
4. AMENDED PETITION FOR POST -CONVICTION RELIEF 
a. Petitioner requests a reasonable time following receipt of the 
deposition transcripts for the filing of his amended petition. I. C. § 19-
4906(a). 
5. DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS AND RESPONSIVE PLEADINGS 
a. Upon the filing of an amended petition, the Court should enter a 
scheduling order for the filing of dispositive motions. I.C. § 19-
4906(c). 
b. The scheduling order should include a reasonable time to respond to 
any dispositive motion filed. 
In conclusion, an efficient, meaningful, and realistic timeline for the final 
resolution of these capital post-conviction proceedings flows from the aforementioned 
series of triggering events that are part and parcel to all post-conviction proceedings and 
required by the standards governing counsels' performance. Accordingly, Petitioner 
respectfully moves this Court to enter a scheduling order taking into consideration these 
events. 
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Dated this ~ day of January, 2006. 
Deputy, State Appellate Public Defender 
£ 1) , )y1 J"' 
tJ(CL-vtll-- ( . / '-' LV~c..J..{ 1 u 
PAULA M. SWENSEN 
Deputy, State Appellate Public Defender 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
. ,-/.l 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this 2~ day of January, 2006, served a true 
and correct copy of the forgoing MOTION FOR THE COURT TO ADOPT 
PETITIONER'S SCHEDULING ORDER as indicated below: 
ROGER BOURNE 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191 
BOISE ID 83702 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL 
INMATE # 33835 
IMSI 
POBOX 51 




I Hand Delivery 
-i-- Statehouse Mail 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile 
__ Hand Delivery 
Mitigation Specialist 
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Session Date: 2006/01/24 
Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Reporter: French, Janet 
Clerk (s) : 
Ellis, Janet 
State Attorneys: 
Public Defender(s) : 
Prob. Officer(s): 
Court interpreter(s): 
Case ID: 0002 
Division: DC 
Session Time: 09:18 
Case Number: SPOT0500155D 
Plaintiff: HALL, ERICK 
2006/01/24 
Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK 
Defendant: STATE OF IDAHO 
CO-Defendant(s) : 
Pers. Attorney: 
State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
Public Defender: 
13:50:57 - Operator 
Recording: 
13:50:57 - New case 
, STATE OF IDAHO 
13:51:18 - Operator 
'Stop recording: 
13:51:29 - Operator 
Recording: 
13:51:29 - Record 
, STATE OF IDAHO 
13:51:30 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court called the case. 
13:52:01 - Other: SWENSON, PAULA 
Here on behalf of petitioner as well 





The Court stated that at last meeting, the Court and counsel 
met in chambers, 
13:54:06 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Mr. Ackley by telephone. Court and counsel discussed the ju 
ry questionnaire. 
13:56:40 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK 
Mr. Ackley stated that he has made multiple revisions to the 
previous order 
13:57:32 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK 
emiled to the Court. 
13:57:47 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
Mr. Bourne stated new order provided is acceptable to the St 
ate 
13:58:04 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court views off the record 
13:58:12 - Operator 
Stop recording: 
14:00:58 - Operator 
Recording: 
14:00:58 - Record 
., STATE OF IDAHO 
14:01:04 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court responded 
14:03:29 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK 
Mr. Ackley responded regarding reconsidering, want unredacte 
d form 
14:10:42 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court will set this matter for hearing on February 2, 20 
06 @ 9:00 a.m. 
14:11:17 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
Mr. Bourne stated motion has 336 requests for Discovery with 
several 
14:11:44 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
sub-parts that could take it into the 1000's 
14:17:16 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court stated may need to start the hearing regarding dis 
covery on the 
14:17:39 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F . 
. aftenoon. 
14:17:44 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
Mr. Bourne stated counsel were discussing discovery before c 
oming in today. 
14:18:04 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
Mr. Ackley trying to prepare a list of what might be agreed 
to. Will need 
14:18:49 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
more time to address that motion 




Mr. Ackley stated everything requested is needed. 
14:21:28 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court could hold a telephonic hearing on Friday, Februar 
y 3 @ 4:30 p.m. 
14:21:46 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
and advise whether the civil trial had gone down and may be 
able to hear the 
14:22:18 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
motions the week of February 7th. 
14:23:20 - Operator 
Stop recording: 
14:23:42 - Operator 
Recording: 
14:23:42 - Record 
, STATE OF IDAHO 
14:23:44 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court will look at February 8th, to set the hearing 






Session Date: 2006/02/03 
Judge: Neville/ Thomas F. 







Case ID: 0013 
Division: DC 
Session Time: 08:45 
Case Number: SPOT0500155D 
Plaintiff: 
2006/02/03 
Plaintiff Attorney: Swenson/ Paula 
Defendant: Idaho/ State of 
Co-Defendant(s) : 
Pers. Attorney: 
State Attorney: Bourne/ Roger 
Public Defender: 
17:09:41 - Operator 
Recording: 
17:09:41 - New case 
Idaho/ State of 
17:10:36 - Judge: Neville/ Thomas F. 
Courtroom: CR501 
Court here for further proceedings. Court inquired if form 
of order agreed 
17:11:23 - Judge: Neville/ Thomas F. 
on access to jury questionnaire. 
17:11:54 - Plaintiff Attorney: Swenson/ Paula 
Ms. Swenson stated that the Court was going to here a Motion 
to Reconsider. 
17:19:03 - Judge: Neville/ Thomas F. 
Court sets over to February 8/ 2006 @ 1:15 p.m. 
17:19:21 - Operator 
S""op ~&~ ... "$ 
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J. DAVID NAVARRO, CLERK OF THE COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, PLAINTIFF 
Plaintiff( s) 
VS 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEFENDANT 
Defendant(s) 
CASE NO. SP-OT-05-00155D 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Motion Wednesday, February 15, 2006 at 02:00 PM 
Judge: Thomas Neville 
Courtroom: 
I certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on Wednesday, February 08, 2006. 
Petitioner: MARK ACKLEY 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
VIlA EMAIL 
Mailed __ Hand Delivered -- Faxed "--
State's Counsel: ROGER BOURNE 
vYlA EMAIL 
Mailed__ Hand Delivered __ Faxed __ 
Dated: Wednesday, February 08, 2006 
NOTICE OF HEARING-Motion to Reconsider 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the Court 
. '\ ./ 





Session Date: 2006/02/15 
Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 





Public Defender(s) : 
Prob. Officer(s): 
Court interpreter(s): 
Case ID: 0018 
Division: DC 
Session Time: 08:40 
Case Number: SPOT0500155D 
Plaintiff: HALL, ERICK VIRGIL 
Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK 




State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
Public Defender: 
14:31:17 - Operator 
Recording: 
14:31:17 - New case 
, STATE OF IDAHO 
14:31:54 - Other: SWENSON, PAULA 
here on behalf of the petitioner as well 
14:32:08 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Courtroom: CR501 
The Court here on Petitioner's Motion to Reconsider oral ord 
ers 
14:32:32 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court has not entered written orders on this matter, thi 
s matter resulted 
14:33:47 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 




14:34:33 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court not aware of written motions, but had questions po 
sed by Mr. 
14:34:54 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Ackley. 
14:38:04 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK 
Mr. Ackley responded regarding January 6, date 
14:42:28 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
Mr. Bourne responded,regarding exparte contact, believe shou 
ld not do that 
14:47:02 - Other: SWENSON, PAULA 
Ms. Swenson argued motion, stated got a copy of visiting req 
uirements for 
14:49:05 - Other: SWENSON, PAULA 
Court appointed experts, would like this as part of the reco 
rd, conts argumen 
14:53:26 - Other: SWENSON, PAULA 
to allow exparte motions for expert access 
14:53:38 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
Mr. Bourne responded 
14:56:07 - Other: SWENSON, PAULA 
Ms. Swenson responded 
14:57:22 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court tentatively inclined to deny a uniform procedure f 
or ex parte for 
14:59:57 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
experts in every case. Court would like to review on a case 
by case 
15:00:09 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
situation. 
15:01:44 - Other: SWENSON, PAULA 
Court is asking to see each one on a case by case situtation 
15:02:23 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court will consider each motion on its own merits. Court go 
es to the second 
15:02:37 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
piece, Motion for access to prior jurors 
15:03:08 - Other: SWENSON, PAULA 
Ms. Swenson makes argument 
15:06:27 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Would have to have a basis for mis-conduct by the jury 
15:06:41 - Other: SWENSON, PAULA 
Would need to interview to find out if there was possible mi 
s-conduct 
15:07:52 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
Mr. Bourne responded 
15:11:14 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 





15:13:44 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
who went too far 
15:14:36 - Other: SWENSON, PAULA 
Ms. Swenson responded 
15:16:41 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court not going to deny access to jury, but must have pr 
ior permission 
15:17:06 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
from the Court and not ex parte, would need notice to the St 
ate 
15:19:36 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK 
Mr. Ackley cont'd to Motion to Reconsider jury questionnaire 
s standby 
15:20:27 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK 
request for unredacted questionnaires, but believe could red 
act addresses 
15:22:15 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK 
Could redact those portions before showing to Mr. Hall 
15:22:32 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
Mr. Bourne responded 
15:23:49 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
Look at group of jurors in two groups, those that were all q 
uestioned and 
15:24:09 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
those released by stip and then those that sat on jury panel 
and the three 
15:24:22 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
alternates 
15:26:35 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK 
Mr. Ackley responded, would review questionnaires, stated Ab 
dullah was given 
15:29:21 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK 
unredacted questionnaires 
15:30:35 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
Each juror looked at defendant and stated they did not know 
defendant, 
15:31:28 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
likewise defendant could have stated whether he knew any of 
the jurors. 
15:31:52 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court indicated that was true. 
15:32:45 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK 
Mr. Ackley stated not hiding identity is in the transcript. 
He would be able 
15:33:40 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK 
to cross reference their number on questionnaire. 




Court believes counsel can do their job with the transcript 
and 
15:36:38 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
questionnaires side by side as redacted. Court will consid 
er motions to 
15:36:57 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
approach the jury on a case by case 
15:37:23 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK 
Response 
15:41:40 - Operator 
Stop recording: 
15:45:04 - Operator 
Recording: 
15:45:04 - Record 
, STATE OF IDAHO 
15:45:06 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court can set the hearing Thursday, March 2 @ 1:30 p.m. 
Would request 
15:45:29 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
counsel try to narrow the scope of the hearing. Request Mr. 
Ackley prepare 
15:45:53 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
forms of orders based on today's motions and provide to Stat 
e copy to view 
15:46:18 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
for form 
15:46:24 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK 
Mr. Ackley stated Discovery motion is quite lenghty and divi 
ded betwwen Ms. 
15:46:48 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK 
Swenson and Mr. Ackley. 
15:46:58 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
no objection 
15:47:03 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Will be in recess 






Session Date: 2006/03/02 
Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Reporter: French, Janet 
Division: DC 





Public Defender(s) : 
Prob. Officer(s): 
Court interpreter(s): 
Case ID: 0001 
2006/03/02 
Case Number: SPOT0500155D 
Plaintiff: HALL, ERICK VIRGIL 
Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK 
Defendant: STATE OF IDAHO 
Co-Defendant(s) : 
Pers. Attorney: 
State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
Public Defender: 
13:51:40 - Operator 
Recording: 
13:51:40 - New case 
, STATE OF IDAHO 
13:52:00 - Other: SWENSON, PAULA 
here on behalf of petitioner Erick Hall as well. 
13:52:37 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court has had provided a couple of orders provided, inquired 
if Mr. Bourne 
13:52:57 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
had any objection to form of the order 
13:53:29 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
Mr. Bourne stated he has viewed one order but not the other. 
13:54:08 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 





~3:54:22 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
between counsel in continuing this matter to another day 
13:54:37 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK 
Mr. Ackley stated have 40 categories that will be requesting 
discovery on, 
13:55:06 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK 
only two of those would the State not object too. Mr. Ackle 
y requested to 
13:55:23 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK 
amend the petition and then come back on further hearing. 
13:56:43 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
Mr. Bourne concurred, State of Law is that motion for Discov 
ery has to be 
13:57:01 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
connected to the Petition. State's view is there is no appa 
rent connection 
13:57:18 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
between the petition now filed and the request for discovery 
Assumed there 
13:57:44 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
would be an amended petition at some point. Don't know th 
at there would be 
13:59:22 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
further amendments after that. 
13:59:30 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court inquires how long to file amended petition. 
14:00:19 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK 
Mr. Ackley indicated if this was a petition just for purpose 
s of Discovery or 
14:01:03 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK 
if this is final petition for summary disposition. Believe 
can have done in 
14:01:32 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK 
4-6 weeks if for purpose of discovery. 
14:03:08 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
Mr. Bourne responded. Would like a serious petition to liti 
gate. . 
14:04:55 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK 
Mr. Ackley stated not prepared to file a final petition yet, 
purpose of 
14:05:36 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK 
conversation yet was to get discovery done. Would take 4-6 
weeks to file 
14:07:19 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK 
amended petition aimed at discovery. 
14:07:52 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 




'14:08:17 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
vacate hearing today on discovery to get a more focused hear 
ing. Court will 
14:09:56 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
request that amended petition by April 17th. The Court will 
not rule on 
14:10:38 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
whether this is the first amended or last amended. Court wi 
11 reserve 
14:10:54 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
judgment, as far as response from the State 
14:12:31 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
Mr. Bourne requested mid may 
14:12:42 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court will order be completed by May 19th. 
14:14:42 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK 
Need to know if the Court is going to allow another amended 
petition. 
14:15:29 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court can't rule in advance in abcense of pleadings before t 
he Court 
14:16:33 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK 
Request further clarification 
14:16:44 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court can't rule in the blind, not knowing whether or not co 
unsel discover 
14:17:23 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
anything further 
14:17:27 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK 
14:17:34 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Need to have this narrowed down at some point. Court loathe 
to rule in the 
14:18:24 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
dark. 
14:21:42 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK 
Mr. Ackley stated need some assurance from the State. 
14:22:18 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Amended complaint is bound to be beneficial for judicial eco 
nomy. 
14:23:28 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
Mr. Bourne had agreed to set this over to get amended petit 
ion 
14:24:33 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK 
Mr. Ackley responded. Would like to proceed on some of the 
discovery issues 
14:26:58 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK 
today. Got a wholesale objection from the State 
Page 3 
Session: Neville030206 
14:27:20 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
, Court does not have ability to hear today. Court will set f 
urther deadline 
14:27:50 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
for possible amendment to the Motion for Discovery by June 9 
tho The Court 
14:29:04 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
will set this hearing for June 23 @ 9:00 a.m. for hearing on 
the motion re: 
14:29:19 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Discovery. Request State advise the Court if any objection 
to the forms of 
14:30:30 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
the order 
14:30:48 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court has been making emails part of the court record. 
14:31:00 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK 
Comfortable with that. 




MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
LS.B. # 4843 
MARK J. ACKLEY, LS.B. # 6330 
PAULA M. SWENSEN, LS.B. # 6722 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
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CASE NO. SPOT0500155 
EX PARTE MOTION 
FOR EXPERT ACCESS 
TO PETITIONER 
(CAPITAL CASE) 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, ERICK VIRGIL HALL, by and through his 
attorneys at the Office of the State Appellate Public Defender and moves this Honorable 
Court to order the Department of Correction (DOC) and the Idaho State Maximum 
Security Institution (lMSI) to grant Dr. James Merikangas, M.D., of Bethesda, Maryland, 
a contact visit with Petitioner in a quiet and confidential setting suitable for interview, 
testing, and evaluation. 
Further, although the Court denied Petitioner's motion to generally use ex parte 
procedures, but because the Court permitted counsel to apply on a case-by-case basis, 
Petitioner moves that this Order be granted ex parte. One of Dr. Merikangas' specialties, 
EX PARTE MOTION FOR EXPERT ACCESS TO PETITIONER PAGE 1 
001.34 
neurology, is not of the type utilized in the underlying trial proceedings and Petitioner 
continues to object to premature disclosure of post-conviction strategy and work-product. 
This request is necessary to develop Petitioner's Claim B.1 in an upcoming amended 
petition. 
Petitioner prays that such access be granted to Dr. Merikangas on the 4th day of 
April, 2006, from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m., and that said Order allow the medical equipment 
necessary to the examination, as specified in Attachment A. 
This motion is made pursuant to I.e. §§ 19-4001, et seq., and 19-870 and the 
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and it 
is based upon all matters of record. 
Dated this I ~y of March, 2006. 
Respectfully submitted; 
~"'11l4'4l~/~ 
 . ,/ 
MARKJ. EY / I 
Lead, Capital Litigat&x1nit 
~u1~ jU}{1C<ltIL 
PAULA M. SWENSEN 
Deputy, Capital Litigation Unit 
EX PARTE MOTION FOR EXPERT ACCESS TO PETITIONER PAGE 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this Ik'thday of March, 2006, served a true 
and correct copy of the forgoing EX PARTE MOTION FOR EXPERT ACCESS TO 
PETITIONER as indicated below: 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL 
INMATE # 33835 
IMSI 
POBOX 51 
BOISE ID 83707 
Statehouse Mail --::r- U.S. Mail 
Facsimile 
__ Hand Delivery 
" " ---
1tlt\}lt~ D. lhc\\(tL 
BARBARA D. THOMAS 
Administrative Assistant 
EX PARTE MOTION FOR EXPERT ACCESS TO PETITIONER PAGE 3 
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2 tuning fo~ks 
Metal stopwatch 
Blood pressure cuff 
Tape measure 
Other Equipment 
Plastic bottle of cloves 
Plastic bottle of vanila 
Pens 
Pencils 
Pad of paper 
Plastic strip with stripes 
Wooden tongue depressor 
Cotton swabs 
Peice of leather 
Piece of cloth 
Latex gloves 
All enclosed in a leather physician·s bag 
EXHIBIT" . f.\ " 
tg) 002 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Roger Bourne 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Idaho State Bar No. 2127 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 











Case No. SPOT0500155 
STATE'S MOTION IN LIMINE 
TO PRECLUDE DEPOSITIONS 
WITHOUT COURT ORDER 
COMES NOW, Roger Bourne, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of 
Ada, State of Idaho, and moves this Court for its order precluding the State Appellate Public 
Defender from conducting "one party depositions" of the Petitioner's trial team members or of 
other material witnesses. The State just became aware that the Petitioner was attempting to 
conduct a "one party deposition" upon reading an email from the State Appellate Public 
Defender to the State and the Court's clerk, dated March 22, 2006, concerning the need for a 
hearing on the issuance of subpoenas for the depositions. Since these so called depositions are 
STATE'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE DEPOSITIONS WITHOUT COURT 
ORDER (HALL), Page 1 
apparently scheduled without notice to the State, the State cannot be there to protect the witness 
or other State interests. The person being deposed is not fully examined nor prepared for the 
hearing so the Court does not get a full and accurate picture of the information relevant to 
whatever issue the deposition is for. Further, the State observes that no permission has been 
given by the Court for depositions as required by Idaho Criminal Rule S7(b). To the State's 
knowledge, no order allowing depositions has been granted by this Court. For those reasons, the 
State objects to depositions and moves this Court to require that no deposition be taken until 
further order of the Court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this Z 7 day of March 2006. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecutor 
Rog;;Bourne 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was 
delivered to the State Appellate Public Defender's Office, 3647 Lake Harbor Lane, Boise, Idaho 
83703 through the United States Mail, this Z']ctay of March 2006. 
STATE'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE DEPOSITIONS WITHOUT COURT 
ORDER (HALL), Page 2 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Roger Bourne 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Idaho State Bar No. 2127 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Id. 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
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___ R_e_s..Lp_on_d......;e_n_t. __________ ) 
Case No. SPOT0500155 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO: ERICK VIRGIL HALL, and STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC 
DEFENDER, his Attorney of Record, you will please take notice that on the 23rd day of 
June 2006, at the hour of 9:00 of said day, or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Roger Bourne will move this Honorable Court" on the 
State's Motion in Limine to Preclude Depositions Without Court Order in the above-
entitled action. 
'"J77(f 
DATED this ~ day of March 2006. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
By: Roger Boume 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
NOTICE OF HEARING (HALL), Page 1 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Notice of Hearing to State Appellate Public Defender's Office, 3647 Lake Harbor Lane, 
Boise, Idaho 83703 by depositing the same in the InterofficeMail.postageprepaid.this 1'7 
day of March 2006. 
NOTICE OF HEARING (HALL), Page 2 
no.f If.f' 
MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State ofIdaho 
LS.B. # 4843 
MARK J. ACKLEY, LS.B. # 6330 
PAULA M. SWENSEN, LS.B. # 6722 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, 
Petitioner, 
v. 












CASE NO. SPOT0500155 
MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF 
SUBPOENAS FOR DEPOSITIONS 
AND SUBPOENAS DUCES TECUM 
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
(CAPITAL CASE) 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, by and through his counsel at the State 
Appellate Public Defender,and pursuant to the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution, Sections 5, 6, 7, and 8 ofthe Idaho Constitution, I.e. § 19-4901 
et seq., § 19-2719, and I.C.R. 57(b), and moves this Court to issue subpoenas for the depositions 
of Amil Myshin, D.C. Carr, Glenn Elam, and Rosanne Dapsauski, as well as subpoenas duces 
tecum for the production of documents. 
MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENAS FOR DEPOSITIONS AND 
SUBPOENAS DUCES TECUM FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
1 
RELEVANT BACKGROUND 
On January 5, 2006, Petitioner filed his Motion For Discovery and his Memorandum Of 
Law In Support Of Motion For Discovery, (herein "Memorandum"). Within these pleadings, 
Petitioner requested, and sought to justify, court-ordered depositions of Amil Myshin (lead 
counsel), D.C. Carr (co-counsel), Glenn Elam (Ada County Public Defender investigator), and 
Rosanne Dapsauski (trial team agent/mitigation specialist), among others. Motion For 
Discovery, p. 24; Memorandum, pp. 17-18. On or about January 19, 2006, the State filed a 
blanket objection to all requests for discovery. On or about February 28,2006, the State filed a 
memorandum in support of its objection. Neither of the State's pleadings addressed Petitioner's 
specific requests for court-ordered depositions. A hearing on the pleadings was set for March 2, 
2006. 
Prior to the hearing, Petitioner, through counsel, reached an agreement with the State to 
continue the hearing so that Petitioner could file an amendment to his petition. The purpose of 
the amendment was to connect his discovery requests to specific claims not raised in his initial 
petition. The agreement was premised on Petitioner's assertion that the amended petition would 
not be considered a final petition. As Petitioner's counsel stated, in part, via an email message to 
Court staff, and "carbon copied" to the State: 
I spoke to Roger earlier this afternoon and we both agreed that tomorrow's 
hearing would be best served by scheduling a deadline for the filing of an 
amended petition and rescheduling the discovery hearing. The deadline would 
not constitute the conclusion of these post-conviction proceedings but rather a 
deadline to raise claims identified to date and appears a necessary step prior to a 
meaningful discovery hearing. 
Exhibit A. 
At the hearing held March 2, 2006, the Court inquired how much time Petitioner would 
require for filing an amended petition. Petitioner's counsel indicated that the amount of time 
MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENAS FOR DEPOSITIONS AND 
SUBPOENAS DUCES TECUM FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
2 
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depended on whether the amended petition would be considered a final petition subject to 
potential summary dismissal, or, as envisioned by counsel, a means of ensuring a productive 
discovery hearing, with leave for subsequent amendment. If the deadline were set for the latter 
purpose, then counsel suggested four to six weeks. However, if the deadline were set for the 
filing of a final petition, then counsel could not give a specific date but did state that Petitioner 
would require much more time. After some discussion, the Court declined to indicate whether 
further amendments would be permitted, imposed a deadline of April 17, 2006, for the filing of 
an amended petition, imposed a deadline of June 9, 2006, for the filing of any amended 
discovery motion, and continued the discovery hearing to June 23, 2006. 1 Petitioner thereafter 
sought to pursue his discovery requests as previously scheduled. The Court refused, indicating 
that it had already placed two civil cases on its docket. Petitioner then asked to at least have his 
request for depositions heard. The Court refused Petitioner's request.2 
Petitioner has recently sought recorded sworn statements from trial team members, 
without resorting to a court order. For various reasons, the trial team members have refused to 
cooperate. The lack of adequate cooperation will be detailed in forthcoming affidavits from 
members of Petitioner's current post-conviction team. 
I. Depositions Of The Trial Team Members, And The Production Of Documents 
Within Their Possession, Are Necessary For Meaningful Post-Conviction 
Proceedings. 
I By scheduling the discovery hearing for June 23, 2006, the Court implicitly determined that 
Petitioner would be permitted to amend his petition with evidentiary support or claims as 
warranted by any court-ordered discovery. Nevertheless, out of the abundance of caution due 
capital cases, Petitioner's counsel believes the most diligent approach is to pursue depositions 
without waiting nearly three months to be heard. 
2 This rendition of facts is made in good faith and to the best of counsels' recollection without 
resort to court minutes and without access to a transcript of the hearing. 
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that guarantees him a full and fair opportunity to develop claims of trial error. See Evitts v. 
Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 401(1985)("[W]hen a State opts to act in a field where its action has 
significant discretionary elements, it must nonetheless act in accord with the dictates of the 
Constitution--and, in particular, in accord with the Due Process Clause."); State v. Beam, 121 
Idaho 862, 864, 828 P.2d 891, 893 (1992)(recognizing that the absence of meaningful capital 
post-conviction proceedings may violate due process); Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 798, 
992 P.2d 789, 793 (Ct. App. 1999)("failing to provide a post-conviction applicant with a 
meaningful opportunity to have his or her claims presented may be violative of due process"); 
see also Roberts v. State, 840 So.2d 962, 971 (Fl. 2002) (recognizing that while post-conviction 
proceedings are designated civil, they "involve interests and considerations that are more closely 
aligned with those traditionally and fundamentally protected in criminal proceedings" and thus 
must comport with due process)( citations omitted). 
A. Depositions 
Petitioner has raised several grounds for relief, including claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, in his initial petition for post-conviction relief. Through depositions Petitioner seeks 
to provide evidentiary support for claims raised as well as support for claims not yet raised, but 
identified through his independent investigation. In addition, Petitioner requires depositions as 
an investigative tool because members of Petitioner's trial team have not provided adequate 
consultation. 
Petitioner generally bears the burden of proving his grounds for reliefby a preponderance 
of the evidence. I.C.R. 57(c). The Supreme Court set out the elements for claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). First, Petitioner 
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must show that counsel's perfonnance was deficient. Second, Petitioner must show that the 
deficient perfonnance prejudiced the defense. To prove deficient perfonnance Petitioner "must 
show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 
688. Petitioner must "reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct" for an 
objective evaluation from counsel's perspective at the relevant time. Id. at 689. Petitioner "must 
overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be 
considered sound trial strategy.'" Id. To rebut this presumption Petitioner must probe counsels' 
decision-making process through depositions. 
Petitioner requires depositions for four reasons: (1) to fully develop claims raised in 
Petitioner's initial petition; (2) to determine whether counsels' challenged decisions were the 
result of sound trial strategy;3 (3) to fully develop claims not yet raised but identified through 
investigation conducted after filing Petitioner's initial petition; and (4) to identify additional 
claims for post-conviction relief whether such claims involve the ineffective assistance of 
counselor judicial, juror, or prosecutorial misconduct.4 See Coleman v. Zant, 708 F.2d 541,548 
(11 th Cir. 1983) (relying in part on the denial of depositions at the state post-conviction level in 
finding that the federal habeas petitioner had been denied a full and fair opportunity to develop 
facts to support his ineffective assistance of counsel claim); Davis v. State, 624 So.2d 282, 283-
84 (Fla. 1993) (holding that the petitioner raising an issue of ineffective assistance of counsel 
3 If trial counsel asserts, or the Court presumes, challenged decisions were strategic, then 
Petitioner must inquire into the decision-making process to detennine whether such decisions 
were unreasonable because made with inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or 
other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. See Campbell v. State, 130 Idaho 546, 548, 
944 P.2d 143, 145 (Ct. App. 1997). 
4 Depositions would not be so critical for each of these reasons but for trial counsels' failure to 
honor their ethical obligation to make themselves accessible for adequate and voluntary 
consultation with Petitioner's current counsel. See infra, ABA Guidelines for the Appointment 
and Perfonnance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, (herein "ABA Guidelines"), 
Guideline 10.13 and Commentary. 
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should have been permitted to take the deposition of his trial counsel); see generally Harris v. 
Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300 (1969) ("[W]here specific allegations before the court show reason to 
believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is 
confined illegally and is therefore entitled to relief, it is the duty of the court to provide the 
necessary facilities and procedures for an adequate inquiry."); Teague v. Scott, 60 F.3d 1167, 
1172 (5th Cir.1995) ("Denial of an opportunity for discovery is an abuse of discretion when the 
discovery is necessary to fully develop the facts of a claim."); Toney v. Gammon, 79 F.3d 693, 
700 (8th Cir.1996) (noting that "a court's denial of discovery is an abuse of discretion if 
discovery is indispensable to a fair, rounded, development of the material facts")(internal 
quotation marks omitted); Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 1997)(same). 
Petitioner cannot rely on the procurement of affidavits, or other investigative methods, as 
a substitute for court-ordered depositions for three reasons. First, Petitioner has not received 
adequate and voluntary cooperation from trial counsel in these post-conviction proceedings 
despite trial counsels' ethical obligations to facilitate Petitioner's representation. As set forth in 
the ABA Guidelines, 
In accordance with professional norms, all persons who are or have been 
members of the defense team have a continuing duty to safeguard the interests of 
the client and should cooperate fully with successor counsel. This duty includes, 
but is not limited to: 
A. maintaining the records of the case in a manner that will inform successor 
counsel of all significant developments relevant to the litigation; 
B. providing the client's files, as well as information regarding all aspects of 
the representation, to successor counsel; 
C. sharing potential further areas of legal and factual research with successor 
counsel; and 
D. cooperating with such professionally appropriate legal strategies as may 
be chosen by successor counsel. 
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ABA Guidelines, Guideline 10.l3 ("The Duty To Facilitate The Work Of Successor Counsel") 
(rev. ed.2003), reprinted in 31 Hofstra L.Rev. 913, 956-57 (2003).5 The lack of adequate 
cooperation will be detailed in forthcoming affidavits from members of Petitioner's current post-
conviction team6, but has included, at a minimum, the failure to disclose all files and notes in a 
timely fashion, the failure to communicate with post-conviction counsel, and the failure to 
cooperate in post-conviction counsels' legal strategy to pursue one-party depositions, i.e., oral 
affidavits, as an alternative to court-ordered depositions.7 Petitioner's counsel is therefore forced 
to pursue more aggressive measures to compel cooperation. Indeed, according to the 
Commentary to ABA Guidelines, Guideline 10.13, consulting with trial counsel is an "absolutely 
critical" part of post-conviction counsels' independent and thorough investigation. 
The duties contained in this Guideline are of enormous practical significance 
to the vindication of the client's legal rights. "[T]he strategic thinking of the 
lawyer, and learning this strategic thinking[,] is absolutely critical to the thorough 
presentation of a post-conviction claim. It should be routinely and openly 
presented to the post-conviction counsel." To do otherwise is professionally 
unethical. 2 
fn2 See id. ("[G]iven the peculiar aspects of the role of counsel whose former 
client brings a post-conviction action, [it] violates counsel's ethical obligations" 
5 The ABA Guidelines in their entirety can be accessed Via the internet at 
http://www.probono.netldeathpenalty/index.cfm. 
6 See I.R.C.P. 56(f) ("Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion [for 
summary judgment] that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to 
justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a 
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had 
or may make such other order as is just."); see also I.C. § 19-4906(c), specifically referencing 
depositions one method for supporting a petitioner's claims prior to an evidentiary hearing. 
7 The State has filed an objection to any court-ordered one-party depositions. This motion is 
based on the assumption that any court-ordered deposition would provide both parties the 
opportunity to examine the deponents. 
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to fail to cooperate with successor counsel in "the disclosure to the post-
conviction counsel of files and notes from the representation, the volunteering of 
absences in the record and the volunteering of counsel's strategic thinking in the 
case."); Meegan B. Nelson, Note, When Clients Become "Ex-Clients": The Duties 
Owed After Discharge, 26 J. LEGAL PROF. 233, 241 (2002) ("Essentially, a failure 
to cooperate with the client's new attorney can constitute the same violations as a 
failure to cooperate with the actual client under Model Rule 1.16."); see generally 
State Bar of Ariz Comm. on the Rules of Prof! Conduct, Formal Op. 98-07 
(1998) (discussing ethical obligations surrounding file retention and surrender to 
clients and successor counsel); Returning Client Files After Termination, HAWAII 
BAR J., Sept. 1998, at 16 (finding an ethical obligation to release to the client "all 
file materials which, if not released ... would prejUdice the rights ofthe client"). 
ABA Guideline 10.13, Commentary. 
Second, court-ordered depositions, unlike affidavits, are the only pre-evidentiary hearing 
mechanism for fully and fairly developing Petitioner's claims. See e.g., Russell v. Acme-Evans 
Co., 51 F.3d 64, 68 (7th Cir.1995) (holding that it is proper under most circumstances to 
disregard an affidavit when the affidavit contradicts the witness's prior deposition testimony); 
Kiser v. Caudill, 599 S.E.2d 826, 830-34 (W.Va. 2004) (holding that the failure to consider an 
affidavit that contradicted earlier deposition testimony was not an abuse of discretion). Indeed, 
the logistics involved in finalizing an affidavit from trial counsel are onerous and time-
consuming, and a near impossibility in light of trial counsels' resistance to voluntary 
cooperation. 8 
Third, court-ordered depositions, unlike affidavits or other discovery methods, are the 
only mechanism, short of testimony at an evidentiary hearing that provides both parties, as well 
as trial team members, a full opportunity "to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's 
8 Petitioner's lead counsel has experience with attempting to obtain an affidavit from trial 
counsel, Amil Myshin, in other cases as well. For example, the logistical difficulties involved in 
the revision and finalizing process of an affidavit in the capital post-conviction case of Darrell E. 
Payne v. State of Idaho, Ada County case no. SPOT0200630D, led to the submission of an 
unsigned affidavit. 
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challenged conduct." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.9 Thus, an affidavit from trial counsel, while 
useful, does not present a format conducive for full presentation of all the circumstances 
surrounding their decision-making. As noted by the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York, 
[D]epositions are preferable if a searching interrogation of the other party 
is desired. At a deposition the examining party has great flexibility and can frame 
the questions on the basis of answers to previous questions. Moreover, the party 
being examined does not have the opportunity to study the questions in advance 
and to consult with counsel before answering, as is the case if interrogatories are 
used. Attempts at evasion, which might be stymied by a persistent oral 
examination, cannot easily be countered by interrogatories. The flexibility and the 
potency of oral depositions is in large part lacking in written interrogatories. 
Madanes v. Madanes, 199 F.R.D. 135, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)(citation omitted); see also 
Hendricks v. Coughlin, 114 F.3d 390,394 (2d Cir.1997). 
Petitioner is not aware of any Idaho capital post-conviction case where a request for the 
deposition of a trial team member was denied by a district court. For instance, Petitioner's lead 
counsel deposed both trial counsel and defense team investigators in the capital post-conviction 
cases of Jimmie V. Thomas v. State ofIdaho, Jerome County case no. SPOT99-112 and Dale C. 
Shackelford v. State of Idaho, Latah County case no. CV2001-0004272. 1O In addition, 
Petitioner's lead counsel is aware that post-conviction depositions of both trial counsel were 
9 This is not to say that one-party depositions, i.e., sworn recorded statements, written affidavits, 
or other documentation do not provide competent evidentiary support for a petition for post-
conviction relief. Idaho Code § 19-4903 specifically provides that, "Affidavits, records, or other 
evidence supporting its allegations shall be attached to the application or the application shall 
recite why they are not attached." 
10 Depositions were not requested by Petitioner's lead counsel in Michael A. lauhola v. State of 
Idaho, Ada County case no. SPOTOlO0492D; however, in that case, the district court indicated 
early on that an evidentiary hearing would be granted over any motion for summary dismissal. 
Trial counsel were both questioned at the evidentiary hearing. Lead counsel did not request 
depositions of trial counsel in Darrell E. Payne v. State of Idaho, Ada County case no. 
SPOT0200630D, see supra n4. 
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taken in Timothy A. Dunlap v. State of Idaho, case no. SP-94-863. See a/so, Rhoades v. State, 
135 Idaho 299, 302, 17 P.3d 243, 246 (2000)(noting post-conviction depositions taken of trial 
counsel). Petitioner asserts that the denial of depositions in these post-conviction proceedings, 
under these circumstances, would violate Petitioner's state and federal rights to equal protection 
of the law, his due process right to meaningful post-conviction review, and would constitute an 
arbitrary denial of the procedural safeguards necessary to protect Petitioner's substantial rights, 
as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment. See e.g., Lankford v. 
Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 125-27 (1991)(relying on due process in weighing the "special importance 
of fair procedure" in capital cases); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)(relying on 
the Eighth Amendment for affording "heightened reliability" in capital cases). 
B. Production Of Documents 
For the same legal grounds discussed above, and incorporated herein by reference, 
Petitioner requests subpoenas duces tecum for the production of documents previously requested 
in his Motion For Discovery, p. 24. Specifically, Petitioner requests documentation identifying 
the cases each trial team member worked on from April 1, 2003, through January 18,2005. (Tr., 
p. 215, L. 24 - p. 216, L. 2 (noting Amil Myshin's heavy workload including a manslaughter 
trial scheduled for April 2004), as well as all e-mail correspondence between trial team members 
and the prosecutor's office. (Tr., p. 249, Ls. 8-14.) In addition, Petitioner requests the 
production of all email correspondence between the trial team and the Court or Court personnel, 
as well as all files and notes in the trial team's possession not previously disclosed to post-
conviction counsel. See supra, ABA Guidelines, Guideline 10.13 and its Commentary. The 
basis for this request with be further justified in forthcoming affidavits from members of 
Petitioner's current post-conviction team. 
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In conclusion, Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to issue subpoenas for the 
aforementioned trial team members' attendance for their depositions at a date and location to be 
determined at the hearing on this motion. Petitioner also respectfully requests this Court to issue 
subpoenas duces tecum for the production of documents, limited to Petitioner's review, and prior 
to the date scheduled for depositions. 
DATED this 31 st day March, 2006. 
,) . 11 Y 
fa ' df~ If,. xd (i-C{/}LdA7"V 
PAULA M. SWENSEN 
Co-Counsel, Capital Litigation Unit 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 3~ day of March, 2006, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document, MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENAS FOR DEPOSITIONS 
AND SUBPOENAS DUCES TECUM FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, was mailed, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
/ 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL V' U.S. Mail 
INMATE # 33835 Statehouse Mail --
IMSI Facsimile --
POBOX 51 __ Hand Delivery 
BOISE ID 83707 
ROGER BOURNE U.S. Mail --
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE Statehouse Mail --
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191 --r- Facsimile. 
BOISE ID 83702 _v _ Hand DelIvery 
E-Mail --
THOMAS F. NEVILLE U.S. Mail --
DISTRICT JUDGE Statehouse Mail --
200W.FRONT -T Facsimile 
BOISE ID 83702 __ Hand Delivery 
E-Mail --
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Mark Ackley 
From: Mark Ackley 
Sent: Wednesday, March 01, 20064:52 PM 
To: 'Janet Ellis' 
Cc: 'Roger Bourne'; Paula Swensen 
Subject: RE: Tomorrow's hearing 
Janet, 
I spoke to Roger earlier this afternoon and we both agreed that tomorrow's hearing would be best served by 
scheduling a deadline for the filing of an amended petition and rescheduling the discovery hearing. The deadline 
would not constitute the conclusion of these post-conviction proceedings but rather a deadline to raise claims 
identified to date and appears a necessary step prior to a meaningful discovery hearing. 
I assume you must be in a hearing as I have not been able to reach and have not heard back from Roger who 
was going to contact you immediately. If the Court would like to hear from us tonight, then I will be available at 
947-9259 (my office line) between 5 and 6 pm. 
If you could please leave me an email on the status of tomorrow's hearing, even if there is no present change in 
status, it would be much appreciated. The status will affect our preparation this evening. Thanks a lot. 
Mark 
-----Original Message-----
From: Mark Ackley 
Sent: Wednesday, March 01, 2006 1:36 PM 
To: 'Roger Bourne' 
Cc: Paula Swensen; 'Janet Ellis' 
Subject: Tomorrow's hearing 
Roger, 
I just dropped you a voice-mail message regarding tomorrow's hearing. Specifically, I would like 
to continue the hearing, if possible, to a date in the near future. If we cannot get a date in the 
near future, then we are prepared to go forward tomorrow. The reason for the request of the 
continuance is to provide us an opportunity to reply to your Objection (received at the end of the 
day yesterday) as well as to provide a written outline to you and the Court identifying the 
relevance of our specific requests to claims in our petition. In light of your Objection, I anticipate 
such an outline could really expedite matters. 
Further, and not mentioned in the voice-mail message, our investigator just received a full 
banker's box of new materials (and identified another) from the Ada County Public Defender's 
office despite the fact that we had requested all such materials previously ... on multiple 
occasions. It may likely be that our review of the materials in these two boxes leads to revisions 
to our discovery motion. 
These are the dates we would be available if you and the Court are amenable to rescheduling. 
March 14-17 or March 21-24. April is wide open. 
I can be reached directly in my office at 947-9259. At 2:30, I will be moving to our conference 
room and can be reached through our general office line at 334-2712. Thanks·, 
- Mark 
EXHIBIT II ~~,_" 
.u""\ .... r!" II 
MOLLY J. HUSKEY, LS.B. # 4843 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
MARK J. ACKLEY, LS.B. # 6330 
PAULA M. SWENSEN, ISB # 6722 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN, ISB # 6247 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
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CASE NO. H0130@J~ 
AMENDED PETITION FOR 
POST -CONVICTION RELIEF 
(Capital Case) 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, by and through his attorneys at 
the State Appellate Public Defender, and petitions this Honorable Court for post-
conviction relief from the conviction and sentences imposed by this Court in the Fourth 
Judicial District, in State v. Hall, Ada County case no. H0300518, on January 18,2005. 
This Court has jurisdiction over the action pursuant to I.e. § 19-2719; §§ 19-4901, et 
seq.; LC.R., Rules 35 and 57; and Article I, Sections 1 and 5 of the Constitution of the 
State of Idaho. Petitioner relies on Article I, §§ 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 17, and 18 of the 
Constitution of the State of Idaho, and the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution as well as International Hunlan Rights 
Law in support of this Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (herein "Amended 
Petition"). 
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I. BACKGROUND (I.C.R. 57(a)(1) through (a)(6» 
1. Petitioner is in the custody of the State of Idaho Department of Correction, 
detained at the Idaho Maximum Security Institution near Boise, Idaho. 
2. Judgment and sentence were pronounced by the Honorable Thomas F. Neville, 
District Judge of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in Ada County, 
Boise, Idaho. 
3. Petitioner stands convicted in Ada County case no. H0300518 of the crimes of: 
Count I, Murder in the First Degree 
Count II, Rape 
Count III, Kidnapping in the First Degree 
4. The Court imposed sentences as follows on the 18th day of January, 2005: 
Count I, for Murder: Death 
Count II, for Rape: Life in Prison without possibility of parole 
Count III, for Kidnapping: Life in Prison without possibility of parole 
The sentences for Counts II and III are to run consecutively. 
5. Petitioner pled not guilty and a jury returned verdicts of guilty to the crimes 
charged. 
6. Other than post-trial motions and a Notice Of Appeal, which cannot be litigated 
under Idaho law until these post-conviction matters are concluded, this is 
Petitioner's first attempt in any court to obtain relief from the convictions and 
sentences herein challenged. 
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II. ILLEGAL RESTRAINT OF LIBERTY 
Petitioner is a person restrained of his liberty in that he is a prisoner of the State of 
Idaho, under the custody of the Idaho State Board of Corrections, held on death row at 
the Idaho Maximum Security Institution. This restraint is pursuant to the following 
conviction and sentence imposed on January 18, 2005, by this Court presiding in the 
Fourth Judicial District, in State v. Hall, Ada County case no. H0300518: Murder in the 
First Degree, Kidnapping in the First Degree, and Rape. This restraint is illegal in that the 
convictions and sentences were obtained in violation of the constitutions of the United 
States and of the State of Idaho and in violation of court rules, statutes and other law as 
set forth below. 
III. LACK OF SPECIFICITY - NEED TO AMEND 
This Amended Petition is filed according to the time constraints imposed by this 
Court. Due to these time constraints, it is impossible for Petitioner to file a petition that 
complies with I.C. §§ 19-4901, et seq;!, § 19-2719; and I.C.R. 57, because of the 
following factors, among others: 
1. The Court appointed Petitioner's present counsel to represent him in post-
conviction proceedings on February 17,2005; 
2. Counsel for Petitioner had no participation in the criminal case leading to the 
conviction and sentences herein challenged; 
3. The underlying sentence of death represents the first death sentence imposed 
since inception of a new and untested death penalty scheme, and thus 
contains many complicated issues of first impression in the State of Idaho; 
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4. A copy of the Reporter's Transcript was not received until on or about 
September 26,2005; and 
5. Present counsel has not had a meaningful opportunity to conduct an 
independent investigation due to the following factors: 
• Petitioner's current counsel have not yet reviewed all transcripts 
received. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a 
thorough review of the trial transcript and the entire record to 
determine the nature, frequency and effect of counsel's errors, 
Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523, 535 (9th Cir. 2001). In this 
case, the trial transcript, grand jury transcripts, and transcripts of 
interrogations total over six thousand (6000) pages. The Clerk's 
Record numbers over five hundred (500) pages, not including the 
Presentence Investigation Report. A thorough review of the 
transcript has been sacrificed to accommodate the investigation 
and litigation of other matters that would not have otherwise been 
necessary but for the State's failure to voluntarily comply with 
their discovery obligations and due to court-imposed time 
constraints and other restrictions placed on Petitioner's ability to 
adequately reinvestigate his case. 
• Petitioner's current counsel are still aWaItmg all requested 
transcripts including a complete Reporter's Transcript of the 
underlying criminal proceedings, and a copy of the Grand Jury 
transcript from State v. Hall, Ada County Case No. 
M9108836JHCR18591.! 
• Petitioner's trial teaIll has refused to adequately cooperate with 
Petitioner. This lack of cooperation has included their failure to 
disclose all their files and notes, and their failure to return email 
and voicemail messages or otherwise adequately consult with 
Petitioner. See Motion for Issuance of Subpoenas Duces Tecum 
and Subpoenas for Depositions incorporated herein by reference.2 
! A copy of this transcript was requested in Petitioner's Motion For Discovery filed 
January 5, 2006, and currently scheduled for a hearing on June 23, 2006. 
2 The single most troubling aspect of Petitioner's reinvestigation of this case has been the 
trial teaIll's unwillingness to cooperate. Petitioner's current counsel simply cannot meet 
their obligations without the cooperation of trial counsel. ABA Guideline 10.7.B.1. 
provides that post-conviction counsel "have an obligation to conduct a full eXaIllination 
of the defense provided to the client at all prior phases of the case. This obligation 
includes at minimum interviewing prior counsel and members of the defense teaIll and 
examining the files of prior counsel." 
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• Petitioner is still awaiting a hearing on his Motion For Discovery 
in which he requested materials including Brady material. See 
Motion For Discovery, filed January 5, 2006. See Moore v. Kemp, 
809 F.2d 702, 730 (11th Cir. 1987) (defendant who was not given 
Brady materials in state post-conviction proceedings did not get 
"full and fair" hearing in the state courts). The hearing is 
currently scheduled for June 23, 2006. 
• Petitioner is still awaiting receipt of the completed jury 
questionnaires. The questionnaires were the parties' "bible" 
during voir dire. (Tr., p. 5445, Ls. 1-3.) 
• The poor condition of the transcript received precludes 
meaningful post-conviction review. There can be no doubt that 
the State must provide an indigent defendant with a transcript of 
prior proceedings when that transcript is needed for an effective 
defense or appeal. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). In this 
case, the transcript quality is so poor that it amounts to a violation 
of both equal protection and due process to proceed upon this 
record. In a capital case, the Eighth Amendment is also violated. 
Petitioner will submit, at a later date, a report of transcription 
errors. 
• Petitioner has, to this point, been restricted from contacting jurors 
due to limitations set by this Court not otherwise required by 
Idaho law. Petitioner intends to file another motion with the Court 
to show that unrestricted jury contact is necessary for meaningful 
post -conviction proceedings. 
• The Court's time constraints and the uncertainty whether the 
Court will permit further amendment have forced Petitioner to 
sacrifice what was a methodical and thorough reinvestigation of 
the underlying case. To avoid procedural default, Petitioner must 
raise claims that he might not otherwise have raised after a 
complete investigation. 
Competent post-conviction representation reqrnres a reinvestigation of the 
underlying criminal case for all potentially meritorious guilt and sentencing-phase claims 
inside and outside the record. See 2003 American Bar Association Guidelines for the 
Appointment and Performance of Trial counsel in Death Penalty Cases (herein "ABA 
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Guidelines"), Guideline 10.15.1 ("Duties Of Post-Conviction Counsel")(Exhibit 1.) The 
Commentary to Guideline 10.15.1 provides in part: 
Two parallel tracks of post-conviction investigation are required. One 
involves reinvestigating the capital case; the other focuses on the client. 
Reinvestigating the case means examining the facts underlying the 
conviction and sentence, as well as such items as trial counsel's 
performance, judicial bias or prosecutorial misconduct. Reinvestigating 
the client means assembling a more-thorough biography of the client than 
was known at the time of trial, not only to discover mitigation that was not 
presented previously, but also to identify mental-health claims which 
potentially reach beyond sentencing issues to fundamental questions of 
competency and mental-state defenses. 
Petitioner's reinvestigation must be both diligent and exhaustive, aimed at 
including all possible grounds for relief since the failure to raise all possible claims may 
result in a procedural bar. See I.e. § 19-2719 (3), (5); Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 
903 P.2d 58 (1995); State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795, 820 P.2d 665 (1991). Further, the 
reinvestigation can neither rely solely on the assistance and investigation of trial counsel, 
nor upon the discovery provided by the State or its agents during the underlying criminal 
proceedings. See e.g., Hoffman, supra (recognizing the inability or difficulty of trial 
counsel's objective examination of their own performance); le.R. 44.2 (requiring the 
appointment of at least one attorney other than trial counsel for the purpose of 
representing the defendant in post-conviction proceedings). At this point, while Petitioner 
has been diligent, due to the reasons noted above, his reinvestigation has not been 
exhaustive.3 Accordingly, Petitioner will seek this Court's leave to file a final amendment 
3 A 1998 survey of the time and expenses required in Florida capital post-conviction 
cases concluded that: 
[T]he most experienced and qualified lawyers at Florida's post-conviction 
defender office, the Office of Capital Collateral Representation[,] have 
estimated that, on average, over 3,300 lawyer hours are required to take a 
post-conviction death penalty case from the denial of certiorari by the 
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nO-lcl\ 
to his petition pursuant to I.e. § 19-4906(a) and ICR 15, after a reasonable opportunity to 
review any court-ordered discovery following the hearing currently scheduled June 23, 
2006. 
For reasons stated more fully herein, Petitioner requests that these post-conviction 
proceedings be SUSPENDED until resolution of the State's prosecution against him for 
the capital murder of Cheryl Hanlon. However, because the Court has not had an 
opportunity to consider a formal motion to suspend these proceedings, and based on the 
Court's deadline, in support of this Amended Petition, Petitioner is able to show the 
Court as follows: 
IV. GROUNDS FOR RELIEF 
Petitioner asserts that the convictions and sentences entered against Petitioner 
were obtained in violation of laws of the United States and of Idaho, including the 
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and 
Article I, §§ 1,5,6, 7, 8 13, 17, and 18, of the Constitution of the State of Idaho, 
provisions of the Idaho Code and the Idaho Criminal Rules as well as international law. 
Within this Amended Petition, Petitioner has raised numerous grounds for relief 
based on various types of claims including, but not limited to, claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel (Strickland claims) as well as Brady violations.4 Petitioner alleges 
United States Supreme Court following direct appeal to the denial of 
certiorari [from state post-conviction proceedings.] 
ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 6.1 (citing "The Spangenberg Group, 
Amended Time & Expense Analysis Of Post-Conviction Capital Cases In Florida 16 
(1998).") 
4 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and Brady v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 83 (1963). To prove a Strickland violation, Petitioner must show (1) deficient 
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that he is entitled to relief on each independent claim. Further, Petitioner alleges that 
even if the claims do not meet the governing level of prejudice on their own, that when 
jointly considered, the accumulation of error creates the degree of prejudice entitling 
Petitioner to relief Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1992). 
A. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO 
TRIAL COUNSELS' FAILURE TO ACT WITH DILIGENCE IN 
ENSURING THAT ALL THEIR CLAIMS WERE FULLY INSULATED 
FROM ANY FUTURE CLAIMS BY THE GOVERNMENT THAT THE 
CLAIMS WERE NOT SUFFICIENTLY PRESERVED. 
Trial counsel must be diligent in protecting a defendant's constitutional claims 
from future attacks by the government that the claims were not properly preserved 
appellate and federal habeas corpus proceedings. See ABA Guidelines, Guideline 
10.8.A.3.c. As stated in part in the Commentary, 
One of the most fundamental duties of an attorney defending a capital case 
at trial is the preservation of any and all conceivable errors for each stage 
of appellate and post-conviction review. Failure to preserve an issue may 
result in the client being executed even though reversible error occurred at 
trial. For this reason, trial counsel in a death penalty case must be 
especially aware not only of strategies for winning at trial, but also of the 
heightened need to fully preserve all potential issues for later review. 
, 
Commentary, ABA Guidelines, Guideline 10.8 (footnotes and quotations omitted). 
1. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To 
Fully Insulate "Motion To Allow Defense To Provide Copy Of Grand 
Jury Transcript To Defendant" From Future Attacks By The 
Government That The Claim Was Not Sufficiently Preserved. 
perfonnance and (2) prejudice. Prejudice is established by showing that but for counsels' 
deficient perfonnance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have 
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability that undennines confidence in 
the outcome of the trial or sentencing. To prove a Brady violation, Petitioner must show 
that the State failed to disclose (1) material and (2) exculpatory evidence. Materiality has 
been defined to mean a "reasonable probability of a different result." Where not 
otherwise stated herein, Petitioner asserts that he has established all requisites for his 
Strickland and Brady claims. 
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Trial counsel moved to be allowed to provide grand jury transGripts to Petitioner. 
(R., pp. 51-52.) The motion was partially denied. The Court specifically limited copies 
of grand jury transcripts to counsel and counsel's staff and experts. The Court 
specifically ordered that trial counsel was not permitted to provide copies to the 
defendant. (R., pp. 24-26, pp. 55-57.) The Court did allow trial counsel to review the 
transcripts with the client, but this was never adequate to allow Petitioner to read the 
transcript in its entirety or adequately review the transcripts for inaccuracies or 
discrepancies. 
While trial counsel did state that the "Defendant has State and Federal 
Constitutional Rights to confront the witnesses against him and to a fair trial," (R., p. 51), 
they did not state the specific constitutional provisions upon which they were relying. 
Counsel should have rested their motion on the following Constitutional grounds: the 
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 
which in addition to the rights noted by counsel, including the defendant's right to due 
process, the right to counsel, the right to assist counsel in his defense, and the right to 
present a defense. Because this is a capital case, counsel should always raise their client's 
Eighth Amendment rights. 
2. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To 
Fully Insulate Their "Motion To Declare Idaho's Capital Sentencing 
Scheme Unconstitutional" From Future Attacks By The Government 
That The Claim Was Not Sufficiently Preserved. 
Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to fully protect 
their challenges to the constitutionality of the new death penalty statute claims from 
procedural default attacks from the government. While trial counsel did cite numerous 
United States Supreme cases, because of the near certainty that the government will 
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assert some sort of procedural bar on nearly every claim in state appellate and federal 
habeas corpus proceedings, trial counsel should have specified specific constitutional 
provisions violated if for no other reason than to foolproof the claim against any 
challenges. 
For instance, trial counsel complained that there are no definitions or explanations 
of weighing, sufficiently compelling, unjust, mitigating circumstances, and that the 
statute fails to explain the weighing process or define aggravating circumstances. (R., pp. 
204 - 205.) It is a fair reading of the motion that trial counsel challenged these statutory 
provisions based on the case law set forth elsewhere in the motion. To absolutely ensure 
subsequent consideration of the claims on their merits, trial counsel should have rested 
their motion on the following constitutional grounds: the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.5 
3. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To 
Raise Any Constitutional Grounds In Support Of Their Motion To 
Establish Procedure During Voir Dire. 
Trial counsel did not cite to one state or federal constitutional provision as 
authority for their motion. (R., pp. 201-208.) Counsel should have rested their motion on 
the following Constitutional grounds: the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
5 Petitioner does not concede that the claims in this particular motion are not properly 
preserved for future review, but makes this claim on the basis that counsel had a duty to 
full-proof their claims against any conceivable procedural attack. In light of the wealth of 
case law in which condemned inmates have lost valid claims under severe default rules, 
Petitioner is struck by the short-sighted and even flippant approach trial counsel took to 
their motion practice, at times captioning motions, "Yet Another Motion To .. :" and often 
not citing to a single constitutional provision in support. (R., pp. 142-44.) 
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST -CONVICTION RELIEF 10 
4. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To 
Raise Any Constitutional Grounds In Support Of Their "Motion in 
Limine" To Preclude IRE 404(b) Evidence. 
Trial counsel made one motion in limine. (R., pp. 372-374.) In this motion, 
counsel moved to exclude I.R.E. 404(b) evidence that the State gave notice it intended to 
introduce, namely, the 1991 rape case involving Norma Jean Oliver, the 1994 case 
involving Petitioner's escape, the pending Hanlon murder case, and the statements of 
Amanda Stroud. Trial counsel did not cite a single amendment, provision, or clause of 
the United States or Idaho Constitutions, although they did mention the inability to cross-
examination and confront particular witnesses. 
Counsel should have rested their motion on the following constitutional grounds: 
the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
In particular, trial counsel should have argued that the Petitioner's rights under the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment would be violated by admission of this evidence. 
5. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To 
Raise Any Constitutional Grounds In Support Of Their "Motion to 
Exclude." 
Trial counsel moved to exclude the testimony of the "various women [defendant] 
has lived with who knew him in 2001, 2002, and 2003," and which that State intended to 
call to testify to establish the propensity aggravator. (R., p. 405.) Trial counsel did not 
cite a single amendment, provision, or clause of the United States or Idaho Constitutions, 
although they did mention the inability to cross-examination and confront particular 
witnesses. 
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Counsel should have rested their motion on the following constitutional grounds: 
the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
In particular, trial counsel should have argued that the Petitioner's rights under the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment would be violated by admission of this evidence. 
6. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To 
Raise Any Constitutional Grounds In Support Of Their "Ex Parte 
Motion to Appoint Jury Selection Consultant." 
Trial counsel moved ex parte to hire a jury selection consultant, Attorney Rolf 
Kehne. (R., pp. 464-465.) The ex parte motion stated in relevant part: 
... AMIL N. MYSHIN and D.C. CARR, handling attorneys, hereby moves 
this honorable Court, ex parte, to appoint and to approve payment of Rolf 
Kehne as a jury selection consultant to help select the jury in the above-
entitled case. Mr. Kehne has been helping trial counsel adjust to the new 
jury-sentencing law and trial counsel wishes to have his help during jury 
selection. 
(R., p. 464.) The Court granted the motion, but when it became apparent that the 
jury consultant was assisting counsel in making legal arguments and potentially 
briefing constitutional issues, the jury consultant was dismissed . 
. .. THE COURT: I want to talk about a couple of things here. I have great 
respect for Mr. Kehne's professional competence. But it's -- as I 
understood the brief discussion Mr. Myshin and I had off the record in 
chambers when he brought me the ex party (sic) motion early yesterday 
afternoon, he was to act as a consultant to help him, Mr. Myshin and Mr. 
Carr, ask appropriate questions. I'm now getting a cite Whitt (sic) v. 
Waynewright (sic) that I've not heard before, that I've never had a chance 
to look at. Sixth Amendment has been referred to in ways that are unclear 
without a chance to reflect on it, and a brief that's promised after the 
weekend. 
I had -- if it's okay with you, Mr. Myshin, I'll make a brief statement of a 
very brief conversation we had -- you and I had in chambers a moment 
ago. My understanding is that the Defense team did not intend to file a 
brief. When we left here Friday night there was some indication that you 
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were crediting that. Second, that I understood that Mr. -- you're not going 
to be employing Mr. Kehne from this point forward as a jury consultant if 
I understood you correctly. 
MR. MYSHIN: Yes, sir. 
(Tr., p. 2061, Ls. 9 p. 2062, L. 14; p. 2067, Ls. 10-21) (sic added)6 
At no time did counsel state the constitutional bases for their requests. (R., pp. 
464-465.) Counsel should have rested their motion, and objected to Mr. Kehne's 
dismissal, on the following Constitutional grounds: the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In particular, cOlllsel needed 
to argue that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel requires effective assistance at all 
critical stages, and that the jury selection process is a critical stage of the proceedings in a 
capital case. 
7. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To 
Raise Any Constitutional Grounds In Support Of Their "Motion To 
StrikelDismiss Aggravating Circumstances." 
Trial counsel did not cite to one state or federal constitutional section or 
amendment as authority for their motion. (R., pp. 186-89.) Trial counsel argued that the 
prosecutor failed to provide adequate legal definitions for the Grand Jury to perform its 
constitutional function. Without jury instructions with proper limiting construction 
regarding the aggravating circumstances, the grand jury could not intelligently decide 
whether a crime (here the aggravators) had been committed. People v. Calbud, 402 
N.E.2d 1140 (N.Y. 1980); State v. Superior Court, 580 P.2d 747 (Ariz. App. 1978). The 
failure to provide the limiting instructions violated Petitioner's state constitutional rights, 
6 After Mr. Kehne was dismissed from the case, the case of Wainwright v. Witt, by any 
spelling, was never mentioned again. 
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Article I, Section 8, as well as his federal constitutional rights under the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments (Due Process Clause) to the United States Constitution. 
In addition trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to 
obtain a ruling on their motion to dismiss the propensity aggravator. On March 15,2004, 
trial counsel filed a Motion To StrikelDismiss Aggravating Circumstances. (R., pp. 186-
89.) Among the grounds for their motion, trial counsel asserted that the Grand Jury 
improperly considered evidence from a subsequent murder as support for the propensity 
aggravator, I.C. 19-2515(9)(h). (R., pp. 187-88.) 
Trial counsel requested that, "[the propensity] aggravating circumstance be 
stricken or dismissed." (R., p. 188.) In its Memorandum Decision And Order, the Court 
changed trial counsel's request for relief to a request for an evidentiary ruling on a 
motion in limine. As the Court stated, "[t]he second issue is whether the Indictment for 
the alleged murder in a case subsequent in time to this case can be used to support the 
statutory aggravator of "propensity" in this case." (R., p. 378) (footnote omitted). The 
Court rendered the following advisory opinion: 
So just as a heads up, I will strike the aggravating circumstance of 
propensity if the State does not offer evidence of conduct in the 
commission of the murder at hand, because I believe that the subsequent 
conduct resulting in the Indictment in the Hanlon case, the 624 case 
should not and cannot be used to support the aggravating circumstance of 
propensity in this case, the 518 case. To me prior,conduct has to be 
conduct that occurred prior in time to this alleged crime. So with that 
exception I'm denying the Defendant's Motion to Strike Aggravating 
Factors. The rest of the factors under Idaho Code Section 19-2515(9) 
specifically E through and including F and G will stand. H will stand if it 
can be proven somehow with conduct in the commission of the murder at 
hand and not by reference to the Hanlon murder. 
(Tr., p. 597, L. 23 - p. 598, L. 14); (R., p. 380, Ls. 18-21) ("Unless the State does make 
such an offer of evidence relating to conduct in the commission of the murder at hand, it 
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will not be able to support the aggravating circumstance of "propensity".) Trial counsel 
received from the Court the necessary factual findings they required for a successful 
motion; however, trial counsel failed to pursue a ruling on their actual claim as presented. 
Trial counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Petitioner because a ruling on the 
motion would have led to dismissal of the propensity aggravating circumstance. 
8. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
Raise Any Constitutional Grounds In Support Of Their Objection To 
Dennis Dean's Testimony Regarding Risk Assessment. 
Dennis Dean is an employee of the Idaho Department of Corrections. He testified 
for the State regarding Petitioner's possible custody status if convicted on the murder 
charge and sentenced. Trial counsel objected to Mr. Deen's testimony as to risk 
assessment, and argued that the defense was precluded from questioning Mr. Deen 
without risk of "opening the door" to evidence of the Hanlon murder, and that there 
would be a denial of confrontation. (Tr., p. 4924, 1.18 - p. 4936, 1. 7.) At no time did 
counsel state the federal constitutional bases for the objection. Counsel should have 
rested the objection on the Constitutional grounds: the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
B. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO 
COUNSELS' FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY LITIGATE ERRORS 
OCCURRING DURING THE GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS. 
Counsel should consider whether any procedures have been instituted for 
selection of juries in capital cases that present particular legal bases for challenge. Such 
challenges include potential challenges to irregularities in grand jury proceedings. See 
ABA Guidelines, Guideline lO.10.2.A. 
1. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To 
Move To Dismiss The Amended Indictment On The Grounds That It 
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Charged An Additional Or Different Offense Than Initially Presented To 
The Grand Jury. 
As noted above, trial counsel filed motions captioned, "Motion To Declare 
Idaho's Capital Sentencing Scheme Unconstitutional," (R., pp. 201-08), and "Motion To 
StrikelDismiss Aggravating Circumstances." Both motions, rested, to varying degrees, on 
the premise that Idaho's aggravating circumstances are elements, or at least functional 
equivalents to elements, of the aggravated crime of capital murder and therefore must be 
charged by way of Grand Jury Indictment or Information. Trial counsel should have 
moved to dismiss the amended indictment, referred to as "Indictment Part II," on the 
additional grounds that it charged an additional or different offense than initially 
presented to the Grand Jury in violation of Petitioner's rights under Idaho statute and 
criminal rules, and constituted a violation of Article I, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution 
and the Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process Clause) of the United States Constitution. 
Had trial counsel raised the issue then there is a reasonable probability that the outcome 
would have been different, as the indictment would have been dismissed. 
Since the release of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (herein "Ring"), and its 
progeny, it is uncontestable that aggravating circumstances are elements, or at least the 
functional equivalents of elements, of a separate and greater crime than that of murder of 
the first degree. Stated differently, the elements of the core crime of murder of the first 
degree are contained entirely in IC § 18-4003, while the elements, or their functional 
equivalents, of the aggravated crime of capital murder are set forth in IC § 18-4003 plus 
at least one aggravating circumstance contained in IC § 19-2515. 
In a meandering and tortured manner, trial counsel endeavored to explain the 
constitutional underpinnings of State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 73, 90 P.3d 298 (2004). 
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Assuming counsel was pressed for time, simply inserting a block quote from Lovelace in 
their motions, with just a little added emphasis, would have been a good start to making a 
point that counsel struggled making throughout argument. 7 
If the legislature defines some core crime then provides for increasing the 
punishment of that crime upon a finding of some aggravating fact[,] .,. the 
core crime and the aggravating fact together constitute an aggravated 
crime, just as much as grand larceny is an aggravated form of petit 
larceny. The aggravating fact is an element of the aggravated crime. 
Id., citing Apprendi, supra at 494 n. 19, 120 S.Ct. at 2365 n. 19, 147 
L.Ed.2d at 457 n. 19 (Thomas, J., concurring). In Sattazahn v. 
Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003), 
Justice Scalia reiterated the analysis from Ring holding that aggravating 
circumstances that make a defendant eligible for the death penalty 
"operate as 'the functional equivalent of an element of a greater 
offense.'" Id. at 111, 123 S.Ct. at 739, 154 L.Ed.2d at 599 citing Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. at 609, 122 S.Ct. at 2443, 153 L.Ed.2d at 576. 
Characterizing "murder" as a distinct, lesser-included offense of 
"murder plus one or more aggravating circumstances," Justice Scalia 
outlined the relevance of facts or elements necessary to prove an 
offense to a jury, for Sixth Amendment purposes, and facts or elements 
necessary to determine whether a defendant is being twice tried for the 
same offense in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy 
Clause. See id. The Court, albeit not a majority, announced: 
In the post-Ring world, the Double Jeopardy Clause can, and must, apply 
to some capital-sentencing proceedings consistent with the text of the Fifth 
Amendment. If a jury unanimously concludes that a State has failed to 
meet its burden of proving the existence of one or more aggravating 
circumstances, double-jeopardy protections attach to that "acquittal" on 
the offense of "murder plus aggravating circumstance(s)." Thus, [Arizona 
v.} Rumsey [,467 U.S. 203, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984)] was 
correct to focus on whether a factfinder had made findings that constituted 
an "acquittal" of the aggravating circumstances; but the reason that issue 
was central is not that a capital-sentencing proceeding is "comparable to a 
trial," ... but rather that "murder plus one or more aggravating 
circumstances" is a separate offense from murder "simpliciter." 
Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101 at 112, 123 S.Ct. 732 at 740, 154 
L.Ed.2d 588 at 599 (plurality). 
7 Petitioner does not assert as an independent ground for relief based on his trial counsels' 
deficient writing skills, with the notable exception of their inability to federalize claims. 
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Lovelace, at 76, 90 P.3d at 301 (emphasis added). From this premise, trial counsel should 
have moved onto the statutory requirements ofLC. § 19-1420 which provides, 
An indictment or infonnation may be amended by the prosecuting attorney 
without leave of the court, at any time before the defendant pleads, and at 
any time thereafter, in the discretion of the court, where it can be done 
without prejudice to the substantial rights of the defendant. An 
infonnation or indictment cannot be amended so as to charge an offense 
other than that for which the defendant has been held to answer. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 7 likewise requires that the indictment or infonnation 
contain all "essential facts constituting the offense charged." See also State v. Windsor, 
110 Idaho 410, 418 (1985). Accordingly, if an initial indictment does not contain all the 
elements of the offense or does not fairly infonn the defendant of the charges against him 
or does not enable him to plead an acquittal or conviction, then it is insufficient. The 
State may amend an insufficient indictment; however - and here is the core of the claim 
missed by trial counsel - "any amendment which charges the accused with a crime of 
greater degree or a different nature than that for which the accused was bound over for 
trial by the committing magistrate is barred by the Idaho Constitution [Article I, Section 
8]." State v. Colwell, 124 Idaho 560, 566, 861 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Ct. App. 1993)(emphasis 
in original). 
Thus, the State amended the initial indictment to charge Petitioner with a greater, 
or at least a different, crime for which he was bound over by the committing magistrate. 
See United States v. Allen, 406 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 2005)( en banc), petition for cert. filed 
(Sept. 29,2005) (No. 05-6764) (holding that the submission of aggravating factors to the 
grand jury for inclusion in the indictment preserves the constitutionality of Federal Death 
Penalty Act prosecutions); State v. Fortin, 843 A.2d 974 (N.J. 2004) (holding that 
"murder is a distinct lesser-included offense of the greater offense of capital murder" and 
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that aggravating factors, as elements of capital murder, must be submitted to a grand jury 
and returned in an indictment pursuant to the New Jersey Constitution.) Accordingly, the 
motion should have been granted and the amended indictment dismissed as 
unconstitutional under Article I, Section 8 ofthe Idaho Constitution. 
In addition, the failure of the government to follow its own established procedures 
dealing with amending indictments constituted a violation of his federal constitutional 
right to due process protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See e.g., Fetterly v. 
Paske!!, 997 F.2d 1295, 1300 (9th Cir.1993) (1980) ("[W]here a state has provided a 
specific method for the determination of whether the death penalty shall be imposed, 'it is 
not correct to say that the defendant's interest' in having that method adhered to 'is 
merely a matter of state procedural law."') (paraphrasing Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 
343,346 (1980). 
Trial counsels' failure to move to dismiss the amended indictment on these 
additional grounds, flowing logically from trial counsels' premise for other motions, 
constituted deficient performance. But for trial counsels' deficient performance there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different. 
2. Trial Counsel Failed To Move To Dismiss Indictment On Ground That 
Grand Jury Failed To Find That Each Aggravator Outweighed 
Mitigation. 
The Grand Jury returned an indictment amended to include four aggravating 
circumstances. However, an additional factual finding must be found to sentence 
Petitioner to a sentence greater than life without the possibility of parole. Specifically, it 
must be found that each aggravating circumstance outweighs the totality of the mitigating 
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circumstances presented. This requirement is a direct consequence of the rationale from 
the rule articulated in Ring: 
[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice 
and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than 
prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be 
charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Id., at 600 (citing and quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243, n.6 (1999). See 
e.g., Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256 (Colo. 2003) (holding that the detennination of 
whether aggravation outweighs mitigation is of the type of factual finding encompassed 
by Ring); Johnson v. State, 118 Nev. 787,59 P.3d 450 (2002). 
Under Idaho law, the maximum punishment for a defendant convicted of murder 
of the first degree and found to have committed at least one aggravating circumstance 
beyond a reasonable doubt is only life without the possibility of parole. This is because 
"maximum punishment" is defined as "the maximum sentence" that may be imposed 
"solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the 
defendant." Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004) (emphasis in original). 
Under well-established Idaho law, the rule is that a defendant cannot be sentenced 
to death, even if aggravators are found, unless it is also found that the aggravating 
circumstances outweigh the mitigation. See e.g., State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 
153, 774 P.2d 299, 323 (1989) ("We hold that the trial court may sentence the defendant 
to death, only if the trial court finds that all the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh 
the gravity of each of the aggravating circumstances found and make imposition of death 
unjust.") Unless this additional finding is made, the maximum punishment is life without 
the possibility of parole. Therefore, to constitute a legally sufficient indictment, the 
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Grand Jury must make this additional finding. Article I, Section 8, of the Idaho 
Constitution, I.e. § 19-1420; ICR Rule 7 (requiring that the indictment or infonnation 
contain all "essential facts constituting the offense charged"); State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 
410,418 (1985). 
Since it impossible to present all possible mitigating circumstances at this early 
stage, the prosecutor must present any known mitigation to the Grand Jury for the 
weighing process. Such an obligation is consistent with the prosecutor's current 
obligations. See Johnson v. Superior Court, 539 P.2d 792 (Cal. 1975)(prosecutor's duty 
to expose exculpatory evidence to grand jury); see also 1 ABA Standards For Criminal 
Justice, § 3 - 3.6(b) (No prosecutor should knowingly fail to disclose to the grand jury 
evidence which tends to negate guilt or mitigate the offense.) Trial counsels' failure to 
move to dismiss the amended indictment on these additional grounds, flowing logically 
from trial counsels' premise for other motions, constituted deficient perfonnance. But for 
trial counsels' deficient perfonnance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome 
would have been different. 
3. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To 
Object To The Interliniation Of "Drowning" As One Of Three Possible 
Causes Of Death And By Failing To Request A Unanimity Instruction At 
Trial. 
The Grand Jury was not presented with evidence that drowning was a probable 
cause of the victim's death, and further, made no such finding. It violated Petitioner's 
rights to notice, to present a defense, to due process, and to heightened procedural 
safeguards in capital cases as protected by Article I, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution, 
and the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
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Constitution, for the Court to interliniate "drowning" as a cause of death absent sufficient 
evidence and findings by the Grand Jury. 
Once multiple, alternative causes of death were alleged by Indictment, Petitioner 
asserts that the State had either dismiss the alternatives or present them all to a jury and 
bear the burden of proving a particular cause of death beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
jury verdicts however do not indicate which cause the jury believe led to the victim's 
death. Moreover, without a unanimity instruction, it is impossible to determine whether 
the jury unanimously agreed on the cause in violation of his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
Because trial counsel has refused to cooperate with Petitioner's reinvestigation of 
this case, and because Petitioner is still awaiting a hearing on his Motion For Discovery, 
it is impossible at this time to fully state this claim, nevertheless, Petitioner asserts he has 
satisfied both prongs of Strickland. 
C. PETITIONER'S FIFTH, SIXTH, EIGHTH, AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED WHEN HE WAS 
IMPROPERLY SHACKLED DURING THE COURSE OF HIS TRIAL. 
Petitioner wore a "leg brace" during all court appearances. (Tr., p. 592.) 
According to the State, the brace was worn under clothing, but would lock whenever 
Petitioner stood and his leg would remain stiff, unless he pressed a button to the side of 
the brace that released it. (Tr., p. 592, Ls. 7-15.) Petitioner would have to push the 
button as he walked. (Tr., p. 593, Ls. 4-6.) This was a new device that the Court had 
never previously employed. (Tr., p. 592, Ls. 23-24.) The Court made no findings whether 
the device was visible and no findings whether the device was necessary. Petitioner 
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believes that the jurors were able to discern this devise and thus knew that Petitioner was 
in fact shackled. 8 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit using physical restraints visible to 
the jury absent a trial court determination that restraints are justified by a state interest 
specific to the particular defendant on trial. Deck v. Missouri, 544 US. 622, _, 125 S.Ct. 
2007, 2009 (2005) (citing Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986).) This basic rule 
embodies notions of fundamental fairness. Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2011; see also, Estelle v. 
Williams, 425 U.S. 501,503,505 (1976) (making a defendant appear in prison garb poses 
such a threat to the "fairness of the factfinding process" that it must be justified by an 
"essential state policy"). Visible shackling undermines the presumption of innocence, the 
related fairness of the factfinding process, the right to counsel and secure a meaningful 
defense, and the maintenance of a dignified juridical process that includes respectful 
treatment of the defendant. Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2013 (citing Coffin v. United States, 156 
US. 432, 453 (1895))(presumption of innocence "lies at the foundation of the 
administration of our criminal law"); Holbrook, 475 US. at 569 (restraint suggests that 
the justice system itself sees "a need to separate a defendant from the community at 
large"); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US. 335, 340-341 (1963)(Sixth Amendment 
guarantees right to counsel in order to secure meaningful defense); Illinois v. Allen, 397 
US. 337, 344 (1970)(shackling affronts the "dignity and decorum of judicial 
proceedings"). 
8 Due to trial counsels' failure to adequately consult with Petitioner and the court-
imposed restrictions on juror contact, he is unable to fully establish the factual basis for 
this claim. 
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The prohibition against shackling applies with equal force during the penalty 
phase of a capital trial. Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2010-2014. Given the severity and finality of 
a death sentence, jury accuracy in making the decision between life and death is no less 
critical than the decision between guilt and innocence. Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2014. The 
appearance of the offender during the penalty phase in shackles almost inevitably implies 
to a jury, as a matter of common sense, that court authorities consider the offender a 
danger to the community--often a statutory aggravator and nearly always a relevant factor 
injury decisionmaking, even where the State does not specifically argue the point." Id. It 
also almost inevitably affects adversely the jury's perception of the character of the 
defendant. Id. And it thereby inevitably undermines the jury's ability to weigh 
accurately all relevant considerations--considerations that are often unquantifiable and 
elusive--when it determines whether a defendant deserves death. In these ways, the use of 
shackles can be a "thumb [on] death's side of the scale." Id., quoting Sochor v. Florida, 
504 U.S. 527, 532 (1992). Here, because propensity was an aggravating factor, the 
shackles were especially prejudicial. 
Absent adequate justification and findings regarding the specific circumstances of 
the case, visible shackling is inherently prejudicial. Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2014-2016 (citing 
Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 568.) The effects cannot be shown from a trial transcript. Deck, 
125 S.Ct. at 2015. Thus, the defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice to make 
out a due process violation. Id. Rather, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the shackling error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Id., 
(citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).) Because of the inherent 
prejudice caused by visible shackling, the trial court has an affirmative duty to make 
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written findings stating that either the shackles are not visible, or findings regarding the 
specific circumstances of the case that might justify visible shackling. 
Absent written findings to the contrary, and because there is reason to believe that 
this new device made Petitioner's custody status and physical restraint apparent to the 
jurors, the use of the restraining device, absent a determination that they were "justified 
by a state interest specific to [that] particular trial," violated "a basic element of the 'due 
process of law' protected by" the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and violated the 
presumption of innocence. Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2012.9 Moreover, the shackling device 
impermissibly affected the jury's determination of aggravating factors and the weighing 
of those factors, in violation of the Eighth Amendment as well as the constitutional 
provisions set forth above. 
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim as he is still awaiting a hearing and ruling 
on his Motion For Discovery, filed January 5, 2006, as well as depositions oftrial counsel 
and permission to contact the jurors. 
D. THE STATE COMMITTED MULTIPLE BRADY VIOLATIONS 
Suppression of evidence favorable to an accused by the prosecution violates due 
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the 
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
Favorable evidence includes not only that evidence tending to exculpate the accused, but 
also any evidence adversely affecting the credibility of the government's witnesses, e.g., 
9 The Court cannot now make the requisite factual findings based on its extra-record 
recollection without making itself a witness in the instant post-conviction proceedings. 
See Dyas, 317 F.3d 934, 936-937 (state court determination that jury could not have seen 
the shackles was unreasonable in absence of any inquiry to establish facts concerning 
what jury could see). 
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evidence that could be used for impeachment. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 
(1972). The prosecution must actively search out material in its files and in the files of 
related agencies reasonably expected to have possession of evidence favorable to an 
accused. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995). 
1. The Prosecution Violated Brady By Failing To Disclose Favorable 
Evidence Pertaining To Norma Jean Oliver 
On or about December 4, 1991, law enforcement arrested Norma Jean Oliver as a 
juvenile runaway. (Exhibit 2.) Following her arrest and incarceration at a juvenile 
detention facility, Ms. Oliver alleged that Erick Hall forcibly raped her the prior day. She 
was transferred to Intermountain Hospital, a psychiatric facility. Petitioner believes that 
Ms. Oliver was arrested based on information that he provided to law enforcement, 
establishing her whereabouts at the Sands Motel. Petitioner believes her false accusations 
of forcible rape were either in retaliation to her arrest, cover for another person, or the 
result of her mental illness. Petitioner was charged with two counts of forcible anal and 
vaginal rape. (Exhibit 3.) Subsequently, the anal rape charge was dropped, and the 
forcible vaginal charge was amended to statutory vaginal rape. (Exhibit 4, Exhibit 5.) 
Petitioner has always maintained that he and Ms. Oliver had consensual sex. However, 
Ms. Oliver, while pretending to be an adult, was only a minor. Accordingly, Petitioner 
pled guilty to statutory rape in State of Idaho v. Erick Hall, Ada County Case No. 
HCR18591. Petitioner spent five years in prison for his conviction, and an additional 
four years for an escape conviction during that incarceration. 
Approximately twelve years after the statutory rape conviction, the State located 
Ms. Oliver for the purpose of prosecuting Petitioner for capital murder. The State used 
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Ms. Oliver to establish aggravating circumstances based on 1991 statement to the police 
that Petitioner choked and violently raped her. (Tr., p. 5454, L. 18 - p. 5457, L. 16.) 
At Petitioner's sentencing, Ms. Oliver had great difficulty recalling events. Ms. 
Oliver admitted that she suffered from a chemical imbalance and was not taking her 
medication at the time she testified; however, she did not indicate the nature or extent of 
her mental health problems. (Tr., p. 4777, Ls. 2-7; p. 4780, Ls. 6-18; p. 4783, Ls. 17-18.) 
On direct examination, Ms. Oliver could not recall critical events relating to the statutory 
rape including whether Petitioner and she engaged in vaginal intercourse, though she did 
indicate that Petitioner penetrated her anally. (Tr. pp. 4756-4783); see also (Tr., p. 4760, 
L.15 ("I only remember bits and pieces"); p. 4761, L.18 ("I can't remember"); pA762, 
LsA-5 (she met Petitioner at Mountain Billiards "I think, but I'm not sure"); pA762, L.18 
(she's "not quite sure" whether they sat around in the trailer at all); pA763, L.24-25 ("I 
closed my eyes - I don't' know [what happened]. I can't remember"); pA764, L.12 ("I 
can't remember [if she couldn't talk because Petitioner was strangling her]. I don't think 
I could."); p.4764, L.14 ("I don't know [if I was scared]."); pA765, L.3 ("I can't 
remember [what it was like what I woke up.]"); pA765, L.21 ("I can't remember"); 
pA766, L.3 ("I can't remember), L.6 ("I can't remember), L.9 ("I don't know. I'm 
sorry"), L. 17 ("I'm not sure."); p. 4768, L.l ("I don't know."), L.1 0 ("I don't remember); 
pA769, L.7 ("I can't remember"), L.13 (witness does "not really" remember getting up 
the next morning); pA771, L.3 (witness "can't really remember" being arrested at the 
Sands Motel); pA771, L.6 (witness "can't really remember" getting put into back seat of 
police car at Sands Motel); pA771, L.9 (witness "doesn't know" if she wound up at the 
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juvenile detention jail); p.4771, L.21 (witness "can't remember" meeting with police 
officer at Intermountain Hospital because "it's a blur").) 
Ultimately, through leading questions, Ms. Oliver effectively testified that 
Petitioner raped her. In addition, Ms. Oliver described a number of injuries that she 
sustained when allegedly forcibly raped by Petitioner. Detective Daniel Hess, who later 
testified as the arresting officer in the statutory rape case, corroborated her description of 
injuries. However, these injuries were not noted contemporaneously with Detective 
Hess's 1991 report nor listed in the emergency room report. Neither the emergency room 
report nor Detective Hess's police report were used to cross-examine either witness. 10 
a. The State committed Brady violations by not disclosing 
documentation or information that Ms. Oliver suffers from Bipolar 
Disorder or other conditions tending to undermine her credibility as a 
witness. 
In the course of Petitioner's reinvestigation of the case, Norma Jean Oliver has 
voluntarily disclosed that she suffers from Bipolar Disorder. As noted above, the record 
indicates that Ms. Oliver was not taking any medication at the time of her testimony at 
Petitioner's trial. Petitioner believes that likewise in 1991, when Ms. Oliver first made 
her allegations she was off medication. 
Petitioner intends to show that Bipolar disorder is a treatable illness marked by 
extreme changes in mood, thought, energy and behavior. If left untreated, bipolar 
disorder tends to worsen, and the person experiences full-fledged manic and depressive 
episodes. Some symptoms of manic episodes include: grandiose delusions, inflated sense 
10 Petitioner previously claimed that the prosecution and/or its agents failed to timely 
disclose requested medical records of Norma Jean Oliver. This was based on an initial 
one-time meeting with both Petitioner's trial counsel wherein they indicated that they had 
made repeated requests for Ms. Oliver's medical records. Trial counsels' belief was 
subsequently further reflected in the trial transcript. 
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of self-importance; racing speech, racing thoughts, flight of ideas; impulsiveness, poor 
judgment, distractibility; reckless behavior; and, in the most severe cases, delusions and 
hallucinations. One of the usual differential diagnoses for bipolar disorder is that the 
symptoms are not better accounted for by Schizoaffective Disorder and is not 
superimposed on Schizophrenia, Schizophreniform Disorder, Delusional Disorder, or 
Psychotic Disorder Not Otherwise Specified. 
Petitioner asserts his case mirrors the facts in Freeman v. Us., 284 F.Supp.2d 217 
(D. Mass. 2003), where a letter had been sent to the prosecuting attorney from a 
psychiatrist for the main and uncorroborated government witness in a criminal 
prosecution. The letter put the prosecutor on notice that the witness suffered from bipolar 
disorder, was currently in the midst of a major depressive episode, and would likely 
decompensate under rigorous questioning by attorneys, and that her medical and 
psychiatric problems would be seriously intensified by her participation in a trial. This 
information was not disclosed to the defense. The federal district court for the district of 
Massachusetts found that the evidence was material as required to establish a Brady 
claim arising from government's failure to disclose the letter. 
In this case, Jay Rosenthal testified that the 1991 forcible rape charges were 
reduced to statutory rape because Ms. Oliver was "vulnerable," "fragile," "terrified," and 
''unable to effectively go on with the case in front of a jury" or withstand cross-
examination based in part on the recommendation of her treatment providers, psychiatrist 
and caseworker. (Tr., pp. 4952-4954; p. 5953, Ls.12-25.) As far as Petitioner is aware, 
this information was not disclosed to the defense at the time he entered his plea bargain. 
Likewise, he believes it was not disclosed prior to his capital sentencing hearing. Further, 
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the State called Mr. Rosenthal prior to calling Ms. Oliver, thus keeping the defense in the 
dark about the reasons for the State amending the charges to statutory rape when they 
cross-examined Ms. Oliver. 
Petitioner claims that the State was on notice of the full nature of Ms. Oliver's 
mental health problems, both in 1991 and 2004, yet failed to disclose this information to 
the defense. Evidence of Ms. Oliver's mental health problems is exculpatory evidence. 
Further such evidence is material because Ms. Oliver's testimony was critical in 
sentencing Petitioner to death. There exists a reasonable probability that without such 
evidence the jury would not have found the propensity aggravator beyond a reasonable 
doubt and would not have found that the other aggravating circumstances outweighed the 
mitigation without her testimony. 
b. The State committed Brady violations by not disclosing the complete 
results of the sexual crimes examination and testing ("rape kit") 
conducted in the Norma Jean Oliver statutory rape case. 
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim as he is still awaiting a hearing and ruling 
on his Motion For Discovery, filed January 5, 2006, motion for depositions and due to 
restrictions on contacting jurors. Petitioner does however assert that the rape kit contains 
eXCUlpatory evidence. Specifically, Petitioner states that the examination and testing 
showed that Petitioner did not have anal sex with Ms. Oliver and that there could be 
evidence indicating that Ms. Oliver had sexual intercourse after being allegedly forcibly 
raped by Petitioner. 
c. The State committed Brady violations by not disclosing all 
photographic evidence that would have impeached the testimony of 
Norma Jean Oliver and Detective Daniel Hess and tended to show 
that Petitioner only committed the crime to which he pled, DOD-
forcible statutory rape. 
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The photographic evidence in this case was the only contemporaneous evidence 
available at trial to corroborate the testimony of Ms. Oliver and Detective Hess regarding 
the degree of injuries allegedly inflicted upon Ms. Oliver by Petitioner. It was difficult to 
identify any injuries in the photographs utilized at trial, but impossible to say 
conclusively that the photos did not depict the injuries as described. 
Petitioner has requested through discovery the original contact sheet of 
photographs taken of Ms. Oliver. Petitioner asserts that the contact sheets or other 
photographs requested will demonstrate that Ms. Oliver and Detective Hess were either 
confused about the nature of the injuries, or were intentionally misleading. 
d. The State Committed Brady Violations By Not Disclosing Evidence 
Suggesting That Norma Jean Oliver Was Incompetent To Testify. 
As noted above, Ms. Oliver had tremendous difficulty recalling events to which 
she was called to testify. Petitioner incorporates by reference Claim - above. Indeed, 
Ms. Oliver's testimony was so disconnected from surrounding facts and circumstances 
that trial counsel could not conduct a meaningful cross-examination as guaranteed by 
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Ms. Oliver's testimony was so junlbled and 
incomplete that it lacked the reliability necessary for introduction of evidence in a 
capital sentencing proceeding under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and denied 
him his rights to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Not only was 
Ms. Oliver's testimony incomplete in court, Petitioner has recently learned through his 
reinvestigation of the case that when Ms. Oliver was contacted by the State to testify in 
the underlying criminal case, her memory of the events twelve years earlier was 
completely lacking. It was only through repeated readings of police reports that Ms. 
Oliver was able to even piece together what she presented to the jury. 
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The State should have disclosed the full extent of Ms. Oliver's memory 
problems to the defense. Had the State done so, then trial counsel could have 
successfully precluded her testimony in its entirety, or otherwise effectively cross-
examined her on her near complete lack of memory prior to being contacted by the 
State. Accordingly, the failure to disclose this information constituted a Brady violation 
and requires reversal of Petitioner's death sentence. 
Petitioner cannot fully state this Brady claim and its subparts as he is still 
awaiting a hearing and ruling on his Motion For Discovery, filed January 5,2006. 11 
e. The State Committed Brady Violations By Not Disclosing Incentives 
Given To Ms. Oliver To Testify. 
Petitioner has learned through his reinvestigation of the case that Ms. Oliver was 
not compelled by subpoena to testify as a witness for the State. Instead, Petitioner 
believes that the State flew Ms. Oliver from West Virginia and provided her meals and 
lodging while in Boise. Petitioner cannot fully state this claim at this time, and reserves 
the right to withdraw this claim upon completion of his investigation including receipt of 
any court-ordered discovery following the hearing scheduled in June 2006. 
2. The Prosecution Violated Brady By Failing To Disclose Favorable 
Evidence Pertaining To April Sebastian 
II It is worth noting that elsewhere in his amended petition, Petitioner also claims that: (1) 
Ms. Oliver was incompetent to testify; (2) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in 
failing to fully investigate, or re-investigate, Ms. Oliver's allegations; (3) trial counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance in failing to move to strike, or otherwise preclude, 
consideration of Ms. Oliver's testimony [based on her incompetence]; (4) trial counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance in failing to impeach Ms. Oliver with information in their 
possession, and disclosed in discovery but never reviewed by counsel; and (5) the State 
committed multiple Napue violations by failing to correct false and misleading testimony 
of their witnesses. 
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April Sebastian testified against Petitioner at his sentencing. At the time of her 
testimony, she was actively represented by Petitioner's trial counsel, Amil Myshin, in her 
upcoming "rider" hearing in the case of State of Idaho v. April Sebastian, Ada County 
case no. H0400228. (Tr., pp. 4868-70; pp. 4875-96.) At the time of her testimony, Ms. 
Sebastian also had another active case, State of Idaho v. April Sebastian, Ada County 
case no. H040033511M0401584. Following her testimony, Ms. Sebastian appeared for her 
"rider" hearing with her counsel, Amil Myshin. The district court presiding over the case 
granted her probation based on a recommendation from the State. 
Petitioner has reasonable grounds to believe that the State offered Ms. Sebastian 
benefits in her other cases in exchange for her testimony against Petitioner. For instance, 
based on a review of court documents, Ms. Sebastian was not a good candidate for 
probation, appearing to have failed on probation twice previously. The extent to which 
the State offered Ms. Sebastian benefits in exchange for her testimony is still being 
investigated. Further, Petitioner cannot fully state this claim as he is still awaiting a 
hearing and ruling on his Motion For Discovery, filed January 5, 2006. Nevertheless, at 
this time, Petitioner asserts that the State violated Brady and such violations warrant 
reversal. Petitioner reserves the right to withdraw this claim upon completion of his 
investigation. 
3. The Prosecution Violated Brady By Failing To Disclose Favorable 
Evidence Pertaining To Michelle Deen Regarding Her Prior Criminal 
Convictions, Her Past Attempts To Broker Deals With The Police To 
Avoid Prosecution, And Her Compromised Mental Health As Reflected 
In By Court-Ordered Substance Abuse And Psychological Examinations. 
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Ms. Deen testified against Petitioner at his sentencing. (Tr., pp.4813-39.) 
Petitioner has discovered through his reinvestigation that Ms. Deen was convicted of at 
least two felonies, only one of which was elicited at trial. 
The State had an obligation to disclose Ms. Deen' s full criminal record including 
both felony convictions stemming from the cases of State of Idaho v. Michelle Deen, Ada 
County case no. H0301398 and State ofIdaho v. Michelle Deen, case no. H0200584. The 
State's apparent failure 12 to provide Ms. Deen's full criminal history to trial counsel 
constitutes a Brady violation warranting reversal. 
In addition, Petitioner's reinvestigation of the case has uncovered the fact that at 
least in one prior incident Ms. Deen has attempted to broker deals with the State, 
through its agents, to avoid prosecution or to obtain leniency. Specifically, in the course 
of review Ms. Deen's files at the Ada County Courthouse, Petitioner has found a 
handwritten note among other court documents stating: 
2-9 - narc. arrest made by patrol. D arrested at 18.4 g meth (+). D wanted 
to talk to police re: "deal." D said meth not hers & didn't want to go down 
on someone elses dope. D then failed to contact cops after they spoke. 2 
syringes found wi dope 
(Exhibit 6.) This appears to be a note, reflecting the circumstances surrounding Ms. 
Deen's arrest on February 9, 2002, for mUltiple drug-related offenses, including felony 
possession of a controlled substance, State v. Deen, Ada County case no. 
12 Petitioner's counsel is forced to assert an apparent Brady violation because based on 
his review of trial counsels' files and the lack of evidence presented at trial, it appears 
this information was not disclosed. However, Petitioner cannot assert with absolute 
certainty that the State did not disclose the information for three reasons: (1) Petitioner 
has not yet received all of trial counsels' files and notes; (2) the trial counsel has 
improperly refused to adequately consult with Petitioner despite his many requests; and 
(3) the State has objected to Petitioner's Motion For Discovery. 
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to curry favor with State agents constitutes a Brady violation warranting reversal. 
Finally, Petitioner has discovered in his reinvestigation of the case that that Ms. 
Deen underwent court-ordered substance abuse and psychological evaluations in the case 
of State v. Deen, Ada County case no. No. H03013981M0311644. The State's apparent 
failure to provide Ms. Deen's full criminal history to trial counsel constitutes a Brady 
violation warranting reversal. 
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim as he is still conducting his investigation 
and is awaiting a hearing and ruling on his Motion For Discovery, filed January 5,2006. 
4. The Prosecution Violated Brady By Failing To Disclose Favorable 
Evidence Pertaining To Rebecca McCusker. 
Petitioner reported Rebecca McCusker to the Idaho Department of Health and 
Welfare for allegations of child neglect and/or abandonment. Petitioner believes that 
corroborating records could establish a motivation for Ms. McCusker to retaliate against 
Petitioner by exaggerating or lying in her testimony at Petitioner's sentencing. These 
records are in the State's possession. Petitioner cannot fully state this claim as he is still 
investigating this claim and is awaiting a hearing and ruling on his Motion For 
Discovery, filed January 5, 2006. 
5. The Prosecution Violated Brady By Failing To Disclose Favorable 
Evidence Pertaining To Evelyn Dunaway. 
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim as he is still investigating this claim and is 
awaiting a hearing and ruling on his Motion For Discovery, filed January 5, 2006. 
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6. The Prosecution Violated Brady By Failing To Disclose Favorable 
Evidence Pertaining To Wendy Levy. 
The State interviewed Wendy Levy in preparation for their sentencing case. 
(Exhibit 7.) Ms. Levy provided evidence to the State that was exculpatory. Accordingly, 
the State found nothing helpful from Ms. Levy and chose not to call her as a witness. 
The evidence provided to the State included, but was not limited to, evidence 
regarding Erick Hall's positive, non-violent relationships with previous girlfriends. This 
evidence was exculpatory because it tended to mitigate against imposition of the death 
sentence and it undercut the State's argument that Petitioner has a propensity to murder 
based on a history of violent sex crimes against former girlfriends. The State had an 
affirmative obligation to disclose this evidence to the defense. None of that evidence was 
provided. The State's Brady violation warrants reversal of Petitioner's death sentence. 
7. The Prosecution Violated Brady By Failing To Disclose Favorable 
Evidence Pertaining To A Potential Alternate Perpetrator. 
The State was in possession of evidence that suggested the possibility of an 
alternate perpetrator ofthe homicide. As even the State recognized, at least when outside 
the presence of the jury, the DNA evidence that linked Petitioner to rape did not establish 
that he also killed Ms. Henneman. The State did however argue, based on their expert's 
testimony, that the DNA sample taken from Ms. Henneman was the sample of just one 
perpetrator, Erick Hall. Thus, the State argued that there was only one perpetrator of 
rape, and therefore one perpetrator of the murder. 
During these post-conviction proceedings, Petitioner has established that the DNA 
evidence actually shows that there was more than one perpetrator involved in the crime of 
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rape. (Exhibit 8.) Petitioner has always maintained, and continues to maintain, that he 
did not kill Ms. Henneman. Petitioner asserts that the secondary contributor to the DNA 
may have been the actual killer. During the course of this reinvestigation, Petitioner has 
identified one possible person as the source for the DNA evidence not yet matched. That 
person, Patrick Hoffert, is deceased. 
According to police reports, Lisa Lewis and Peggy Hill told Detective Dave 
Smith and Scott Birch of the Attorney General's Office that they had seen and spoken 
with Lynn Henneman near the Greenbelt on the night she was abducted. (Exhibit 9.) 
Ms. Lewis indicated that Ms. Henneman asked for their assistance on directions to the 
DoubleTree Inn. According to Ms. Lewis, Petitioner and Patrick Bernard Hoffert then 
arrived, at which point Petitioner spoke briefly to Ms. Henneman. Ms. Hill reported 
noticing Ms. Henneman's yellow sapphire ring and recalled that Petitioner left with Ms. 
Henneman. 
The State did not call either Ms. Lewis or Ms. Hill to testify despite that fact that 
on the surface, their testimony would appear incriminating of Petitioner. The reason the 
State did not call these witnesses is because there is more to the story. Specifically, the 
morning after Ms. Henneman's abduction, Patrick Hoffert, the other individual placed 
with Ms. Henneman the night before, committed suicide. (Exhibit 10.) An investigation 
was conducted both by the Garden City Police Department and the coroner's office. 
I Through reinvestigation of this case, Petitioner has obtained the affidavits of Ms. 
Lewis and Ms. Hill, who confirm the information in the police reports. (Exhibit 11, 
Exhibit 12.) Further, Ms. Lewis indicates that Deirdre Muncy, Patrick Hoffert's former 
girlfriend, told her that prior to committing suicide Patrick stated that, "he raped the 
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girl.,,13 When Ms. Lewis attempted to bring this information to the attention of the 
Garden City Police, she was told to mind her own business. Ms. Lewis also indicates that 
several years later she positively identified the woman she met as Lynn Henneman 
through a photographic array given to her by Detective Dave Smith of the Boise Police 
Department. Ms. Hill was also contacted by Detective Smith, but with no follow-up. This 
information does not appear in trial counsels' files and was not presented at the trial. 
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim as he is still investigating the degree of 
information known but withheld by the State and further is awaiting a hearing and ruling 
on his Motion For Discovery, filed January 5, 2006. 
8. The Prosecution Violated Brady By Failing To Disclose Favorable 
Evidence Connecting Christian Johnson To The Henneman Homicide. 
Christian Johnson was the State's prime suspect in the Henneman homicide for 
numerous months. Based on the amount of time he was under investigation, Petitioner 
believes there are numerous documents and other information not contained in trial 
counsels' files, which should have been disclosed by the State if those documents or 
information inculpated Mr. Johnson. Evidence tending to identify someone else as the 
perpetrator is exculpatory and material. Grube v. Blades, 2006 WL 297203 (D. Idaho 
2006)(slip copy, memorandum order). 
Petitioner is still investigating this claim and reserves the right to withdraw it 
upon completion of his reinvestigation of the case. 
E. THE STATE COMMITTED NUMEROUS NAPUE VIOLATIONS 
13 Deirdre Muncy denied this assertion, but that alone, does not make the evidence 
inadmissible or irrelevant at a capital sentencing proceeding, especially in light of the 
other odd circumstances involving Mr. Hoffert that remain. 
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The deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of evidence 
known to be false violates the Fourteenth Amendment. The same result obtains when the 
government, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it 
appears. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). In other words, the state cannot 
create a materially false impression regarding the facts of the case or the credibility of the 
witnesses. In Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935), the Supreme Court made 
clear that deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of known false 
evidence is incompatible with "rudimentary demands of justice." This was reaffirmed in 
Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942). In Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), the 
Court stated that, "[t]he same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false 
evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears." Id., at 269; see also Giglio v. 
United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972) 
Prosecutor falsehoods alone do not automatically entitle a petitioner to relief. 
Relief is compelled when the false impressions are "material," which means when "there 
is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of 
the jury." United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 
264 (1959); Mooney v. Holohan, 394 U.S. 103 (1935). The record must suggest a 
reasonable likelihood that during deliberations the jurors could have considered the false 
evidence or argument. 
1. The Prosecutor Elicited Materially False Testimony From Dennis Dean 
Regarding Idaho Department of Corrections Inmate Classification 
System, Directives For Classification And Conditions Of Confinement. 
During the sentencing trial, the State created a materially false impression of how 
the Idaho Department of Corrections (mOC) would determine Petitioner's custody 
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status, and the conditions of confinement to which Petitioner would be subjected. At 
sentencing, the State called Dennis Dean, the Inmate Records Placement Manager with 
the IDOC. (Tr., p. 4904, Ls. 9-11.) Mr. Dean described the initial classification process 
for offenders, and explained that classification was a "risk assessment" done to determine 
how best to house an inmate. (Tr., p. 4906, L. 24 - p. 4907, L. 6.) The State elicited 
testimony that the IDOC system has three prison levels of "secured" facilities-
maximum, medium, and minimum-and other non-secured facilities such as work 
centers. (Tr., p. 4905, L. 17 - p. 4906, L. 1.)14 
The prosecutor deliberately and repeatedly elicited materially misleading 
information from Mr. Dean suggesting that Petitioner, if sentenced to life without the 
possibility of parole, could be housed at a minimum custody facility: 
Q. Okay. So if a person were, say at the medium security facility and 
they were misbehaving, showing disrespect to staff or breaking 
things or doing a variety of other rule violations, they could get 
more points and go to maximum security? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then, over time, if they behaved and did certain things, they could 
lose points and ultimately go to minimum custody? 
A. Yes, those points - detention points would fall off after a year. 
(Tr., p. 4911, Ls. 6-15) The prosecutor asked about conditions at minimum secured 
facilities, and elicited that inmates at those facilities can work on "fire fighting crews [] 
14 This information alone is incorrect. According to IDOC, there are at least 5 levels of 
custody. (Exhibit 13.) (IDOC Offender Classification). Furthermore, Mr. Dean's claims 
or implications that classifications are based on purely "objective" criteria are false. ( Tr., 
p. 4907, Ls. 9-10) (Exhibit 14.) Petitioner does not at this time have access to all of the 
necessary IDOC policies, nor does Petitioner have access to the "IDOC Male Offender 
Custody Classification User Manual," but will request those policies and manual in an 
amended discovery motion if not voluntarily disclosed by the IDOC. 
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that work out of that facility," can work on "road crews," "have the opportunity to work 
outside," have access to "a therapeutic community," and can attend classes." (Tr., p. 
4915, Ls. 9-25) This examination was designed to deliberately mislead the jury into 
believing that Petitioner would be eligible for minimum security despite first degree 
murder, rape, and kidnapping convictions, using the assumption that the Petitioner would 
receive a life without parole sentence. (Tr., p. 4949, L. 22- p. 4950, L. 8.) 
The State did finally elicit testimony on redirect examination that Petitioner 
would not be eligible for minimum custody under the current IDOC classification system. 
However, the State immediately pointed out that the classification system is not state law, 
but merely IDOC policy, and that "from time to time points and classifications have to 
change based on prison populations and crowding and various like that." (Tr., p. 4950, 
Ls. 4-7) It is improper to rely on speculative future housing policy changes to obtain a 
sentence of death. Overall, the State left the jurors with the overwhelming, and incorrect, 
impression that Petitioner could be eligible to live in a minimum secured facility at some 
point, which is not the case. The prejudice was especially acute because the State drew 
attention to the fact that Petitioner's escape in 1994 was from a minimum secured 
facility. (Tr., p. 4920, Ls. 18-25.) 
The State also improperly and prejudicially implied that Petitioner would 
eventually be housed in "country-club-like" conditions. Mr. Dean testified that the 
medium secured facility was "like a little town," "something like a college campus," with 
a gymnasium, dining room, chapel, where inmates could go to work, play at the ball field, 
earn wages, attend college classes, and live in a therapeutic environment. (Tr., p. 4913, 
L.18 - p. 4915, L. 6.) According to the IDOC Directive 303.02.01.001, however, 
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST -CONVICTION RELIEF 41 
001.95 
"medium custody" offenders "shall be held within the confines of a secure perimeter," 
movement "shall be structured and monitored," and inmates "shall normally be under 
continuous armed staff supervision and in restraints" whenever outside the facility. The 
moc medium security facility is surrounded by multiple layers of razor wire, attack 
dogs, and armed guards. 15 The State's presentation of Petitioner's "conditions of 
confinement" if sentenced to life without parole is extremely misleading, irrelevant to the 
jury's sentencing determination, and highly prejudicial in that it encouraged the jury to 
make its sentencing determination based on improper, irrelevant, and incorrect 
information. There is a reasonable likelihood that the false and misleading testimony 
could have affected the judgment of the jury. 
2. The Prosecutor Deliberately Created The Materially False Impression 
That Petitioner Seriously Choked Evelyn Dunaway While Engaging In 
Sexual Intercourse. 
The State argued at sentencing that Petitioner's history with girlfriends and other 
women established his propensity to commit murder. In support of its propensity theory, 
the State called Petitioner's former girlfriend, Evelyn Dunaway, to testify. The State's 
questioning of Ms. Dunaway was materially misleading and unduly prejudiciaL 
The State's examination of Ms. Dunaway was designed to and did leave the 
impression that Petitioner seriously choked Ms. Dunaway while having sexual 
intercourse with her: 
Q. Okay. Would that have been in March of2002? 
A. Possibly. 
15 Through discovery, Petitioner intends to offer further evidence of the lack of decent 
conditions, lack of programming, lack of exercise, lack of job training, and the 
unlikelihood that Petitioner will ever be assigned to medium custody. 
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Q. All right. Was that the end of the relationship then? 
A. It was. 
Q. Okay. Was there another time before that when Erick choked you with 
his hands? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where did that take place? 
A. In our bedroom. 
Q. At that same trailer? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why was he mad at you that day? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Okay. How serious was the choking? Was it--
A. It was serious. 
Q. Tell us what happened, that you remember? 
A. There was a couple times -- I don't remember. 
Q. Was it bad enough to scare you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I mean did he come up from behind you, or sit on you, or how did it 
work? 
A. He would sit on me. 
Q. I just need to ask you one other area, Evelyn, that I don't care to ask 
you but I need to anyway. While you were living there with him in the 
trailer for those months did you have a sexual relationship with him? 
A. We did. 
Q. I just need to know kind of in terms of frequency. Was -- how often 
was there sexual intercourse between you? 
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A. Daily. 
Q. Was it sometimes more than daily? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was that of your -- of your instigation or his? Did he want sex --
A. Sometimes both but more him. 
(Tr., p. 4846, L. 1 - p. 4947, L. 16)(emphasis added). 
Given that the victim, Lynn Henneman, was purportedly raped and choked to 
death, the connection the State wished the jury to infer is obvious: Petitioner has a 
propensity for choking women while having sex. However, Ms. Dunaway never testified 
that Petitioner choked her while having sex. Rather, the prosecutor deliberately asked 
questions in such a way that the jurors would naturally make the connection between 
sexual intercourse and choking, despite the fact that he was inquiring about two separate 
areas. (Tr., p. 4847, L. 2 (informing the witness that they were now transitioning to a 
different area of questioning).) Indeed, in Petitioner's reinvestigation of the case, Ms. 
Dunaway has confirmed that Petitioner never choked her while having sex. (Exhibit 15.) 
There is a reasonable likelihood that the false and misleading testimony could 
have affected the judgment of the jury. 
3. The Prosecutor Deliberately Created The Materially False Impression 
That Petitioner Choked Michelle Deen While Engaging In Forcible 
Sexual Intercourse. 
In further support of its propensity theory, the State called Petitioner's former 
girlfriend, Michelle Deen, to testify. As with Ms. Dunaway, the State's questioning of 
Ms. Deen was materially misleading and highly prejudicial to Petitioner. 
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The State's examination of Ms. Deen was designed to and did leave the impression 
that Petitioner choked Ms. Dunaway while having forcible sexual intercourse with her: 
Q. Now, I hate to be indelicate and I -- but I told you I was going to have 
to be some and so I need to ask you about your sexual relationship with 
the defendant. 
Who decided when and where and how and such as that in terms of 
when you were going to have sexual relations? 
A. Erick did. 
Q. And how did he decide that, I mean, and how did he convey that to 
you? 
A. It just pretty much when he wanted it, it was right then and there. 
Q. Did it matter if you said no? 
A. It didn't matter. 
Q. If you did say no, what would happen? 
A. It would still happen. It would be pretty much take my clothes off and 
have sex. 
Q. Did he ever have to use force on you to get you-
A. He's a very strong man. I couldn't fight Erick back if I wanted to. 
Q. Did there come a point when, you know, August when he put you in a 
headlock over something that had come up? 
A. He put me in a headlock, and I can't remember the situation why he 
put me in a headlock. He had me in a headlock on the couch and he told 
me that if I yelled or moved that all he had to do was to twist my neck and 
he could kill me. And he told me not to tell nobody about this, about our 
situation or he'd kill me. 
Q. Okay. How hard did he squeeze? 
A. It was very forceful. It hurt really bad. I couldn't move. I was too 
scared. 
Q. Did -- (brief delay.) Did it interfere with your breathing? 
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST -CONVICTION RELIEF 60199 
A. I couldn't breathe that well after he did it. You know, during the time 
he did it it was hard for me to breathe and I didn't want to move or say 
anything, because I didn't want to die. 
Q. Okay, now. When you -- after this all happened, did you decide to 
leave? 
A. Yes, I did. Erick went to bed -- we went to bed one night, he got 
sound to sleep and I snuck out and left. 
(Tr., p. 4820, L. 22 - p. 4822, L.16). The prosecutor thus "linked" sexual intercourse and 
choking. The witness never testified that Petitioner choked her during sex, yet the 
prosecutor's questioning was designed to connect sexual activity with force. Given that 
the victim, Lynn Henneman, was purportedly raped and choked prior to her death, the 
connection the State wished the jury to infer is obvious. There can be no doubt that the 
erroneous conclusion the prosecutor calculated jurors would draw was material, given the 
allegations about the manner of Ms. Henneman's death. 
4. The Prosecutor Elicited Materially False Testimony From Norma Jean 
Oliver. 
In support of its propensity argument, the State relied heavily upon allegations 
that Petitioner forcibly raped Norma Jean Oliver in 1991. Petitioner was originally 
charged with two counts of forcible anal and vaginal rape of Ms. Oliver. (Exhibit 3.) 
Subsequently, the anal rape charge was dropped, and the forcible vaginal charge was 
amended to statutory vaginal rape. (Exhibit 4.) Petitioner pled guilty to vaginal statutory 
rape. During Ms. Oliver's testimony at the sentencing trial in the instant homicide case, 
the State repeatedly elicited materially false testimony regarding the 1991 rape case. 
First, the State elicited testimony it the State itself had not found credible when it 
elicited testimony from Ms. Oliver suggesting that Petitioner had anally raped her in 
December 1991. (Tr., p. 4767, Ls. 5-7 ("[h]e started having anal sex with me and I told 
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